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For the nearly three decades of coexistence between economic liberalization
and political authoritarianism, China remains as an anomaly to the liberal mantra of
our time. This project explores a segment of the China Paradox, the state-society
interaction channeled by the Residents Committee. Being the largest urban
neighborhood organization, the committee deserves study because of its controversial
status interlaid between ordinary residents it claims to represent and the authoritarian
state. The committee enters the discourse as a directly congruent example of the same
paradox that the whole China displays, when it is endowed with important, yet
tension-changed statutory functions ranging from social control to service provision
and neighborhood self-governance. How, and under what conditions, does the
committee carry out its functions? What can be learned about changing state-society
relations from the dynamics of neighborhood politics in China?
This project draws its analytical framework on the theoretical models of state
penetration, civil disobedience, corporatism, and synergy, as well as on the practices
of American, Cuban, and Japanese neighborhood organizations and the Chinese rural
Villagers Committee. The research is designed as a comparative study over four
distinctive Residents Committees in Tianjin City. Being a fulltime fellow worker for

five months, I have accumulated in-depth information about the committees through
daily observation, extensive interviews, and intensive documentation.
The four committees’ functions are identified and explained primarily through
their structural connections with the lowest state organ in cities, the street office, and
residents (including other neighborhood organizations and activists). The study
reveals multiple possibilities of Chinese social/political transformation. Among them
emerges a promising trend of state-society cooperation, which is realigning and
accommodating political authoritarianism and economic openness into a seemingly
sustainable pattern of development at the urban grassroots. Referred to as an
“amphibian” organization spanning public-private division, the committee highlights
the limits of the state-society antithesis in the study of political transformation. The
observed patterns of neighborhood politics also raise caution against the universal
applicability of the liberal norm of civil society to countries like China with
distinctive conditions from which the original norm is present and constructed.
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Introduction
China’s Residents Committee
Linking the State with Ordinary Residents
Chapter One

Prologue
The Dejia Community does not appear to be strikingly different from
hundreds and thousands of other urban communities in China. Roughly 4,500
residents live in this warm but clean and comfortable neighborhood, located in the
heart of the metropolitan Tianjin City. Most of the adults rush out of the
neighborhood for work at dawn, leaving this cluster of six-floored concrete-brick
mixing apartment buildings quiet and even a little dreary. On the northwest side of
the community sits a line of freestanding one-floored buildings. The organization
occupying these buildings is the Dejia Residents Committee, which is for all intents
and purposes in control of the community.
We have complained about this issue many times to the city and district
leaders as well as the related governmental sections. No results! Therefore,
being the representative of all Dejia residents, our committee is formally
seeking help from you, the People's Congress of Tianjin City as the highest
authority in our city. Please put our accusation into your propositions and
discuss it in your coming annual meeting. We earnestly trust that you
representatives will bring justice back to our community.
This is an excerpt from a letter sent by the committee to the People's Congress
of Tianjin City on December 12, 2003. In the letter, the committee accused its backfence neighbor, the No.1 Rest House of Tianjin City, of infringing upon the interests
1

of the committee. The No. 1 Rest House is a luxurious villa specially prepared for the
most senior national and foreign leaders when they visit Tianjin City. The facility is a
military forbidden zone. Local residents call it “the Camp David of Tianjin City.”
The dispute started in 2003 when the Rest House facility installed a huge
boiler near the bounding wall that separates it from the Dejia Community. The boiler
is located just 14 meters away from the four nearest Dejia residential buildings—
numbers 65, 66, 67, and 68. The residents began complaining about the low
frequency rumbling and the exhaust pollution emitted from the boiler immediately
after it had been finished. They worried about not only the damage to their health, but
also the devaluation of their private property as the result of the pollution. Some even
called the boiler a “time bomb.” Representing its constituents, the committee
attempted several times to negotiate with the facility. However, the facility manager
never bothered talking with the committee. Indeed, the facility even prohibited the
committee members from entering its compound to check the boiler in the name of
security. That was not an uncommon result in China, since no one would question the
facility’s authority and legitimacy over a no-ranking and unofficial residential
organization.
However, what makes the story interesting is the persistence of the committee
in its accusations. First, it asked help from the street office, but the office refused to
back the committee. The reasons were simple. First, the administrative rank of the
facility is much higher than the rank of the street office in the Chinese administrative
hierarchy. More importantly, the facility is a security station, an “independent
2

kingdom” beyond the control of regular administration. The office believed that the
fight with the facility was helpless, and tried persuading the committee to back down
on this issue. It even warned the committee of the potential consequences for both
residents and the committee if the dispute was scaled-up to higher levels of
administration. The committee defied the warning, however, and went up to the
district and, later, to the city government. After receiving similar rejections, the
committee sued the facility but the district court refused to accept the case. Finally,
the committee sent the letter to the People's Congress of Tianjin City for help, and
then sent a similar letter to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference of
Tianjin City two days later.
Eventually the committee’s perseverance harvested some results. The Tianjin
City Planning and Land Resource Bureau and the Environmental Protection Bureau
of Hexi District Government together ruled that the boiler was a non-sanctioned
illegal construction, and its emission exceeded the national environmental standard.
Leaving aside the detail of how the irresponsible government sector was punished and
residents were compensated, the committee’s action itself raises some interesting
questions about the nature of its organization and its interactions with the state and
ordinary residents. What is the Residents Committee? How could it win a concession
from a powerful piece of the state? How frequent are such concessions? What can we
learn about grassroots state-society relations in contemporary China from the
organization?

3

Residents Committee: A Chinese “Parallel Polis?”
The Dejia Residents Committee is only one of 1,115 Residents Committees in
Tianjin City (Tianjin Statistical Yearbook, 2003). They together constitute the lowesttiered but largest social network existing between the state and ordinary residents in
the city. Each committee has between three and nine full time members, and they are
often middle-aged or elderly women handpicked by local governments. A committee
is usually in charge of a variety of issues that affect several thousand urban residents.
According to the Chinese Constitution (1982), the committee is the only grassroots
organization that is legally recognized within urban communities. It is supposed to be
self-governing body that is elected by and is accountable to ordinary residents. The
Constitution also guarantees it an independent legal status, protecting its operations
from outside infringement by the state or other organizations.
The Dejia Residents Committee’s action against the No. 1 Rest House of
Tianjin City followed its legal obligation precisely. It played the leading role by
representing the best interests of its constituents. Such an activity is reminiscent of
success stories from former East European communist countries where disobedient
civil societies organized at the grassroots level, competed with, and eventually won
over the penetrative states that governed over them.
Indeed, it is not hard to find some similarities between the Dejia Residents
Committee and the initial stages of the Polish Solidarity movement. Both cases
present observers with grassroots organizations that effectively organized and led
their constituents to engage in a silent nonetheless resilient battle against the abusive
4

states. Even the fighting strategy that the committee adopted is close to the East
European model; that is, by promoting legitimate opposition rather than vociferous
confrontation when the state’s power was asymmetrically stronger.
The committee’s director, Ms. Li Lan, told me that she had stood firmly to a
principle from the beginning: solving the dispute by appealing only to legal means.
She believed that any non-peaceful resistance would do nothing but ruin the
legitimacy of the committee’s accusation. When the court refused to accept the case,
Ms. Li tried hard persuading a few angry residents not to block the entrance of the
facility, protest on the street or in the front of the city government building, and even
go to Beijing to appeal. Her decision finally proved appropriate.
Given these similarities, does the Residents Committee represent a genuine
transition at the grassroots level that someday in the future it might lead up to
democratization of China? I.e., is the organization a potential “parallel polis,” similar
to those dissent organizations in Eastern European communist countries?
When this first story about the Dejia Residents Committee is told, many
would raise this Eastern European analogy as I did when I first read the documents.
The analogy is alluring as we live in the age when “history” is supposed to end with
the liberal mantra (Fukuyama, 1992). Dictatorship should be torn down according to
the sentiment of the mantra, and democracy and liberty must prevail. Any activity
like that described above as undertaken by an organization like the Dejia Residents
Committee should raise curiosity about the possibility of a bottom-up liberalization in
the largest remaining communist country on this planet.
5

This liberal mantra, not surprisingly, has already had a significant ripple effect
on the study of the state-society relations in China. Many China observers, inspired
by the effective explanatory power of the liberal concept, and perhaps more
encouraged by the triumph in East Europe, have attempted either to prove or discover
the universal value of the mantra and its indicated path in Chinese context.
Typical examples of these sorts of effort can be found in studies of the
Chinese rural institutional counterpart to the urban Residents Committee, the
Villagers Committee. Figure 1-1 shows the great similarities between the two
institutions. While the Villagers Committee serves as the link between peasants and
the state in rural areas, the Residents Committee has essentially the same legal status
in cities. Both institutions are defined in the Constitution as “grassroots mass selfgoverning organizations” with similar structures and statutory functions.
The Villagers Committee started attracting the interest of researchers in the
late 1980s when the mechanism of direct election was adopted in some villages.
Despite some serious reservations about the authenticity of the democratic elections
in the Villagers Committees (Kennedy, 2002; O’Brien and Li, 2000), the literature
enthusiastically suggests that the organization represents a genuine path to grassroots
democracy and the eventual democratization of Chinese politics (Bai, 1997; Carter
Center Delegation Report, 1997, 1998; Epstein, 1997; International Republican
Institute, 1994, 1997; Oi and Rozelle, 2000; Pastor and Tan, 2000; Shi, 1999; Wang,
2001; Wang, 1997). The practice of the Villagers Committee at the rural grassroots is
described as “a definite step forward in the nation’s delicate move toward a more
6

democratic government” (Institute for Rural Development, 1994, p. 1). As Wang
(1997, p. 1440) argues, “The active participation of eight hundred million of Chinese
peasants at every level of elections will become an irresistible force to reconstitute the
state from below.” As a result, he continues, “the Chinese case shows that the
democratic wave can flourish first in rural areas” (Wang, 1997, p. 1440).
The studies on the Villagers Committee identify it as an important selfgoverning entity for rural peasants to “shield themselves against the encroachments of
local government and to protect their legal rights and properties” (Wang, 1997, p.
1440). Coordinately, the Dejia Residents Committee was engaged in exactly this
same sort of activity in the above-relayed story. If the Villagers Committee is the
hope of democratization for rural China, what is about the Residents Committee for
cities? Given the same legal nature between the two grassroots organizations, would
it be possible that the Residents Committee follows its rural cousin in changing the
political establishment from the below? Such an analogy is indeed not baseless if the
broad context of Chinese economic reform is brought into picture.

7

Figure 1-1: The Formal Governing Structure in China 1
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There are four cities directly under the control of the central government. There are also few
provinces that directly control their counties, such as Jiangsu Province.
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Urban Crisis: Economic Reform and Governability
Lipset (1959) once empirically tested for a positive correlation between
economic development and democracy. Ever since then, this correlation has been
treated as a holy ordinance, even though it is sometimes labeled as being economic
determinism and linearity (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Przeworski and Limongi,
1997). According to the theory, economic growth increases the desire and capability
of people to participate in decision-making processes, which in turn facilitates
democratization. This economic theory proposes at least three social and political
changes as the result of economic development. First, ordinary people become more
interested in influencing governmental decision-making process since economic
growth increases state-individual interactions. Second, economic development alters
the stratification of the population and creates a dominant middle class. Finally,
increases in personal wealth change people’s political orientations towards a more
open system (Weiner, 1971; Nie and Prewitt, 1969).
This economic-political tandem relationship underlies many contemporary
Chinese state-society studies, which suggests that economic reform will facilitate, if
not cause, democracy to Chinese society sooner or later (White, 1993a). In fact,
nearly all observers who praise the democratic progress in rural China have based
their arguments on the fact of China’s rapid economic development situation either
explicitly or implicitly, regardless of their detail arguments. It is argued that crisis of
rural governance, as a result of economic liberalization, has forced the state to accept
democratization in rural villages (Shi, 1999). Now, if economic development created
9

a crisis that triggered democratic transition in rural China, as the liberal scholars
believe, what is the situation in cities, where deeper crisis occurs as more profound
economic reform measures are taken?
The Danwei System – The Traditional Urban Control Cornerstone
Cities once were safe boxes in China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
imposed a Soviet-style planned system to manage the economy after it took power in
1949. The state monopolized all social resources, which made it possible to deeply
penetrate urban society through direct control over not only production resources, but
also living resources, such as food, employment, housing, social welfare, and
education. In this totalitarian system, politics, economy, and social life were very
much intertwined and the state became the axle that commanded essentially
everything in the society. In order to match this centralized economic basis in cities,
the CCP created a tightly controlled network, “the working unit system” [the danwei
system] (Lu and Perry, 1997). Besides serving as the basic economic unit for the
state-owned economy, the danwei was also the cornerstone for social and political
control in cities. All danwei were subordinated to various levels of government, and
urban residents were subordinated to various danwei. A danwei managed nearly all
aspects of its employees’ lives (including their families) from the cradle to the grave.
This was a system where urban society was deeply embedded into the state’s political
will. If the society was a big “honeycomb,” as Shue (1988) characterized, each
danwei formulated an independent and closed cell. Each individual was slotted into a
small cell. He or she became a “danwei person” [danwei ren] rather than a “social
10

person” [shehui ren], when most of his or her needs depended upon his or her danwei.
Therefore, the society was sliced into millions of largely isolated danwei. Each
danwei existed under the shadow of the state, and each individual was a danwei’s
dependent.
This system was a highly effective control system, and fit well into the
Chinese planned economy. The state had successfully managed cities utilizing it until
the Dengist economic reforms were adopted in the late 1970s.
Crisis of Urban Governance
Deng Xiaoping, the principal architect of Chinese economic reform, inherited
a massive and sluggish stated-owned economy on the brink of collapse when he took
charge of China in 1978. He then initiated a fundamental reform in economic area:
gradually transforming the planned economy into a market economy. Nearly three
decades later, a few question the achievements of the Chinese economy. With nearly
the highest growth rate in the world over the period, China has become the sixth
largest economic entity in the world (the second if using purchasing parity value), and
it has since been more or less fully integrated into the world economic system.
However, under the aureole of its rapid economic growth, the urban governing
structure has been dragged down into an unprecedented crisis. The danwei system,
upon which the state relied for social and political control, is rapidly dissolving as the
effects of economic reform affect the Chinese social system and politics.
In line with the Dengist reforms, the state has gradually retreated from being
involved with direct production activities. It pushes its formerly owned danwei to
11

face market competition. Since the market economy is built upon the profit-seeking
motive, the danwei has had to peel off its non-economic responsibilities like
providing housing, medical services, child schooling, and social security to its
employees. As a result, the trinity of state-danwei-urban residents has been dissolved
from both directions (Croll, 1999).
Economic reform has also created new types of working units that have little
connection with the state. State-owned employees constituted only less than thirty
percent of total urban employment in China in 2002 (Table 1-1).
Table 1-1: China Urban Employment Personnel (1999-2002)
(10,000 persons)

Urban employed persons (Total)
State-owned units
Urban collective-owned units
Cooperative units
Joint ownership units
Limited liability corporations
Share-holding corporations Ltd.
Private enterprises
Units with funds from Hong Kong, Macro, &
Taiwan
Foreign funded units
Self-employed units

1999 2000 2001 2002
22412 23151 23940 24780
8572 8102 7640
7163
1712 1499 1291
1122
144
155
153
161
46
42
45
45
603
687
841
1083
420
457
483
538
1053 1268 1527
1999
306
310
326
367
306
2414

332
2136

345
2131

391
2269

Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2003.

That number has particular political significance from an historical
perspective: just thirty years ago a vast majority of urban employees worked for stateowned units. More interestingly, the number of people working in private enterprises
and so called limited liability corporations doubled in just four years between 1999
and 2002, which reflects the rapid pace of privatization in China.
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Table 1-2 shows a more dynamic trend of employment composition in Tianjin
City. In 1978, seventy-seven percent of employees worked in the state-owned system.
Today, that number has dropped to forty-six percent. 2 In contrast, the number of
employees in “other ownership” and “private and individual” sectors skyrocketed
after 1993. 3 Before that, they constituted a negligible part of the total work force in
the city.
The national level data and the data in Tianjin City both suggest a simple fact:
the majority of urban residents no longer directly rely upon the state for their living
resources. Economic independence implies more personal freedom from the state. As
the traditional danwei becomes no more than a purely economic entity, the state is
losing its most powerful means of control over the urban society in the reform era.
Even those who still work in state-owned units have much weaker ties with the state,
since those remaining state-owned units, like their private competitors, are primarily
concerned with making profit. Indeed, people often find that non-state sectors are
more attractive, especially for young Chinese. For example, an average state-owed
unit worker received only seventy-one percent of income that a foreign funded unit
worker did in 2002 (China Statistical Yearbook, 2003).

2

The percentage of state-owned employees among total employees in Tianjin City is higher than the
national level, because it was one of the selected cities in which the state had heavily invested during
the pre-reform era.
3
1993 is the year when China decided to recommitted to the economic reform process after the chilly
stagnation after the 1989 student event. Since then, Chinese private economy has entered rapid track of
growth.
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Table 1-2: Tianjin City Urban Employment Personnel (1978-2002)
(10,000 persons)

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

CollectiveOther
Private and
Total urban State-Owned
owned
Ownership
Individual
employment Employment Employment
employment employment
217.5
168.3
49.1
0.1
230.34
178.2
52.04
0.1
243.59
188.08
54.61
0.9
255
194.02
59.88
1.1
262.02
198.91
61.61
1.5
270.33
201.27
66.96
2.1
276.39
201.29
71.42
0.98
2.7
281.08
205.26
69.71
1.51
4.6
284.5
209.97
68.47
1.76
4.3
286.63
212.1
66.89
2.54
5.1
286.64
213.99
64.33
3.04
5.28
289.91
217.32
63.45
3.61
5.53
290.01
217.26
62.55
4.5
5.7
300.58
219.34
66.17
6.05
9.02
303.7
212.73
72.39
8.85
9.73
312.7
210.9
75.5
16.3
10
318.6
206.5
71.4
24.4
16.3
319.8
202.1
68.4
29.2
20.1
317.1
199.1
62.8
31
24.2
318.6
196.16
58.19
35.8
28.45
312.65
183.49
53
41.58
34.58
313.89
176.54
47.54
49.8
40.01
296.61
163.84
40.58
55.37
36.82
295.37
153.25
32.13
60.94
49.05
295.71
137.81
26.6
82.54
48.76

Source: Tianjin City Statistical Yearbook, 2003.

The dissolution of the danwei system has been accompanied by demographic
change, which aggravates the crisis in urban governance. Economic growth creates a
huge demand for cheap wage labor, which in turn breaks down the traditional
segregation between the urban and rural sectors. In order to control urban residents
and peasants, peasants were largely prohibited from entering cities without the state’s
permission before the mid-1980s. However, nearly 110 million peasants have filed
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into almost every corner of Chinese cities today (People’s Daily, 2002). 4 A nation
wide survey conducted in 1997 shows that an average urban community contains
about 115 officially registered temporary peasants. That does not include more
unregistered “black” peasants (Liu and Lu, 1997, p. 194). 5 Nowadays, more than one
in ten urban residents are registered as peasants in the average Chinese city, and the
number is even higher in major cities (Solinger, 1995, p. 128).
While this flood of “floating population” has made the Chinese economic
take-off possible, it also has posed tremendous challenges to the state’s capacity for
political control. The Chinese government and ordinary urban residents once referred
to the members of this population as “mangliu,” vagrants who wander aimlessly,
begging, stealing, gambling, and working in prostitution (Li and Hu, 1991, p. 22). In
many ways, the members of this demographic are the most rebellious population in
China since they are young but have almost no stable interest connection with the
cities where they live. In Chinese history, the “floating population” has subverted
many regimes, including the Nationalist Regime (1911-1949 in mainland China, fled
to Taiwan later), and the CCP is acutely aware of this fact of history. To some extent,
controlling the “floating population” along the economic liberalization has become
the most urgent problem for urban social stability (Jiang and Lu, 1997).
Besides the dissolution of the danwei system and floating population, cities
are also paying increasingly higher price for losing social justice and equality.
4

People’s Daily is the official newspaper managed by the Propaganda Bureau of the CCP Central
Committee.
5
A person living in cities without proper documents and permissions is considered illegal and he/she
will be fined and deported by public security organs.
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Mounting social problems are swelling in the reform era, such as unemployment
(Muo, 2000), enlarging the marginal classes (Khan and Riskin, 1998; Solinger, 1996),
crime (Tanner, 2004), moral decay (Bakken, 1999), and environmental deterioration
(Economy, 2004). Just a few cases can illustrate the pace and intensity of these
problems. For example, urban unemployment in Tianjin City multiplied by 38 times
in just seven years from 1996 to 2002 (Table 1-3).
Table 1-3: Official Urban Unemployment Rate of Tianjin City (1996-2002)
Year
Urban unemployment rate (%)
1996
0.37
1997
1.57
1998
4.71
1999
7.02
2000
13.52
2001
14.05
2002
14.30
Source: calculated from Table 2-15 in Tianjin City Statistical Year Book, 2003.

The nationwide number of offense cases against public order accepted or
investigated by public security organs jumped ninety percent and seventy-five percent
respectively from 1995 to 2002 (Table 1-4 and Table1-5). 6 Perhaps there is no better
word than ‘shocking’ to describe the severity of social problems in Chinese cities.
These problems threaten not only the confidence of ordinary Chinese on the rightness
of economic reform, but also the legitimacy of the regime day by day (He, 1993). For
example, Tang finds that “dissatisfaction with the pace of economic change reached
an historic and ultimately volatile high in 1989, and by 1999, dissatisfaction was even

6

One of the most rapid growing and largest type of public order offenses is “Violating Regulations on
Management of Residence or Identity.” Those regulations target primarily on floating population. The
violations show the scale of floating population.
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higher, although the political situation was supposedly more stable” (Tang, 2001, p.
906) 7
Table 1-4: Offense Cases Against Public Order Accepted by Public Security
Organs (1995-2002) 8
Unit: Case
Number of Cases Accepted to Be Treated
Total

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

3289760 3363636 3227669 3232113 3356083 4437417 5713934 6232350

Disturbing Work or Public Order

332120 381035 330886 300201 268747 272113 413042 544363

Gang Fighting or Picking Quarrels and Making Troubles

84588

86626

90233

99050 103178 135930 154016 147307

Acting Indecently Towards Women

63220

63808

53976

41294

34192

32341

33063

27468

Obstructing the Government Workers to Perform Their Duty

45999

48686

45998

45971

47640

50490

56163

51917

Violating Regulations on Management of Firearms

23070

55019

35461

26234

24734

26456

59729

19052

Violating Regulations on Management of Explosives

26883

33475

35114

34912

49304

62819

88614

71606

Beating Other Body

503283 511716 537455 568438 576712 837778 1053191 1135896

Robbing Other People of Their Valuables

729707 620202 515110 528818 517277 732633 915240 1001965

Defrauding, Snatching or Extorting and Racketeering Valuables

93471

89405

78257

86537

5821

5525

4970

4859

4529

Intentionally Damaging Public or Private Valuables

48737

50221

49779

53033

54492

82159 107066 117672

Forging and Fraudulently Selling Bills or Certificates

43318

41224

29700

26119

23075

18131

18205

16656

Disturbing Public Order

13061

11011

10945

9000

10134

17539

12826

11275

Making Stirs and Then Robbing Public or Private Valuables

90494 117594 141194 150620
6048

6888

6007

Prostitution or Going Whoring

186661 210724 210390 189972 216660 225693 242053 224976

Gambling

433831 441929 417784 365221 382272 413846 463218 446654

Violating Regulations on Management of Residence or Identity

197808 218338 217676 268537 306111 561719 759048 899068

Others

458182 494692 563935 583917 646532 844128 1190378 1359848

Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China, 1996-2003.

7

Tang (2001) also finds that, people considered themselves worse off in 1999 than they did in 1989 in
two key areas, income and job opportunities.
8
The table does not include (1) criminal cases, and (2) the offense cases handled by non-public
security organs, such as the Residents Committee.
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Table 1-5: Offense Cases Against Public Order Investigated and Treated by
Public Security Organs (1995-2002)
Unit: Case
Number of Cases Investigated and Treated

1995

Total

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2968220 3117623 3003799 2994282 3105940 3823011 4851600 5196998

Disturbing Work or Public Order

330462 378452 322084

298650 267119 264865 406813 534504

Gang Fighting or Picking Quarrels and Making Troubles

81581

83769

87341

95560

98808 121290 134246 126225

Acting Indecently Towards Women

62141

62881

53225

40613

33538

30791

30660

25335

Obstructing the Government Workers to Perform Their Duty

45394

48128

45515

45347

46909

48504

53381

49599

Violating Regulations on Management of Firearms

22730

54773

35271

26047

24434

26081

58353

18699

Violating Regulations on Management of Explosives

26213

33305

34857

34473

48832

61410

86410

70496

Beating Other Body

476254 486295 509924

534990 536009 695294 829360 881592

Robbing Other People of Their Valuables

468437 430375 353804

357360 351066 399436 476997 470116

Defrauding, Snatching or Extorting and Racketeering Valuables

86589

83089

72385

78943

79449

87948

93956

84496

5554

5296

4794

4715

4254

5320

5542

4582

Intentionally Damaging Public or Private Valuables

46670

48377

48081

50513

51465

66250

78898

84051

Forging and Fraudulently Selling Bills or Certificates

43162

41165

29428

26017

22863

17911

17872

16154

Disturbing Public Order

12982

10937

10890

8910

10001

16765

12245

10688

Making Stirs and Then Robbing Public or Private Valuables

Prostitution or Going Whoring

185441 209652 209244

189452 215128 222132 239461 221930

Gambling

431453 439928 415991

363737 379039 402588 455727 438295

Violating Regulations on Management of Residence or Identity

197060 217380 216358

267877 305002 557131 749540 889793

Others

446097 483821 554607

571078 632024 799295 1122139 1270443

Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China, 1996-2003.

The Lumpy State
Economic reform brings unprecedented challenges to urban China. However,
the state is far from ready to cope with them. The old control network, the danwei
system, is fading quickly. The state has to find new ways to manage more
economically and socially liberalized residents, a massive floating population, and
other explosive social problems.
The state’s first instinctive response is to enhance its local bureaucracy to fill
the power vacuums created by economic development. That is why we see a
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paradoxical fact in Chinese administrative reform. In one way, the state promised to
drastically reduce its size by cutting its involvement in direct economic activities.
Ironically however, the size of bureaucracy nearly doubled in the reform era (Tang,
2003). Most of the new positions were added at the local government level. For
example, the Pudong Street Office, the lowest administrative unit above the earliermentioned Dejia Residents Committee, saw its official personnel expand from seven
employees in the 1970s to roughly two hundred today. This does not include another
three hundred temporary employees that also work for the office. A simple
calculation illustrates how the expansion in the number of local officials has become
a huge burden on the state’s fiscal resources. 9
To make things worse, China has entered a period of rapid urbanization. The
Chinese urban population increased from 172 million in 1978 to 481 million in 2001
while the number of urban districts nearly doubled from 467 to 830 (China Statistical
Yearbooks, various years). It is predicted that the urban population would reach 630
million by 2010, which means more peasants moving into cities, more numbers of
cities, and larger size of cities (Qin, 1998, p. 16). All of these changes will further
stretch the already tight government budget. Relying on additional bureaucratic
expansion to manage cities is just fiscally unsustainable.
In addition, the swelled local governments have become increasingly
inefficient in the handling of diverse and complex issues in city management, largely
9

Tianjin City has 99 street offices by 2002. If each street office has 200 employees at 2500 yuan per
month salary level, the payroll only would be nearly 600 million yuan, 3.4 percent of total revenue
(17.1 billion yuan in 2002) of the whole city. If we include the operating costs and the costs of their
temporary employees, that percentage would be much higher. Data from Tianjin City Statistical
Yearbook 2003.
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due to the hierarchical nature of the bureaucracy (Xu and Cheng, 2002, p. 18). The
excessive expansion of local bureaucracy has become a seedbed for corruption. There
is a vast amount of literature describing the power-related corruption in the reform era
(Cai, 2003; Gong, 2002; Guo and Hu, 2004). Even the former General Secretary of
the CCP, Jiang Zemin, has publicly admitted in the 15th National Congress in 1997
that bureaucratic corruption is rampant and still growing bigger (People’s Daily
[Oversea edition], 1997b). Jiang has also publicly warned the CCP that bureaucratic
and cadre corruption is the number one issue that threatens the ruling status of the
CCP as it continues (Ma, 1999). Among all the different manifestations of
bureaucratic corruption, local bureaucrats were responsible for most of them. Since
these crooked officials are close to ordinary citizens, their bad behavior evokes a lot
of social resentment, which is then in turn transferred onto the regime itself. In fact,
the CCP had to discipline a large number of its corrupt cadres, of whom more than
twenty thousand served at urban district and street office level, over sixteen hundred
at the city level, and only seventy-eight at the provincial or ministerial level during
the period from October 1992 to June 1997 (People’s Daily [Oversea edition],
1997a).
Such a wide range of corruption at the local government level confirms Deng
Xiaoping’s worry about the alienation of bureaucratic power and disconnection from
ordinary people. For Deng, the expansion of local governments was not a solution but
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the ultimate root cause of the problems of bureaucratism and corruption (Deng,
1994). 10
Residents Committee Called On
Chinese cities are facing a crisis of governability, and it is clear the lumpy
bureaucracy in cities is not capable of handling these daunting challenges. If local
governments are not the solution, what else can the state do?
Similarly to what it had done in the countryside, the state soon identified the
Residents Committee as the key organization that could replace the danwei system in
cities. Jiang Zemin believed that urban community development (including the
Residents Committee) is “a critically important aspect of the overall mission of
sustaining the Party’s principles, handling the problems of the masses, and solidifying
a micro-basis of the governance” (People’s Daily, 1999). The then Premier Li Peng
pointed out that the Residents Committee “is taking on greater and greater roles in
social life and community construction. As the reform deepens, the function of the
Residents Committee is changed and more and more jobs will fall on its shoulders”
(People’s Daily, 2000b). The current President Hu Jintao also publicly advocated
strengthening the Residents Committee once he admitted the ruling basis of the CCP
was at risk in cities.
The grassroots is the ground of all our work. We must maintain the control
over the grassroots and solidify the basis. … Over the years, our attention on
the grassroots is the countryside and the state-owned enterprises. Now
according to the changing situation, besides continuing the above work, we
must prioritize the urban community construction. This is a work with not
10

Deng’s (1994) very candid discussion about the problems resulting from the bureaucratism and overcentralization of power is in that article.
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only great social and economic meanings, but also critical political meanings
(People’s Daily, 2000a).
It has been rare for the highest leadership in China to talk about urban
organizational problems in such a prominent way, which indicates the fact that there
have been important policy changes regarding the Residents Committee. The crisis of
governability indicates the necessity of changing state-society relations in cities, and
it seems that the Residents Committee is going to be a key element of any solution.
Like reform in rural villages, reform in cities can be characterized as decentralization
from the state. Deng Xiaoping once argued that the only solution that can increase the
efficiency of governance and curb bureaucratism and corruption is to decentralize
power to the hands of ordinary people (Deng, 1994, p. 328). The core of his argument
involves reforming the structure of totalitarian control so as to encourage a
counterbalance between the grassroots and corruptive and inefficient bureaucrats,
although it must be stated that Deng certainly did not see liberal democracy as the
objective of reform. However, loosening control over society has often been believed
to be an important step toward the emergence of a dissenting civil society in Eastern
European communist studies (Lewin, 1998; Weigle and Butterfield, 1992). This view
is echoed by Chinese state-society scholars when they see the state’s retreat from its
economic function as an opportunity for civil society to emerge in China (White,
1993b).
In rural areas, it is the crisis of governability that has forced the state to
empower the Villagers Committee, which in turn has set grassroots democratization
on track (Shi, 1999; Wang, 1997). Nowadays while facing even bigger crises in cities,
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the state has adopted a similar strategy: decentralizing its power to society, including
the Residents Committee. If the Villagers Committee has championed and
exemplified the cause of rural democratization in rural China, what will be the role of
the Residents Committee in its cities? Will it epitomize a similar transformation as
the literature has portrayed the Villagers Committee as doing? Referring to the broad
picture of the liberal mantra, is the Residents Committee a key element of a genuine
civil society, and thus is it the antithesis of the communist state? The story of the
Dejia Residents Committee offers a promising perspective in leading an effort against
the abuses of the state. However, that story is only one aspect of the committee’s
relations with the state and its residential constituents. I found something in its
archives that shows a dramatically different picture of how it connects with the state
and residents.
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Another Facet: The Residents Committee in the Literature
The Spring Festival is coming. We must tighten our neighborhood security in
four areas. First, we must pay attention to monitoring, educating, and assisting
the sensitive persons inside our neighborhood, especially released convicts.
We need man-to-man monitoring: men visiting their homes, talking to them,
and reporting on their unstable thought and behavior; second, we need to keep
on monitoring and correcting Falun Gong practitioners; 11 third, we need to
know fairly well the situation of special groups in our neighborhood; and
finally, we must be careful of those outsiders who live in our neighborhood
and of other floating populations. They are planning to return home as the
Spring Festival comes, and we must be careful to take every precaution and
try to monitor their activities.
This quote comes from the dossier of the comprehensive neighborhood
security meeting convened by the Dejia Residents Committee on January 11, 2002.
The Spring Festival for Chinese is like Christmas for Americans. When every Dejia
resident is geared up for the holiday preparation, the committee also keeps itself busy.
Community security is no doubt its priority, although its plan cited in the dossier is
not necessarily consistent with the priority of the safety of the residents. The
monitoring of residents with criminal records, neighborhood outsiders, or of those
practicing outlawed religion may make the committee suspicious and somewhat
untrustworthy in the eyes of the residents it represents. However, these security
measures are certainly cheered on by the state.
Some of these security measures were primarily the initiatives of the street
office, but were carried out by the committee. The committee convenes such a
security meeting every month, a meeting that includes all of the committee members,
11

The Falun Gong is accused as an evil cult spreading superstition and malicious fallacies to deceive
people, according to the government ruling. It was cracked down soon after thousands of its believers
surrounded the National Administrative Council building, something like the American White House,
in 1999. Since then, practicing Falun Gong is outlawed in China (For more discussion on Falun Gong,
see Danny Schechter (ed.), 2000).
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neighborhood activists, and sometimes the ward police and a few resident
representatives. One major goal in the meeting is to keep all kinds of “unstable
elements” under control.
Neighborhood control is hardly a new challenge for many states. Due to either
the resource limits or the intricate but often trivial nature of neighborhood affairs,
many states rely on neighborhood organizations to mobilize and control the mass
population at the grassroots level. However, the purposes and means of social control
vary from state to state. Perhaps a few could disagree that the security measures
undertaken by the Dejia Residents Committee have gone far beyond the utmost a
resident could bear in Western societies. It reminds us of a well-recognized
neighborhood organization, the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR)
in Cuba.
Fidel Castro created the CDR in 1960 “as a system to mobilize and reeducate
citizens, to publicize official goals and activities, to counter internal and external
campaigns of aggression, and to promote and organize cooperatives, civil defense,
and first-aid projects” (Bunck, 1994, p. 9). As an element of repression, the CDR was
primarily a coercive organization aiming at revolutionary transformation, social
control, and political mobilization (Dominguez, 1978, p. 208).
The security measures adopted by the Dejia Residents Committee could be
associated with what the CDR is doing in Cuba: both help the state extend its
tentacles into the deepest levels of society through peer pressure and neighborhood
surveillance. In looking at the Spring Festival security plan, one can easily see a
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social control network in the Dejia Community organized around the committee. The
committee first takes control orders from the street office and then eventually
implements them inside the community upon the targeted population. Such a
penetrative scenario is consistent not only with the conventional image of China and
its “communist” style of practicing politics, but also with the available literature on
the Residents Committee.
Literature on the Residents Committee
There are a few studies that exist on the Residents Committee, and most of
them date back to pre-reform era (Cohen, 1968; Lieberthal, 1980; Salaff, 1971;
Schurmann, 1968; Townsend, 1967; Vogel, 1971; White, 1971) and the very early
reform period (Benewick, 1991; Clark, 1989; Li and Bachman, 1989; Jankowiak,
1993; Whyte and Parish, 1984; Wu, 2002). Among the available information in the
literature, the committee is portrayed mainly as a social control organization, like the
Cuban CDR. Although its functions in social relief, neighborhood sanitation, and
other non-coercive areas were skimmed through here and there, overall the literature
treats the committee as only significant because it is the coercive state’s little
myrmidon. Whyte and Parish (1984, p. 244) find that the committee plays key roles
in trying to supervise things through the leadership of the street office and the street
police station. Most of the security measures taken by the Dejia Residents Committee
today have their historical roots in the pre-reform China.
The Residents Committee officers, and the security officer in particular,
devote a great deal of attention to keeping track of various kinds of suspect
individuals and families in the neighborhood – individuals under ‘mass
supervision,’ released convicts, people with bad class backgrounds or political
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histories, or simply those suspected of engaging in illicit activities. At times,
some of these ‘negative elements’ have had to regularly report on their
activities and attitudes and even to perform menial labor around the
neighborhood. … Generally during times of disorder or on national holidays
or during the visits of important foreign dignitaries, it is common to have
residents organized to stand guard and patrol and to order certain suspect
individuals in the neighborhoods to stay at home (Whyte and Parish, 1984, pp.
244-245).
Besides specifying how the Residents Committee carried out the social control
function, the literature is also very helpful in establishing a historical basis for
understanding why it was established.
In the pre-reform era, the state dominated cities through the danwei system.
However, the danwei system had cracks: there were urban residents who could not be
absorbed into the controlling purview of any danwei, such as the unemployed,
housewives, and the disabled. In order to fill in the cracks and to bring the abovementioned urban dwellers into the danwei, the Residents Committee was established
since the 1950s (Salaff, 1971). In his report to the CCP Central Committee, Peng
Zhen, a prominent senior leader responsible for public security and legal affairs,
wrote:
Since we are at the beginning of our industrialization and we are still in
transitional period to socialism, there are many street residents who do not
belong to factory, firm, school, and administration in even relatively
industrialized cities. These people even constitute sixty percent of total
population in some cities. In order to organize and gradually transform them
into danwei, and to reduce the burdens of district governments and dispatch
public security units, we suggest establishing Residents Committees, besides
street offices (Peng, 1991, p. 241).
Since the Residents Committee had existed primarily for the purpose of filling
the cracks of the danwei system, its role in social control was not conspicuous,
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compared with the high-profile roles of the more coercive and influential social
control organizations, such as military, political party, public security agencies, and
the danwei in the pre-reform era. That is probably the key reason that the committee
in the pre-reform era was barely studied, as it showed no difference from other more
salient social control organs.
Despite its negligibility, the literature shows that the committee created a
grassroots state-resident relationship that was consistent with what the CDR in Cuba
did: it created a top-down dynamic of state penetration into the cracks of society.
Such a scenario is understandable as there was no way for the committee to behave
differently in a totalitarian system like the pre-reform China (Tsou, 1986). 12
If the security plan of the Dejia Residents Committee fits into the state
penetration literature that is derived primarily from the pre-reform era, the challenge
for the literature is to reevaluate the organization under a very different state-resident
context after nearly three decades of profound economic and social changes. As
Chapter Two will show, the Residents Committee has emerged from being a marginal
player to being the most important “middleman” between the state and ordinary
residents in urban communities today. The state has recognized its critical position
and, therefore, is actively promoting changes in the organization.
In the light of this important policy change, a few studies have yet begun to
address this increasingly important organization. One example, however, of a study
12

Some scholars, such as Shue (1988), argue against the concept of “totalitarianism.” However, even
Shue (1988, p. 17) agrees that most of delays, distortions, and deflections of state’s intention came
from local governments rather than civil society. In the pre-reform era, it was no space for institutions
that were truly independent from the state’s will. Judging from the conditions of civil society,
“totalitarianism” is appropriate to characterize the state’s power and authority in that era.
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that has begun to unpack the committee in light of recent political changes is the
study by Benjamin Read. He finds that the committee plays various important roles in
assisting its residents in some communities, despite its consistent emphasis on
facilitating administration and policing.
It is indeed true that the RCs [Residents Committees] intrude far less into
ordinary people’s lives than they once did, and also that there are significant
obstacles that hinder them from blossoming into models of town-hall
democracy (Read, 2000, pp. 806-807).
Read also focuses on the committee’s attempt to cultivate interpersonal ties
with residents, a pattern called “Administrative Grass-roots Engagement,” and why it
could win cooperation or face resistance from residents (Read, 2003). His researches
clearly articulate a new facet in contrast to the otherwise consistent image of an
unkind and even coercive committee in the usual literature.
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State and Ordinary Residents: A Dilemma for the Residents Committee
The Dejia Residents Committee illustrates some very interesting possibilities
of transformation: it could on the one hand become a defiant civil organization which
leads residents to fight against the abusive state as in the first story; or conversely it
could continue on in its pre-reform role as a power chain that transfers the state’s
control down to ordinary individuals as in the second story. Is the Resident’
Committee a potential challenger to the authoritarian state or a Chinese version of
Cuban CDR? The answers to this question become particularly interesting when the
broad paradox in contemporary China is considered.
Residents Committee and the China Paradox
China is experiencing an economic revolution: it has been replacing its
formerly planned economy with a market economy, it has joined the World Trade
Organization, and it has been promoting an open and competitive economy. While it
took America almost fifty years to double per capita incomes after 1840 and took
Japan thirty-three years to repeat that performance after 1880, China succeeded in
doubling her per capita incomes in only ten years after 1978 (Rohwer, 1997, p. 116).
The economic volume of China is twenty-eight times bigger in 2002 than it was in
1977 (China Statistical Yearbook, 2003). In contrast to her rapid commercialization,
however, China still remains the largest communist state in the world.
The coexistence of rapid economic liberalization and a one-party system for
such a long period of time puzzles the world. The dominant trend worldwide tends to
suggest that the market economy, which is prevailing throughout China, induces
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political democratization. This trend was supported when democratic transitions
occurred in several formerly authoritarian regimes after they actively promoted
economic growth, as in Spain, South Korea, Turkey, Philippines, Thailand, and
Indonesia. The collapse of the former Soviet Union and its East European satellites
further endorses this theory from the opposite direction: the planned economy seems
to have sold itself as a dead-end, which inevitably leads to the demise of the
communist political system. Based on this logic, communist China would soon
become history either due to the stagnation of its planned economic system or to the
economic and social liberation it initiated in its market-oriented reforms. The first
scenario is partially right as the CCP abandoned the dogma of Marxist economic
planning and adopted the principle of the market and free competition. However, the
second scenario still remains a theoretical hypothesis at best. The CCP has
successfully promoted longer economic expansion than most authoritarian countries;
meanwhile, it maintains relatively stable control of the political area. 13 The
continuously growing economy under the CCP’s political monopoly poses an
interesting paradox for the dominant liberal mantra to explain.
“When will China collapse?” The question has been raised repeatedly in the
Western world since China initiated economic reform in the late 1970s. However,
there is no persuasive evidence to suggest that the day will ever come. On the
contrary, the average Chinese citizen increasingly favors political conservatism,

13

For example, a survey over urban residents in six major Chinese cities asked their favorite economic
and political models, 76 percent thought that China should learn from the US economic model, but
only 21 percent agreed with the US political model (for details, see Tang, 2001, p. 902).
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supporting the one party system and a rising sense of nationalism (Tang, 2001). In
addition, the Chinese model has gradually influenced some developing countries from
Africa to Asia, including the remaining communist countries like Vietnam, Cuba, and
North Korea. Even Russia is recovering from its fever for democracy, and sees in its
own potential future convergences with what China is doing now. The experience of
China so far cannot be easily incorporated into the prevailing intellectual discourse,
however. As China keeps on growing, its paradox is becoming a very interesting and
important phenomenon to observe in world politics.
The Dejia Residents Committee is only a tiny piece of the gigantic China
puzzle, but it can enter the discourse as a directly congruent example of the same
paradox that the whole of China is experiencing at present. If the economic reforms
force the Chinese state to strike a delicate balance between its authoritarian control
and the increasingly stratified society, that balancing endeavor has to be absorbed into
any intermediate organization, like the Dejia Residents Committee, as it intensively
interacts with both the authoritarian state and ordinary citizens simultaneously.
As the two stories of this chapter indicate, the Dejia Residents Committee
clearly feels pressure from both sides. In one way, it was under its residents’ pressure
to run after the abusive government. As their representative, it responded to its
constituents’ concerns and fought for the best interest of the community on the
environmental issue, despite the political superiority of its opponent and the “wellmeaning advice” emanating from the street office. Conversely, the security measures
it took indicates the heavy influence it received from the street office to address the
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concerns of the state. The Dejia Residents Committee exists like the insides of a
sandwich, laid between the street office and the residents. It faces a dilemma: it has to
be accountable to its residents and simultaneously responsive to the state. It is
obviously not a simple penetrative organization of the state anymore, since it also
fights hard against the state’s infringement upon the interests of its constituents.
However, to call it “a parallel polis” as this term was used in the Eastern European
communist politics is similarly debatable, since it retains means of social control
rooted in the pre-reform China.
Research Questions
One can trace the root of the dilemma the Dejia Residents Committee is
facing to the tension between the authoritarian state and a stratified society. It is also
the core question in the China Paradox. To a large degree, this is easy to anticipate.
The activities in a Residents Committee should, after all, inevitably reflect the overall
paradoxical state-society situation in contemporary China. If the Dejia Residents
Committee only reflected the interests of its residents or the state, it would not be
such an interesting organization. The challenge for the committee is to take care of
both, and more interestingly, to connect them together.
How does the Dejia Residents Committee interact with both the state and the
residents? Why does it listen to the state in one instance, but defy it on other
occasions to fight for residents’ interests? Intermediated between the state and
residents, how is it able to achieve success one way or another? These are interesting
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questions reflecting not only upon the controversial status of the Residents
Committee, but also on overall state-society relations in China.
Of course, the above two stories only represent a small fraction of the daily
responsibilities of the Dejia Residents Committee. There is much more to be explored
in attempting to figure out how it interacts with both the state and ordinary residents.
For any organization that manages several thousand urban residents must be
politically and socially important, and, therefore, worthy of being explored, and this is
to say nothing of the fact that the total number of Residents Committees in China
exceeds 115,000 (China Statistical Yearbook, 2003). The sheer quantity of them and
the salience of China as a case study in world politics also imply their importance as
objects of study. More importantly, there is no other organization that is so closely
connected with the hundreds of millions of urban Chinese residents, and yet, also
fundamentally crucial for the imperatives of the authoritarian state. Therefore, the
research question in this project is this: How does the Residents Committee interact
with the state and ordinary residents in contemporary China? More specifically, the
project attempts to address three sets of interrelated questions:
1. Being interlaid between the state and ordinary residents, how does the
committee carry out its three statutory functions in urban communities? 14
2. What account for functional similarities and differences across the different
committees?

14

The three statutory functions are: service provision, neighborhood self-governance, and social
control. They will be discussed in the next chapter in details.

34

3. Consequently, what can we learn about state-society interactions at the urban
grassroots level? How does this study contribute to the analytical frameworks
in which Chinese state-society relations are debated? To what extent can
Western-originated prescriptive languages be transplanted to Chinese politics?
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Project Preview
Analytical Framework
The Residents Committee is an underestimated grassroots organization in
Chinese state-society studies. The available literature offers a useful but incomplete
understanding about it in the reform era. In order to have a comparatively meaningful
analysis, my analytical framework needs to go beyond the limited focus of the
literature on the Residents Committee. However, the available literature should be the
starting point. It contributes to the first model I can use to conceptualize the Residents
Committee: the penetrative model. As the literature suggests, a penetrative Residents
Committee, like the Cuban CDR, would behave as merely a tool of the state for the
purpose of control over ordinary residents in its neighborhood. This model is used
regularly to describe the relationship between state and social organizations in the
pre-reform China as well as other totalitarian systems.
In contrast, the literature on former communist countries in Eastern Europe
suggests an opposite model: the civil disobedience model. It is based upon the
prevailing liberal understanding of state-society relations, particularly as regards the
transition of the repressive regimes into ones more exemplary of liberal ideas. It will
emphasize a Polish Solidarity style of a self-governing organization, which could and
would be a key element of urban incipient democracy in contemporary China.
The third model, the corporatist model, is borrowed from the literature of state
corporatism. It would not treat the Residents Committee as only a flunky of the
penetrative state in a closed society, as the penetrative model did. Instead, it focuses
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on the elite complicity at the neighborhood level. The state and the local elite bolster
each other for mutual interests, but largely at the costs of ordinary residents.
The last is a synergistic model. It concentrates on how the state and grassroots
organizations (or individual citizens) foster structural arrangements and reciprocal
interactions so that a cooperative and constructive connection is created for the sake
of grassroots development. It is possible that both the state’s capacity and residents’
interests are enhanced under the synergy, at least in the short term. The synergistic
model is not as neatly cut as the other three models; however, it offers something
different that cannot be easily incorporated into any of the three models.
The four models together construct different prototypes of the Residents
Committee, and their viability is tested when the actual functions of the committee
are explored. This project approaches the committee from its statutory functions. The
Organic Law of Urban Residents Committees has designated three functions to the
committee: social control, service provision, and neighborhood self-governance. Each
function can be further specified into multiple tasks. As the two stories of the Dejia
Residents Committee show, the committee’s functions reflect its distinctive relations
with the state and ordinary residents. Therefore, by closely examining how the three
statutory functions are carried out, the explanatory capacity of the four models could
be tested and the overall state-society relations intermediated through the committee
could be interpreted.
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Research Methods
Four Residents Committees are chosen from Tianjin City for a comparative
case study. Each has its unique features. The Jingtai Residents Committee was
established in 2002 in the Jingtai Community. The community is affluent and
privately owned, with modern high-rise buildings and a beautiful environment in the
downtown Tianjin City. The Huashan Residents Committee is located on the outskirts
of the city. The committee, which was created in the early 1980s, is besieged by all
kinds of problems as the result of deindustrialization. The whole region is depleted as
its major industries, textile and bicycle, are bankrupt.
The other two committees, the Dejia and Shiyan Residents Committees, have
many similarities. Both are located on the same street in the middle of the city. They
were both established in the 1950s and reorganized in the late 1980s. In addition, they
are facing roughly the same composition of middle-class residents. However, at least
one thing differentiates them: the Shiyan Residents Committee spearheaded the first
direct election in Tianjin City in 2003. The direct election in and of itself is worthy of
study.
I spent five months in those committees collecting information. Multiple
methods were employed to access the selected communities. I talked to committee
members, neighborhood activists, ordinary residents, and governmental officials. I
also spent much of my time as a volunteer working together with the committees I
observed. Intensive document review was my daily job, and I was amazed by the
quality of the archives these committees stocked.
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Project Structure
This project proceeds along four sections. The first section lays the foundation
for the project. The section starts with the analytical framework, with a focus on the
relationship between the four ideal models and the Residents Committee’s three
statutory functions. A brief comparison among neighborhood organizations in the
United States, Cuba, Japan, and the Chinese Villagers Committee adds an
international perspective on how state and society are connected differently at the
grassroots level. I also discuss the historical evolution of the Residents Committee
within the broad political context of China.
The methodological section discusses the case selection, access methods to
the field, data collection methods, and the measures taken to protect informants.
The next section delineates the three statutory functions of the Residents
Committee. The discussion is organized between the four committees. In each case,
the ways that each committee carries out its statutory functions is explored and
compared with other committees. At the end of the section the readers should be clear
about the similarities and differences between the four committees.
The last section explains the patterns observed in the four committees. I focus
on a set of structural factors, mainly each committee’s historical endowment, personal
factors, and structural relations with the state and local residents. This study finds that
the functional differences between the committees are primarily results of those
structural relations. A comparison of the functional differences and their underlying
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structural relations together draws a vivid picture about grassroots state-society
interactions channeled through the committee.
Findings
This study finds that the four Residents Committees play very different roles
in their communities. None of the four ideal models can fully explain such a diverse,
multi-faceted, and paradoxical organization. However, there is a discernable dynamic
on the horizon, despite its variation from community to community. Interlaid squarely
between the authoritarian state and ordinary residents in the rapidly changing society,
the committee is experiencing a silent, nonetheless fundamental transformation: from
a typical social control machine to an increasingly balanced ‘sandwich’ organization
which formulates and withholds the interests of reciprocal community networks,
although sometimes the networks are tension-charged.
In addition, the state-committee relationship is experiencing significant
adjustments. The influence of the state on the committee is still profound and
dominant in many cases. However, an adaptive, flexible, and cooperative statecommittee relationship is gradually replacing the traditionally rigid and total control
of the state. It is the result of both the committee’s structural changes and the state’s
self-reform effort. The other side of the equation sees gradual but steady expansion of
neighborhood self-governance through the operation of the committee. Many new
mechanisms have been developed to increase the accountability of the committee as
well as local officials to the interests of ordinary residents. However, the
transformation of the committee does not show promising signs as far as becoming a
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‘dissenting’ entity as the liberal mantra predicts. On the contrary, the operations of
the committee sometimes have solidified the ruling basis as well as the legitimacy of
the political system, at least in the short run.
The Residents Committee’s transformation reveals some important changes
between the state and society in urban communities. The interactions between the
state and residents are becoming increasingly institutionalized and stabilized as both
are involved in an emerging cooperative community network around the committee.
Indeed, the state and residents can often identify more common interests than
differences at the community level, which makes community cooperation feasible.
However, the tension between them is real and sometimes even out of control, which
underscores the difficulty and uncertainty of grassroots structural adjustment in the
authoritarian system.
The state, embodied primarily in the street office, presents a mixed picture. It
is fair to say that the authoritarian state is still a major source of problems for the
transformation of the Residents Committee. The state will not cease its effort to
maintain certain levels of influence on the committee, as it recognizes the
increasingly critical status of the committee in urban management. However, the state
also sees the effort towards self-constraint, flexibility, and willingness to cooperate
with the committee and residents, and more than often such effort is self-motivated.
To a large extent, it is the state, particularly local governments, which originates and
buttresses the innovations that have occurred in the committee and its community.
Similarly to the economic reform, the reform at urban grassroots governance is a
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state-led series of developments, characterized by a gradual process of
decentralization.
Meanwhile, the urban neighborhoods are increasingly stratified in the reform
era. Community civic groups have emerged and are actively involved in diverse
neighborhood activities. However, one could hardly raise the hope of a burgeoning
civil society in those groups, since they play a subordinate role compared to the
state’s influence and the Residents Committee in urban communities. Rather than
being in non-conformity or even opposition to the authoritarian state, these groups are
quite ‘tame’ and supportive of the current political arrangements.
This project also finds that a state-civil society dichotomy cannot accurately
communicate the true dynamics found in urban communities. The dichotomy tends to
pitch society against the authoritarian state. If it followed the dictated discourse over
the happenings in contemporary China, our inquiry would easily miss those changes
occurring outside of the dichotomous scheme but that are nonetheless fundamental
and politically significant. As the project will show, the changes, which centered
around what I call “amphibian organizations” like the Residents Committee, are
crystallized into a trichotomous community network: the state, the committee, and
residents (community civic groups). While the future of the trichotomy faces
uncertainties, it is imperative to acknowledge that such a network is catching up with
the broad social and political changes in the current Chinese political context. The
project also illuminates the deficiencies of the prevailing liberal mantra in the
discourse of Chinese state-society relations, and calls for indigenous frameworks in
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which the development of those countries whose characteristic is distinct from the
traditional Western models can be empirically studied from within, rather than
prescriptively “discovered” from outside.
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Contextual Ground for the Residents Committee
Chapter Two

Prologue
Jan 4, 8:10 am, Shiyan #9, two adults fighting, report to police station.
Jan 4, 9:35 am, Shiyan #1, a madman screaming in the stairway, Wang
Lijuan reach the spot and banish him.
Jan 4, 1:05 pm, Shiyan #26, cracks in the coping, contact housing
management station.
Jan 4, 2:40 pm, Shiyan #31, Room 101, ground water outflow, contact
waterworks and help drain.
Jan 4, 3:10 pm, Shiyan #21, Room 101, toilet unusable due to the
outside sewer clog, contact pumping station and clear the sewer pipe.
Jan 5, 9:27 am, Shiyan #6, Room 602, Granny Li feels heart attack and
calls for help, Huo Jianmin and Zhang Liping contact and help send her to
community medical station.
Jan 5, 2: 34 pm, Shiyan #6, Room 201, Ms. Zheng complains local
police station not returning her son’s household registration card, call police
station and card returned.
Jan 5, 2: 52 pm, Shiyan #68, reporting suspicious new house-renters,
report to police station.
Jan 5, 3: 36 pm, Shiyan 32, Room 302, Mr. Jia reports overcharge of
his electricity bill, contact Chengnan Power Supply Bureau (find no
overcharge).
…
…
This is a short excerpt from the thick book of the 2004 Sunshine Community
Hotline Register. The Shiyan Residents Committee opened this hotline to provide
timely services to its residents under the newly elected committee leadership in June
2003. The hotline has quickly become really “hot.” Indeed, there were seventy-nine
calls in January 2004 alone, roughly three per working day. One committee member,
Grandpa Liu Jingyu, told me that the popularity of this hotline exceeded the
committee’s original expectations. He and other committee members were delighted
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about the success of this innovation. “The hotline is now a powerful means for
solving the difficulties and addressing the anxieties of our residents. It further
strengthens our ties with them,” Grandpa Liu said.
However, he also expressed deep worry about the future of the hotline. He
complained, “the street [office] apportions too many things for us to do. Each of our
social workers can barely cope with them. The street still holds its old mind, trying to
order us to do this or that. What can we do for our residents if we’ve always busy
with the street office’s business? The hotline is a good example. When a call comes
in, one of us has to leave his/her works that are at hand and has to help the caller. We
promise our residents instant help over the hotline, but we simply feel too overworked
to handle such a high volume of calls while tons of governmental works are piling up
on the desk.”
Grandpa Liu Jingyu, a 69-year old retired vice-President at Xinanlou Middle
School, feels rather frustrated whenever he talks the conflict between the street
office’s assignments and his committee’s intended to-do list. He certainly hopes to
keep and even invest more energy into the hotline, but he has to be realistic about the
workloads his committee has already had. As a matter of fact, his committee often
needs to balance the jobs from the street office and its own self-ruling initiatives.
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Residents Committee and Its Three Statutory Functions
This tense situation of controversy is not unique for the Shiyan Residents
Committee at all. As the second story of the Dejia Residents Committee in the first
chapter shows, the Residents Committee in general is heavily influenced by the street
office. Ostensibly the committee was mostly an instrument of the state for social
control in the pre-reform era, even though it did deliver some limited services
(Benewick, 1991; Clark, 1989; Jankowiak, 1993; Whyte and Parish, 1984; Wu 2002).
There was little room to care for local residents since it was largely occupied by the
state’s social control initiatives. Indeed, the committee even had to act in ways that
directly conflicted with the interests of residents when it was ordered to carry out
unpopular state policies like political study, household security inspection or sending
sons and daughters of residents to remote rural areas.
However, when the legal language is examined that establishes the Residents
Committee, it can be clearly seen that it is intended (in word, at least, if not in fact) to
be much more than just an instrument of social control. Both the Constitution and the
Organic Law of Urban Residents Committees designate it as “the only legitimate
neighborhood self-governing organization,” which should not only help the state to
maintain social order, but also serve its residents and promote neighborhood selfgovernance. Article 3 in the Organic Law specifies the following three functions.
First, the committee should provide public service to its residents. Service
provision can be divided into two categories: administrative service and selfgoverning service. The former refers to the state-sponsored service, and although the
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primary goal of these is to address the state’s concerns, the service also benefits local
residents. The latter refers to the committee-sponsored service that directly responds
to residents’ requests but without linkage with the state.
Second, the committee should defend and represent residents’ interests. As a
self-governing organization, it should: (a) protect residents’ rights, (b) convey their
concerns to local governments, and (c) advice local governments over neighborhood
affairs. These functions all fall under the category of neighborhood self-governance,
i.e., they all involve the responsiveness and accountability of the committee to its
constituents.
Third, the committee should assist the state in managing the neighborhood in
three areas: (a) publicizing laws, educating residents, and promoting a “socialiststyle” of civilization; (b) facilitating government’s policies; and (c) maintaining
public security.
Within each statutory function there are numerous detailed roles a committee
usually plays. Table 2-1 lists some of these major roles. The Organic Law requires the
committee to carry out all three functions. However, the committee in practice has
encountered great difficulty in balancing these functions, because the law holds
within it some inconsistencies and ambiguities.
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Table 2-1: Functions of the Residents Committee 15
Social control
Surveillance over political dissent, released convicts and other unstable elements
Publication and dissemination of state’s laws and policies
Household registration control
Family planning and birth control
Floating population control
Neighborhood security and preventive investigation
Neighborhood dispute mediation
Participation in state-sponsored anti-crime campaigns
Administrative service
Governmental evaluation, examination, and appraisal
Governmental census and survey assistance
Social welfare policy implementation
Unemployment reduction
Environment and cleanup campaign
Organizing charity activities
Collecting fees
Emergency management
Community economy
Self-governing service
Residential convenient services
Neighborhood cleanup and environmental protection
Neighborhood security patrol
Organizing neighborhood cultural events
Fostering, supporting, and coordinating other residential groups or organizations
Coordination and cooperation with non-residential organizations
Property management
Neighborhood self-governance
Organizing committee elections
Organizing various residential meetings
Residential financial and decision-making openness
Encouraging and mobilizing residential participation
Evaluating performance of the Residents Committee
Establishing community covenant or neighborhood self-governing pact
Conveying residents’ concerns to local governments
Defending residents’ interests or rights vis-à-vis local governments or other
organizations

15

I should acknowledge the potential inadequacy associated with this classification. Some roles, such
as neighborhood cleanup and environment protection, perceivably fall into more than one category. In
addition, this table is by no means comprehensive to include all observed roles.

48

The first inconsistency comes from the conflict between the conflicting
imperatives of social control and neighborhood self-governance. The Organic Law
defines the committee as a “non-governmental” and “self-governing” organization. It
is not meant to be part of the state apparatus and should be elected by and responsible
to residents. However, the Organic Law also requires the committee to assist local
governments in the area of social control. The state has the right to “advise” the
committee, which, in practice, often becomes the right to “command” it.
Social control ultimately involves the top-down penetration from the state. In
contrast, neighborhood self-governance requires bottom-up representation. Therefore,
serving the state is not necessarily compatible with representing residents, especially
when the interests of two are at odds. It is often the case that the committee cannot
resist the state’s intervention and maintain its own independence and integrity. For
example, the committee in the pre-reform era was intrusive and coercive, taking roles
like residential mobilization, political campaigning, and neighborhood surveillance.
Its relationship with its constituents was, therefore, strained and even antagonistic
(Whyte and Parish, 1984). When the state totally dominated the committee’s agenda,
it left little space for the committee to address residents’ interests. Ordinary residents
were fearful as to what the committee would do, and so the committee itself could
thus not gain trust or easy cooperation from its constituents.
The inconsistency is also found in service provision when the committee has
to balance between administrative and self-governing services. The area of
“administrative services” obviously reflects the state’s intention in may of not all
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instances. For example, local governments in China often sponsor street cleanup
campaigns several times a year. A clean neighborhood is certainly in the residents’
interest. However, these campaigns sometimes require residents to sacrifice their
leisure time to participate on an involuntary basis. In contrast, self-governing
initiatives––such as the Sunshine Community Hotline in the Shiyan Community––are
created to address the idiosyncratic needs of each community, and are largely
irrelevant to the state’s priority or agenda. Given limited resource, the committee
often needs to make a choice between administrative and self-governing services.
The functions of the committee reflect the cooperation, conflict, negotiation,
and resolution of the structured interests inside urban communities. Deeply immersed
in intensive state-resident interactions, the committee provides clues to understanding
how the lively neighborhood politics take place on daily basis. The primary goal of
this project is––in the first place––to learn the functions of the organization and its
interactions with the state and residents. By comparing several committees in this, the
project draws can then make several inferences about grassroots state-resident
relations in contemporary China.
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Analytical Framework
The analytical frameworks used to study neighborhood organizations vary,
depending on the focus of the research being done. And needless to say, there are
several possible ways that researchers can focus on neighborhood organizations. For
instance, the instrumental utility of neighborhood organizations might be a research
focus, where they are looked at as a kind of means to a certain end. Or, they could be
viewed as voluntary, spontaneous, and self-governing social movements, which have
value simply in and of themselves. One could focus on their utility for social welfare,
education, hygiene, or other specific social activities. Finally, one could look at them
as working models of grassroots social organization and mobilization. Each of these
foci would then, of course, necessitate the employment of a different analytical
framework. This project adopts a framework based on examining the ways that the
Residents Committee is structurally connected to both the state and urban residents.
Consequently, the analytical framework here employed covers not only the generic
aspects of the organization, but highlights its more substantive aspects as well. More
importantly, to understand the committee from the state-society dimension underlines
the uniqueness of the organization from neighborhood organizations in other
countries.
The analytical framework in this project addresses two fundamental
arrangements that are crucial to any political regime in the world today. The first such
arrangement involves the concept of “functional differentiation.” Simply put, it
implies the necessity of different institutions taking on different functions in modern
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society; and relatedly the concept brings with it the fact that the state—no matter how
strong it is—can never perform all these different functions. As a result, a
neighborhood organization in a place like China (despite its seemingly ‘trivial’
functions) can be seen to acquire an indispensable societal function.
This fact about neighborhood organizations bridges into the second aspect of
the political arrangement: the principle of power (de)centralization. In any modern
country, a certain level of power centralization into the hands of the state is necessary
for political order and stability at least. However, the extent of centralization varies in
different systems at different times. History has taught many lessons about the
dangers of over-centralization. The ways a neighborhood organization behaves can
thus be used as indicators to probe the extent of the power of (de)centralization in a
society.
Therefore, the Resident Committees and its functions reflect both the generic
and substantive aspects of Chinese politics, even though the organization at first
appears miniscule and dispensable. There is relatively rich information available
about neighborhood organizations, and it offers up huge spectrums of experience that
reflect how they function in different national contexts. Starting from some of this
literature and some of these experiences, this project draws four “ideal” or
“constructed” models which establish the baseline of an analytical framework. 16 Each
ideal model portrays a functionally distinctive committee, and each will be used for

16

The concept of using ideal or constructed model borrows from Max Weber (see Weber 1946).
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focusing on a different pattern of state-resident interaction in Chinese urban
communities.
The Penetrative Model
As its name implies, the model treats neighborhood organizations as
instruments of the state to dominate society. It is a well-developed model borrowed
from the specific literature of the Residents Committee as well as the broad literature
of communist and other highly controlled regimes. The penetrative model follows an
extreme statist understanding about state-society relations. This model elaborates on
the idea of total state domination over society, arguing the elimination of distinctions
between private sphere and state domain. That is, any legally established grassroots
organization within the context of the state-citizen interaction would necessarily be
dominated by public activity oriented toward the pursuit of the interest of the state (or
the leading class). This is what Arendt (1951) and Tsou (1986) called
“totalitarianism,” in which politics, economy, and social life are intermingled and
unified so that they can better serve the will of the state.
The penetrative model offers a unique perspective to understand how a highly
centralized state machine is connected with ordinary citizens in China. Under this
model, the Residents Committee is seen as nothing more than an instrument of the
state for neighborhood control. Indeed, the literature has revealed the coercive nature
of the committee before the reform era (White, 1971). During the various political
campaigns, the state dominated the committee, and through it, imposed authority,
maintained control, and gained compliance from urban disassociates who could not
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be effectively managed through the state-controlled danwei system (Salaff, 1971).
Existing in the tiny interstice between the state and citizens, the committee functioned
like a link in the state’s power chain, transferring the state’s commands downwards
into every resident’s private life.
In the penetrative model, the state and the committee often maintain a strictly
hierarchical relationship, and the committee has no autonomy from the state at all.
The state controls not only the committee’s daily operations, but also its internal
structure (Lewis, 1971). This dominant relationship makes it so that the committee’s
primary goal is to maintain social control within its neighborhood. Service provision
thus is only a trivial function, as most of its energy is devoted to neighborhood
policing and surveillance. Being a tool of social control, it was not necessarily violent
when confronting ordinary residents, even in the Cultural Revolution. However, its
relationship with urban citizens was often tense since it treated them as subjects rather
than as constituents (Whyte and Parish, 1984, pp. 281-284). Residents were often
passively involved in the committee’s calls for actions. Citizen participation was low
or “involuntarily high,” so to speak. This was the case during various political
campaigns before the late 1970s, especially during the Cultural Revolution. Finally
neighborhood self-governance is largely irrelevant to the committee in the penetrative
model.
Certainly, most China observers give less and less weight to totalitarianism as
the defining characteristic of Chinese politics in the reform era. But despite the
waning trend, there are still totalitarian elements inherent in the system which can
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exert significant coercion when necessary, such as cracking down on political
dissidents, Falun Gong, and criminals. The Spring Festival security plan in the Dejia
Residents Committee is a clear reminder of the historical continuity in the coercive
side of the committee. The committee still exerts indispensable role in neighborhood
policing and compliance-gaining when the state decides to show its coercive muscle
(Read, 2003). Therefore, the penetrative model poses some interesting questions
about the committee and about the nature of neighborhood residents and state
interactions: How much coercion on the part of the state is the committee still
engaged in the reform era? To what extent is social control still its primary function
and what is the attitude of the committee towards its social control function today?
How effectively does the authoritarian state penetrate down into the urban grassroots
level in contemporary China?
The Corporatist Model
It refers a particular set of policies and institutional arrangements for
structuring interest representation. The idea of corporatism can be roughly split into
two camps. The first camp is “social” or “democratic” corporatism, which has been
widely practiced in Austria, Switzerland, Germany and some Northern European
countries. It interprets the political process in terms of democratic competition,
ideologies of social partnership, concentrated interest representation, and informal but
continuous political bargaining among interest groups (business enterprises and labor
unions in particular), bureaucracies, and political parities (Katzenstein, 1984). Social
corporatism is often used to explain the integration of conflicting interests in stable
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democracies. However, for non-democratic countries where electoral competition
does not exist and the society is often atomized, social corporatism has limited usage.
In order to understand state-society interactions in some non-democratic
regimes, the second camp of corporatism, “state” corporatism, was developed in the
1930s and 1970s when the state-society relations in Fascist Germany and Italy, and
some of the military governments in Latin America and Franco’s Spain were under
consideration (Cardoso and Faletto, 1984; O’Donnell, Schmiter and Whitehead,
1986). A repressive state often charters or even creates interest groups, attempts to
regulate their number, and gives them the nominal status of a quasi-representational
monopoly along with special prerogatives. In return, the state claims the right to
monitor these representational groups through a variety of mechanisms so as to
discourage the development of unwelcome groups or conflicting interests. Through
the collusion with those interest groups, the state extends and strengthens its control
over a large population. The state would not be able to achieve this if it totally relied
upon its own coercive muscle. It is this collusion between the state and certain
interest groups that represents the difference between the corporatist model and the
penetrative model. The state establishes a kind of patron-client compliance in the
corporatist model, which is quite distinct from the sort of principal-agent hierarchy
that comes with the penetrative model. The state is obviously dominant in both
models, however.
State corporatism has been employed both to explain the success and to
highlight challenges of the Chinese era of economic reform. Jean Oi once attributed
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the corporatism as the key institution for the rapid growth of rural industrialization.
In the process local governments have taken on many characteristics of a
business corporation, with officials acting as the equivalent of a board of
directors. This merger of state and economy characterizes a new institutional
development that I label local state corporatism (Oi, 1992, p. 100).
However, while this type of arrangement contributes perhaps one of the most
dynamic economic sectors in China, this “Local State Inc.” headed by public officials
rather than real entrepreneurs has created a heaven for corruption and inefficiency.
The privileges that are available through the corporatist coalition are becoming
increasingly predatory and market distorting, which causes unprecedented public
resentment (Lu, 2000). Many observers have expressed their deep worry about the
extent to which the economic reform is thwarted as the result of the corporatist
collusion (Duckett, 2001; Gong, 1997; Johnston and Hao, 1995; Yao, 2002).
When the corporatist model is used to analyze the committee, it highlights at
least one interesting possibility for neighborhood politics. The Chinese law gives the
committee monopolistic status in the representation of residential communities. In
this corporatist model, the state, as the patron, provides the committee with legal
status and necessary support for its daily operations. In return, the committee, as the
client, takes the state’s interests as its priority in urban neighborhoods. The legal
status guarantees the centralization of power in the hands of the committee. The
important decisions are primarily reached behind the scenes between the state and the
committee, and its members (and perhaps the neighborhood activists) are the elite
group in a neighborhood that wins prerogatives from the state in exchange for their
obedience.
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Since a corporatist Residents Committee relies on the state’s endorsement for
legitimacy and power, the state has enormous influence over its operation. Social
control is likely the priority of the committee under such a corporatist arrangement.
However, a corporatist committee might engage in limited service provision
for its residents. Unlike with the penetrative model, a corporatist committee is free to
function somewhat benevolently because of the very way in which it is structured.
The committee members and neighborhood activists need to gain cooperation from
ordinary residents in order to maintain effective social control. Service provision,
such as immunization and other basic health care services, is an expedient way to
reduce animosity and increase cooperation from residents. The operation of the
committee also reduces the profile of the state inside the neighborhoods, and,
therefore, cushions grassroots pressure for changes.
However, the type of services that a corporatist committee provides is
selective and discriminatory under most circumstances. The dependent nature of the
committee determines that most services that it provides are administrative services.
Since the committee rarely involves ordinary residents in its major decision-making
process, the self-governing service initiatives are hardly reached into its agenda.
Finally, despite claiming to represent all residents, a corporatist committee has
little to do with interest representation for ordinary residents. Instead, it serves as a
filter for managing and manipulating ordinary residents by monopolizing legitimate
channels of interest expressions inside its neighborhood. The interests of the state and
the committee are the only interests attended to while unwelcome voices are blocked
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from reaching the state.
The corporatist model contributes an alternative possibility to the penetrative
model in grassroots state-society transformation. The collusion of elites at the level of
the neighborhood organization will produce the kind of committee that has to lean
upon the authoritarian state and will almost always pay lesser attention to voices of
ordinary residents. If, however, the state’s total control over neighborhood affairs was
no longer feasible, it is interesting to know if the authoritarian state was capable of
maintaining effective control through corporatist arrangements. What are mechanisms
that make state-committee collusion possible? To what extent doe this collusion hurt
ordinary residents? What is the sustainability of the corporatist arrangement in
neighborhood control?
The Civil Disobedience Model
In sharp contrast to the penetrative model and the corporatist model, the
studies on the former communist countries reveals another useful model – the civil
disobedience model. This model assumes inevitable conflict between civil society and
a repressive state, no matter whether the state represents the will of a class, an elite
group, or itself. Therefore, the distinction between the repressive state and civil
society, as well as the independence and self-identification of civic organizations, are
absolutely crucial for the development of civil society. This model often dismisses the
real capacity of the repressive regime to exert social control and penetration. Instead,
political dissidents have opportunities to create alternative structure outside of the
state, a polis that is parallel to the state (Arato, 1981; Frolic, 1997; Shue, 1988). In
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practice, it stresses the power that civil society has of deploying pragmatic strategies
that can deal with the repressive state. Hence, it advocates silent non-conformity,
gradual opposition, and civil disobedience from below, pressuring the repressive
regime to make concessions, like Michnik’s “new evolutionism” (1985) and
Gorbachev’s “socialist pluralism” (1998). If the penetrative model describes a
political regime-dynamic of top-down domination, the civil disobedience model
emphasizes an interest regime built or characterized by bottom-up transformation.
The sudden collapse of the former USSR and East European communist
blocks has been explained from many different perspectives. It has been discussed in
terms of bureaucratic politics, institutional and social structural conflicts, individual
power struggles, or in terms of the movements and ideological shifts that are
inevitably part of international politics. The civil disobedience model contributes a
unique perspective in which dissenting civil society becomes an important element of
democratic transition because of the fact that it penetrates the stagnation of the
communist states from the bottom up. It attempts to understand the macro political
transitions from the state-civil society interactions. Since civil society is inherently
opposed by its very nature to any despotic power, the conflict between civic
organizations and a communist state becomes inevitable. Depending on the power
balance, the democratic transition is possible at certain stages when disobedience
civic organizations are mobilized into concerted opposition. Ultimately, this model
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echoes the liberal concept of civil society developed in the Western literature. 17
A defining characteristic for such a parallel polis is that it is “capable, to a
limited degree at least, of supplementing the generally beneficial and necessary
functions that are missing in the existing structures, and where possible, to use those
existing structures to humanize them” (Kiss, 1972, p. 27). That said, as part of the
parallel polis to the state, the Residents Committee is supposed to compete with the
state at the grassroots level to win recognition and legitimacy from ordinary residents.
Therefore, it should be first and foremost an advocate and defender of residential
interests. It should also manage itself as a care provider, i.e., the main provider for
self-governing services in a neighborhood.
The committee follows the principle of self-governance, which is at odds with
the state’s penetrative imperative. It is unlikely to suppose, however, that the
committee will directly confront the monolith of the state. It could, indeed, silently
promote its interests through the “weapons of the weak”––for instance by engaging in
only minimal cooperation with the state or by engaging in the covert delay, distortion,
and even destruction of policies from the state (Scott, 1985). Social control would
then unlikely be the function of a disobedient committee because the state would
eventually be too wary of it to trust it.
The civil disobedience model is part of the liberal mantra that dominates statesociety studies on China. The literature on the Villagers Committee shows how the

17

Civil society is widely believed as a pillar for a healthy democracy in the Western literature. A
classical example is Alexis de Tocqueville, who attributed the vigor of American democracy partially
to a free and decentralized civil society (Tocqueville, 1945).
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mantra dictates the explorative processes that are applied to China. Indeed, both the
Villagers Committee and the Residents Committees would not be fundamentally
different from civil organizations in liberal democratic polities, should they truly
observe their statutory status designated to them by the Constitution. However, the
complaint from Grandpa Liu Jingyu of the Shiyan Residents Committee and the
security plan in the Dejia Residents Committee at least raises caution about the liberal
interpretation of state-society relations to the Chinese context. How significant is the
Residents Committee to the authoritarian state as well as to an emerging civil society?
Is it moving toward a “parallel polis” as the dissent grassroots organizations did in
former Eastern European countries? If this is the case in China, how could the
Residents Committee play non-conformity games with the authoritarian state? Could
it spearhead a democratic transformation in urban communities, as the Villagers
Committee is believed doing in rural villages? No matter what the answers to these
questions would be, the civil disobedience model offers a unique perspective on how
and to what extent the committees––that are found in China and elsewhere––performs
the function of neighborhood self-governance and resist or defy, either overtly or
covertly, the will of the authoritarian state.
The Synergistic Model
This model is derived primarily from the theory of the developmental state
that focuses on economic growth as the positive result of synergistic relations
between the state, often authoritarian in nature, and the private business elite
(Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1982; Okimoto, 1989; Wade, 1990; World
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Bank, 1993). The theory attempts to “liberate” the state from the indoctrination of the
liberal mantra that tends to portray an active state as an obstacle rather a facilitator for
economic growth. Taking economic growth as a nationalistic project, a
developmental state could play a combination of different roles at various stages of
growth, such as custodian, demiurge, midwife, and husbandry. 18 The specific roles a
state takes on have varied across time and across economic sectors, and theorists that
have contributed to the synergistic model of thought have spent much time
deliberating upon which roles are appropriate and when. The idea of the
developmental state in general, though—no matter the circumstances—is closely tied
to the desirability and importance of “good government” for the development of later
industrializing countries.
The synergistic model shifts the focus from state-private business coproduction ideas to ideas that involve state-grassroots organization cooperation. Its
theoretical orientation goes beyond treating grassroots development either as a nonstate business, such as social capital inherited from natural endowments of history
and culture as Putnam argues, or a spontaneous antithesis to the repressive state as the
literature of social movements in East European countries indicates. 19 The synergistic
model tries to bridge public-private division and advocates state-society cooperation
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Peter Evans (1995, pp. 74-98) has summarized the economic functions a state can play. Custodian
means regulator. Demiurge is the involvement of a state in directly productive activities. Midwife
describes a state’s policy initiatives that assist or induce private capitals to take on more challenging
endeavors. Related to midwife, husbandry focuses on support and prodding a state enacts to the
existing private counterparts to sustain in competitive businesses, particularly in today’s global
economy.
19
For example, Putman (1993) treats the repository of social capital as a casual factor for the better
bureaucratic performance in northern Italy, i.e., the state is determined not determinative.
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as a key institutional factor for grassroots development (Evans, 1996; Fox, 1992;
Gupta, Grandvoinnet and Romani, undated World Bank paper; Heller, 1995; Ostrom,
1996; Tendler, 1997; Warner, 1999; World Bank, 2004).
Following the synergistic model, neighborhood organizations are not
considered to be totally independent of the state or totally dependent on it for their
genesis. The Residents Committees should be interpreted as major partners with
whom and through whom the state can enhance its developmental goals inside the
microcosmic world of its neighborhoods. As neighborhood affairs become
increasingly complicated and indigenized at the same time that they become less
sensitive to the national politics, empowering the committee to handle these
challenges is in the state’s best interest. In contrast, the committee also requires
assistances from the state so as to satisfy the increasing demands from its constituents
and to cope with those problems that are often beyond its capacity alone, such as
crime and floating population. The synergistic model dictates that the state and the
committee formulate a cooperative relationship; one in which both need to seek
assistance from each other to boost their legitimacy in the eyes of residents.
Identifying the areas to co-produce win-win results is critical for the synergy. Service
provision is thus the easiest function to build such synergy. A direct outcome from
the synergy is the net benefit to local residents, i.e., the improvement of quality and
quantity of services at the neighborhood level. It is the most salient characteristic for
synergy model.
The synergistic model is obviously different from the other models discussed
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so far. It implies a different reality of political development from the total domination
of the political regime in the penetrative model, the grassroots uprising in the civil
disobedience model, or the collusion implied by the corporatist model. Instead, the
synergy is a rather intricate arrangement for mutual enhancement, as Evans argues:
Creative action by government organizations can foster social capital; linking
mobilized citizens to public agencies can enhance the efficacy of government.
The combination of strong public institutions and organized communities is a
powerful tool for development (Evan, 1996, p. 1130).
If such a synergy could take place, the enhancement of the committee would
show not only in the improvement of its service provision capacity, but also in the
effective functioning of mechanisms of neighborhood self-governance. Its intensive
cooperation with the state would gain trust from the state, which helps it move
towards becoming a relatively autonomous grassroots entity. In addition, its selfgoverning function becomes easier when it fosters intimacy with ordinary residents as
a result of better services.
The synergistic relationship certainly implies a calling for the committee to
address the state’s concerns, such as social control. Indeed, in the current Chinese
political context, a viable self-governance would have to begin with governing
initiatives from the state. A committee whose destination of self-governance is a
“parallel polis” would not win trust from the state, and would be unlikely to exist in
contemporary China.
The state-society synergy has been observed in some non-democratic
countries, such as Vietnam, Senegal, and Nepal. As Evans argues, “the synergy is
constructable, even in the more adverse circumstances typical of Third World
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countries” (Evans, 1996, p. 1119). Would a synergistic relationship be built between
the authoritarian state and the Residents Committee in China? This question raises the
opportunity for a different outlook of state-resident relations channeled through and
withheld in the committee. The focus is to rethink the effort of the authoritarian state
in formulating mutually empowering structures with grassroots organizations, like the
committee, for non-zero-sum outcomes.
The biggest challenge for the synergistic model is that it is not as neatly cut as
the other three models. The synergistic theory pays enough attention to explain the
empirical level questions about development, but seems somewhat reluctant to further
draw conclusions concerning the deeper political questions that are implied by the
model. Indeed, some interesting puzzles are created in a scenario of state-society
synergy. What makes the synergy possible? Why would the Chinese communist state
choose cooperation with the committee? What characteristics does the committee
have that enable it to establish synergistic relations, rather than subordinate, collusive,
or conflictive relations with the state? What are the political consequences of the
synergy of the state and ordinary residents? These are politically significant
questions, which are germane to grassroots politics in contemporary China.
So far, this chapter has discussed four ideal models that can be used to
understand state-resident relations intermediated through the committee. Each ideal
model draws a distinctive combination of functions a committee might play.
Together, they make up the analytical framework of this project. For better reading,
summarizes the four ideal models with their corresponding statutory function(s).
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Table 2-2: Analytical Framework – Ideal Models and Statutory Functions of the
Residents Committee
Model
Penetrative
Corporatist
Civil
Synergistic
model
model
disobedience
model
Function
model
Social control
X
X
X
Administrative
service
Self-governing
service
Neighborhood
self-governance

X

X
X

X

X

X

The challenge is to explore the actual functions the committee plays and
compare them with the analytical framework in Table 2-2. The comparison tells the
suitability of each ideal model to explain neighborhood politics. More importantly,
such a test helps to explore grassroots state-society relations in the post-totalitarian
China, which is the ultimate goal of this project.
One thing should be clarified here. Any model that can be called “ideal”
originates in accordance with the necessity of simplifying the complexity of reality
for the purpose of scientific theorization. Reality is always more delicate and more
rich than any ideal model can capture. For example, the literature has shown that even
a penetrative committee in the pre-reform era had be involved in providing services to
residents from time to time, in accordance with its primary goal of social control.
Therefore, Table 2-2 is only a simplified intellectual construction. Rather than
reaching deeply into every aspect of a matter, each ideal model is forced to abstract
its reasoning by focusing only on the functions that preoccupy the committee.
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Neighborhood Organizations: An International Perspective
The above section lays out the analytical framework that is derived from the
practice of grassroots organizations in various countries. In order to better situate this
project in the literature, this section complements the above theoretical theme with
practical discussion of several neighborhood organizations operating from several
different national contexts. The functions of those organizations vary from place to
place, which provides rich references to understand the functions of the Residents
Committee in China.
Neighborhood Organizations in the United States
Neighborhood organizations in the United States have a diffuse and limited
leadership in neighborhood governance. American neighborhoods are quite open to
many kinds of neighborhood organizations. As such, there is often no particular type
of organization that consistently dominates the affairs of American neighborhoods.
Neighborhood power is spread across a broad range of institutions; institutions such
as neighborhood associations, social service organizations, housing and economic
committees, religious organizations, and many ad hoc groups. These organizations
are quite different in nature: some of the organizations are public organizations while
others are private; some are completely indigenous groups whose leadership rests in
its local constituents, while others are local chapters that operate according to the
instructions of their national leadership. In addition, given the diverse nature of
neighborhood organizations, many policy initiatives that are implemented at the
neighborhood level do not originate from residents themselves.
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One particular feature is the limited purposes of American neighborhood
organizations (Chaskin, 2003). Most organizations are formulated for a particular set
of singular, parochial purposes. American neighborhood affairs are often created
along issues, such as housing, child education, poverty relief, and neighborhood
security. Accordingly, one organization usually has a limited voice; many of them
have a voice related to issues that are closely related to the purpose of the
organization, but otherwise have no real influence. In addition, these organizations
largely focus on neighborhood affairs and local politics. They are largely irrelevant or
isolated from state or national politics. Since these organizations are specialized in
their narrow fields, coordinated activities in the neighborhood between different
organizations have often themselves to be difficult undertakings (Fairbanks and
Mooney-Melvin, 2001).
Another unique feature of American neighborhood organizations is their
relative independence from the state. The state is traditionally viewed suspiciously in
American eyes. The idea of democratic control over the state power is one of the most
fundamental American values (Fisher, 1994). Neighborhood organizations are often
entrusted with the ideal of “true” democracy, in which civil virtues are fostered and
local people directly rule through active participation. These diverse but vibrant
neighborhood organizations weave a civil network such that the power of the state is
somewhat counterbalanced. As a result, local governments sometimes incur tensions
with some neighborhood organizations (Baker, 1995). Certainly, many neighborhood
organizations often keep good legal or fiscal relationships with various governmental
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agencies. For example, American Residential Community Associations, one of the
most popular neighborhood organizations, has to win approval from government
before they can operate in any particular neighborhood (Dilger, 1992). 20 Another
powerful organization with many local chapters called Neighborhood Association
heavily relies on federal Community Development Block Grants, and many other
federal and state funding sources. However, despite these and other linkages with the
state, most neighborhood organizations are able to maintain their institutional
independence reasonably well. The impacts of the state on these organizations are
largely confined to support, consulting, and, to a much lesser extent, regulating and
controlling.
In general, American neighborhood organizations represent a diffuse,
pluralized, and specialized leadership in the arena of neighborhood governance.
These organizations usually keep a high degree of independence from the state. The
power of these organizations within a neighborhood comes either directly from the
neighborhood (the residents) or from outside non-governmental institutions, both of
which aim at addressing residents’ concerns and representing their interests. Serving
the state’s interest or maintaining social control is not the primary task. Instead, a net
of decentralized neighborhood organizations can often counterbalance the state’s
arbitrary power.

20

Residential Community Associations have over 150,000 units across the America. They are notprofit corporations that are created by real estate developers. They are responsible for housing related
neighborhood affairs, such as housing developing, property management, and enforcement of
covenants, rules, and regulations.
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Committee for the Defense of the Revolution in Cuba
If the United States presents a typical example of what neighborhood
governance looks like in a liberal and open society, then the Committee for the
Defense of the Revolution (or CDR) in Cuba shows what a neighborhood
organization could look like or be capable of in a repressive and closed society.
Unlike the American neighborhood organizations whose primary roles involve
grassroots self-governance, the role of the CDR is largely a coercive one; it is charged
with the maintenance of social and political control at the micro-level of blocks and
streets in Cuba. The CDR members are required to perform “voluntary work” in the
field and to attend political meetings. These activities tend to strengthen the state’s
political influence over individuals and to keep the neighborhoods under control. The
mass organization of the CDR also hinders the involvement of other organizations in
neighborhood affairs; the CDR monopolizes the public sphere and claims the right to
exclusively represent all officially recognized social and occupational groups in
Cuba. It keeps society atomized and weak through surveillance, peer pressure, and
constant interference in the private sphere (Aguirre, 1984).
In addition, the CDR has a highly centralized and hierarchical structure, which
also sharply differs from the diffused leadership structure seen in American
neighborhood organizations. Cuban has nearly eight million CDR members. The
power of this organization is centralized in a very small CDR elite core, however. To
some extent, the CDR functions like a highly disciplined political party. Those local
CDRs that are present in neighborhoods, on farms, at factories, or even local
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bureaucratic structure are controlled by numerous regional CDRs, which ultimately
receive orders from the national center of the CDR. The leadership inside the CDR is
strictly top-down, with decisive power placed in the hands of the national directorate
(Fagen, 1969).
The CDR is primarily a political organization. Its national directorate usually
has about thirty members, all of whom are ruling party members. Its national
coordinator is even a member of the Communist Party’s central committee. Similarly,
most leaders of the lower CDRs are also party members and, not surprisingly, are
members of the local elite. Those leaders often have opportunities to be promoted to
higher levels of the party hierarchy after serving several years in the CDRs.
The centralized leadership structure and party pre-eminence that dominates
the affairs of the CDR in Cuba inevitably leads to the fact that the CDR is always
positioning the social control prerogatives of the state as its top priorities. In practice,
the CDR has kept a very close relationship with Cuba’s Ministry of the Interior
(Minint) and often actively participated in repression against dissidents and protesters.
“Partly through its use of the CDRs, partly through its own agents, Minint can obtain
information on the daily activities of every person in Cuba” (Aguirre, 2002, p. 92). As
political instability has intensified, the CDRs have even been partially militarized to
maintain effective control.
During the present crisis, military officers have been in charge of institutions
and state organizations. Thus in 1990, for the first time, an army general was
made national coordinator of the CDRs, and the mass organization was made
part of the Ministry of the Armed Forces (Minfar). A plethora of new or
reactivated social control agencies with a military element or influence have
been created, recreated, and at times consolidated. They include the Territorial
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Troop Militia and the Armed Forces National Defense College, the latter
opened in 1991. The National Social Prevention and Attention Commission
was created in 1986 to improve the vigilance of the CDRs, while the vigilance
brigades started in Santiago de Cuba in 1991, the same year as the peasant
vigilance detachments (Aguirre, 2002, p. 77).
In general, the CDRs are active in at least four areas of social control. First, it
is the eyes and ears of the state on every city block. Each CDR has a core group of
activists who spy on ordinary residents, and they also have certain coercive power
that can be used against its constituents.
Second, the CDR often acts as the frontier policy executor on a wide range of
issues from putting anti-revolutionaries under house arrest to rationing basic food and
clothing to the citizens of Cuba. The CDR is indeed very effective in rallying the
masses around the state’s agenda.
Third, the mass organization of the CDR makes a priority of streamlining the
ideological orientation of its members through study and education about government
policies, documents, and laws. It also regularly organizes several political study
groups, targeting everyone from children to career people to the elderly, with the
clear intention of infusing state-accepted ideologies and behaviors into them (Fox and
Starn, 1997).
Fourth, the CDR is a critical instrument of the state that can be used to
mobilize the masses. The membership for the CDR is not based on volunteering, and
is in fact highly discriminatory in the sense that it is very careful to keep out political
dissidents or those who are vocally opposed to the regime. Despite this fact, though,
ordinary residents are pressured to join the CDR, participate its activities and pay
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their monthly membership fees. Indeed, despite its meticulousness in attempting to
keep subversives out, a CDR membership has become a requirement for normal life
in Cuba (Dominguez, 1978, p. 264). The consequences of being a nonmember of the
CDR are unpleasant at best and might be devastating under extreme circumstances.
There were periods in the history of the CDR when it had tried deviating from
the priority of internal security by espousing a more diverse and politically neutral
agenda. However, it proved fruitless when the deviation moved beyond ran afoul of
the tolerance of the state. As a result, the national directorate had been purged several
times so as to restore the idea of revolutionary vigilance as the absolute priority of the
CDR (Fernandez, 2000).
Chokai in Japan
The United States and Cuba provide examples of distinctive––and essentially
polarized––prototypes of neighborhood organizations. American neighborhood
organizations prioritize neighborhood self-governance while the Cuban CDR stresses
social and political control. Japan contributes the third type of neighborhood
associations within this spectrum.
Japanese neighborhood association is called the Chokai (or chonaikai). It has
a long history that can be traced to the neighborhood responsibility system of the
Tokugawa era (1600-1868), in which the urban neighborhoods shared responsibility
for tax payment, public order, fire fighting, and infrastructure maintenance. The
Chokai has many similarities with the CDR in Cuba. Like the CDR, the Chokai is a
very comprehensive neighborhood organization, and it is operated through monthly
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dues from each family in the neighborhood. The Chokai provides a unified leadership
over a wide range of neighborhood issues and happenings. And though it is
theoretically a voluntary organization, membership in the Chokai is still almost
universal (Sorensen, 2002, p. 343).
The Chokai maintains a close relationship with Japanese central and local
governments. A commonly accepted fact is that the main function of the Chokai is to
carry information and directives down from various governmental levels to regular
people and, to a much lesser extent, operates in the reverse direction, to carry
residents’ requests and demands up to the state. In fact, the Chokai’s extreme affinity
with the state provides a very effective means of social control, descending in vertical
hierarchical connection from the top levels of administration into virtually every
family in the nation. Its coercive function was exploited to its fullest extent during
World War II (Dore, 1958, p. 272). In the 1930s and 1940s, the Chokai was an
integral element of the Japanese totalitarian system. It actively promoted imperialism
and nationalism, spying and policing deviant behavior, distributing rations, and
squeezing savings from neighborhoods for the war effort. The Chokai was
temporarily abolished during the post-war occupation, but it began regrouping
(usually under a slightly different name) with many of the same members and
boundaries that had been previously established (Bestor, 1989). Today, the Chokai is
still very useful in insulating and diffusing grassroots pressure on Japanese local
governments (Sorensen, 2002, p. 107).
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However, despite its role in social control, the Chokai is different from the
CDR in Cuba. The most salient different is that the Chokai is much less coercive than
the CDR. In Cuba, political control is the dominant agenda and embedded into
neighborhood management. In contrast, politics is largely played at national and
municipal levels in Japan, and thus the affairs of neighborhood are not generally
made a first priority by the Japanese state. Although the Chokai still keeps civil
defense functions (such as neighborhood watch, criminal monitoring, etc.) these
functions are politically neutral and are not coercive in nature. Despite the
responsiveness it has to the state, the Chokai is no longer a purely top-down
organization. As Japanese society is pluralizing, the Chokai has gradually moved
towards the liberal end of the social-governmental spectrum. It has become
increasingly self-organized and responsive to the demands of its constituents in recent
years (Garon, 1997). In contrast, Cuba has achieved little by way of efforts to
neutralize the political domination-functions that have been the bailiwick of the CDR,
and it has taken virtually no steps to increase the accountability of the CDR to its
members (Fernandez, 2000).
The most distinctive feature differentiating the Chokai from both American
neighborhood organizations and from the Cuban CDR is its role of comprehensive
service provision to local residents. Unlike the CDR––which is still largely operated
according to imperatives of social control––the Chokai has gradually shifted its
primary role from one of social control to one of neighborhood service in the years
since World War Two. Japanese today are increasingly accepting the Chokai as a
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service provider instead of as a low-level auxiliary body of local government. The
existence of the Chokai contributes to the quality of urban life, the sense of
community, and the degree of self-reliance in a Japanese neighborhood, which is
similar to what American neighborhood organizations are doing. However, the way
that a Chokai serves its neighborhood is quite different from the way an American
organization would. Neighborhood services in the US are decentralized and are
largely uncoordinated. They are usually made available and coordinated through
many organizations that follow in line either with grassroots initiatives or along with
the leadership of non-governmental outsides. And––as would be expected in
America––the state maintains a very low profile in neighborhood services. By
contrast, neighborhood services are provided in a much more unified and
comprehensive manner in Japan, where the Chokai functions as an overarching
umbrella-like organizer. The Chokai generally administers a broad range of services.
The following presents only a partial list of such service and some of the things that
the Chokai is involved with: garbage collection and recycling arrangements,
neighborhood cleanup and beautification, vaccination campaigns, neighborhood
watch activities, organization of local festivals and block parties, information
dissemination, and many other activities in particular areas (Garon, 1997). In
addition, the Chokai often keeps a close relationship with local administrators in
service provisions––especially those services that are initiated from the government
but benefiting local residents. Through cooperation with the state, the Chokai
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strengthens not only its legitimacy as the leading neighborhood organization, but also
its actual capacity to provide services to its constituents.
In general, the Chokai represents a mixed model, located somewhere on the
spectrum between the extreme models presented by American neighborhood
organizations and the Cuban CDRs. It displays some elements of grassroots
democracy, and yet it also maintains a strong affinity for the imperatives of the state
regarding social control. The comprehensive nature of service provision capacity and
responsibilities in addition to the close relationship with the state enjoyed by the
Chokai reflects the spirit of the long and deep tradition of “state sponsored
capitalism” or the “developmental state” (Johnson, 1995). This kind of close linkage
with the state gives the Chokai greater capacity to service its constituents. However,
as far as the model of the interventionist state is concerned (which tries to teach moral
ideals and to mold social norms) the autonomy and self-governance components of
the Chokai are comparatively weak.
Villagers Committee in Rural China
Besides constructing international comparison, this project is also attempting
to compare the Chinese urban Residents Committee with its well-known rural twin––
the Villagers Committee.
Like the CDR in Cuba, the Villagers Committee carries the state’s imperative
to control Chinese rural society. In the 1950s, China adopted a military-like system in
rural villages, the commune system. Peasants were treated as a group rather than
individuals in a commune. It was a very intrusive and highly controlled system, in
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which peasants were highly organized in collective endeavors of production,
distribution, and consumption. This proved to be very destructive and costly
especially during the “Three Years of Natural Disasters” (1959-1961). The commune
system was decollectivized in the late 1970s and replaced by the household
contracting system in which peasants gained the usufruct over the land and hence the
attendant freedom to dispose of agricultural products for their own profit after
meeting the state’s quota. The land reform, marketization, and privatization that
happened at this time in rural China partially released peasants from total dependence
on the state. Facing the “ocean” of new small-scale farming economy, the state
effectively lost the means for mobilizing rural peasants and implementing policies.
In addition, the old rural governing structure proved inappropriate for
handling the new challenges. As the rural economy expanded, the state saw the
growing decay of the party-state apparatus at the grassroots level and the increasing
level of tension present in cadre-peasant relations (Wang, 2003). The elimination of
the commune system also quickly induced a decline of social order in the countryside
(O’Brien and Li, 2000). Both of these factors contributed to rising crisis of the state’s
legitimacy and social control vis-à-vis the state in rural China.
The state needed to fill the grassroots vacuum with some organizations that
could achieve its objectives of social control, and yet be not as costly and destructive
as the old commune system was. The Villagers Committee was created primarily for
this purpose. Today, most social-control related tasks are carried out through the

79

Villagers Committee (i.e., family planning policy, tax collection, and military
conscription, etc.).
However, the way that the Villagers Committee helps the state to maintain
social control is not coercive and intrusive in the same way that the CDR is in Cuba.
Rather than simply being the puppy of the state, the Villagers Committee is
increasingly responsive to peasants’ needs (Oi and Rozelle, 2000). Two factors
contribute to this new responsiveness.
The first most prominent factor involved is the peasants’ increasing desire
(sanctioned by the state’s consent and molded by its guidance) to participate in the
neighborhood decision-making process. When the commune system was abolished,
the collective ownership of village property was retained and transferred to the
Villagers Committee (Oi, 1989). Many properties in a village, including land, school,
roads, irrigation systems, and other similar items of infrastructures, are all still
collective-owned today. As the monopoly power over collective property, the
Villagers Committee makes decisions that are often critical to each peasant’s life.
Since collective property gives peasants some sense of ownership, it provides a strong
incentive for peasants to care and pay attention what the Villagers Committee is
doing. And this in turn provides pressure to the Villagers Committee to be responsive.
In addition, Chinese law creates a legal basis for peasants to participate in––if
not to totally control––the operation of the Villagers Committee. The Organic Law of
Villagers Committees (1987, revised in 1998) mandates that all members of the
Villagers Committee must be directly elected. Besides mandating the need for the
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direct election of the committee members, the law also regulates the committee’s
decision-making process, aiming to increase the popular control over the Villagers
Committee by its constituents. These institutional arrangements, especially direct
election, show a clear improvement in the Villagers Committee’s ability to be
responsive to villagers’ demands (Pastor and Tan, 2000; Shi, 1999). Many even
optimistically conclude that the Villagers Committee is a hope of China’s democratic
transition. Grassroots democracy is prophesied to be about to take off, and the local
administration will continue to be held more accountable, transparent, and efficient
through the continued deepening practice extension of the operations of the Villagers
Committee (Wang, 1998). Certainly, some researchers still doubt the authenticity of
the Villagers Committee elections and its contribution to grassroots democracy
(O’Brien and Li, 2000). However, even the most critical observers would not accept
the argument that the Villagers Committee is nothing but a CDR-like instrument for
social control. Indeed, the Villagers Committee’s responsiveness as described above
is a feature that distinguished it from the Japanese Chokai, the decision-making
process of which is often closed to its local Japanese constituents and is more
responsive to the state’s call.
So far, the above four examples provide some concrete patterns of stateresident interactions in different countries. All but the American neighborhood
associations have active agendas in the area of social control. However, the Japanese
Chokai and Chinese Villagers Committee are less coercive in nature than the Cuban
CDR. American neighborhood organizations are likely the most responsive to the will
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of their constituents, which is quite opposite to the Cuban CDR, but between these
two extremes––in the middle of the spectrum––we find the modeled responsiveness
of the Japanese Chokai and Villagers Committee. These degrees of responsiveness
thus vary between times and locations. All four examples, however, are responsible
for service provision in various ways and to differing extents. In the American case,
we see the very independent nature of its grassroots organizations from the state, and
thus the independent way in which American neighborhood organizations practice
and are responsible for service provision; comparatively, the Chokai has corporatist
connections with the Japanese state. As far as the Chinese example is concerned, the
literature often draws a synergistic picture regarding the Villagers Committee and
service provision, although some believe that the synergy indeed is corporatist
collusion between the state and rural elites. Even in Cuba the CDR tries to engage in
providing services to its residents, such as sanitation and immunization, but the scale
of those services is very limited.
It is clear that despite the neatness of the picture drawn so far, the four
examples show both similarities and differences between their various forms and
functions. However, the combination of functions in each distinguishes them from
each other. They are all unique cases as far as state-society relations are concerned.
The fact that indeed so many similarities and differences are observed warns
researchers that they cannot oversimplify the exuberant state-society interactions at
the grassroots level with any theoretical framework. No single ideal or theoretic
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model can predict or describe or mathematicize the exact functions of the various
neighborhood organizations in the four cases.
Nevertheless, the discussions of the four cases bring this investigation into an
international context, from which comparisons can be drawn when the Residents
Committee is studied.
For example, to what extent is the Chinese Residents Committee similar to the
Cuban CDR, in terms of political and social control? Both countries are authoritarian
and ostensibly communist. Or an additional question that can be asked is this: has the
Residents Committee been primarily restructured to be a service provider in addition
to being an entity of social control, as has happened in the case of the Chokai in
Japan? How responsive is the committee to its residents? Can it balance the power of
the state with the needs and aspirations of its constituents, as its American
counterparts do? In addition, has Residents Committee become another bright “star”
in grassroots democracy as the Villagers Committee has been widely interpreted to
have become?
Before any of these questions can be adequately addressed, however, the true
nature and origin and culture of the Residents Committee must be understood. The
rest of this section is thus devoted to providing information about the legal status and
the history of the Residents Committee. I will start with a story from the third
Residents Committee I visited: the Huashan Residents Committee on the outskirts of
Tianjin City.
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The Legal and Practical Status of the Residents Committee
On a rainy morning in May 2004 some strident noises attracted my attention
soon after I arrived in the Huashan Community. I quickly crammed my bicycle into a
topsy-turvy cluster of bicycles and rushed into the office of the Huashan Residents
Committee. An angular mid-age woman with her sloppy pajamas, standing in the
middle of the main office, exchanged fire with Ms. Liu Yixi. Ms. Liu is the head of
the community security subcommittee under the Huashan Residents Committee. I
immediately recognized the angry woman as well, who was called an “unfriendly
frequenter” in private by some committee members. The woman, a recently laid-off
textile worker, demanded that Ms. Liu punished her neighbor, since she suspected
that her neighbor secretly cut off her sapling mulberry. Her accusation was simple:
nobody but her neighbor would do that since they had quarrels over the protrusion of
the tree limbs into her neighbor’s garden.
“Why do you not ask XXX to compensate my losses? How many
times do you want me come here?” she shouted at Ms. Liu.
“Where is your evidence? What do you want me to do? Arrest XXX!?
I have repeated hundreds of times that I could not help you if you could not
prove it.” Liu replied with some impatience.
Liu’s attitude further irritated the women. She pointer her finger at Ms.
Liu and roared, “My tree is dead. That is the evidence! What else do you want
me to prove? Then, what do you do here? Just wasting time? You committee
members are do-nothing and impotent!”
Feeling offended, Liu raised her voice too. “If you think you can win,
go to the police station or court. I cannot help you. By the way, it is not your
business to judge my job, like a dog trying to catch mice – too meddlesome. I
tell you that no one can live without us for even just one day, up from the
central government all the way down to all Huashan residents.”
The quarrel was soon diffused as other committee members separated both
sides. Ms. Liu’s last comment is certainly an impulsive overstatement. However, it
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certainly illustrates clearly her attitude about her job. Ms. Liu is not willingly to
accept the idea that her “job” is cheap. 21 Like many other committee members I met,
the comments like those that the angry resident made really hurt their self-esteem.
Indeed, this is not my only time witnessing such a response from members of the
Residents Committees. They sometimes defend their “humble” jobs rather fiercely,
since they clearly realize that they are belittled the same way that street cleaners or
other manual workers sometimes are by people who knew very little about the
committees.
However, what they do is really crucial to neighborhood governance. As
urban affairs become increasingly complex and nuanced, the Chinese state relies
more and more on the committee to handle the grassroots problems. From a legal
perspective, there are a few Chinese organizations with more preeminent status than
the committee. Article 111 of the Constitution (1982) calls the committee as
“grassroots mass self-governing organization” [jiceng qunzhong xing zizhi zuzhi]. It is
one of the only two grassroots self-governing organizations recognized in the
Constitution. 22 Tracing its legitimacy directly from the Constitution differentiates the
committee from many other urban organizations, governmental or non-governmental.
The Organic Law of Urban Residents Committees, which is derived from the
Constitution, further fortifies the committee’s legal status. The Organic Law is so far
the most comprehensive and specific law that details the nature, function, and
21

It is hard to say that the Residents Committee positions are “vocations” in the conventional way,
since the committee members only receive a small amount of stipend for what they do. For all
Residents Committees I visited, the stipend is even below the minimum wage level in Tianjin City.
22
The other one is the Villagers Committee in rural China.
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structure of the committee. It purports to strengthen the committee by the principle of
self-governance and commits it to promoting “local socialist democracy and urban
socialist material and spiritual civilization” (Article 1). According to the Law, the
committee is not part of the state apparatus; rather, it is an “autonomous mass
organization” through which urban citizens manage community affairs, educate
themselves, and serve their own needs (Article 2).
However, the importance of the committee means much more than its legal
prominence. It is perhaps the oldest and most persistent grassroots organization in
China since the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. 23
Although it has suffered many setbacks and zigzags from the radical politics during
the 1960s and 1970s, the economic reform brings real opportunities for its substantial
expansion.
As Chapter One shows, the rapid economic growth in China has experienced
has created a severe crisis of governance in Chinese cities. It is not coincident that the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) promulgated the
Organic Law to promote the Residents Committee in December of 1989, a politically
chilly year when instable factors in cities congregated into the largest political turmoil
in the reform era. The emphasis on rejuvenating the committee can only be fully
appreciated if only its practical de facto status in urban governance is understood. The
administrative structure of Chinese cities is three-tiered. Administration is divided
into three levels––city government, district government, and the street office. These
23

The first Residents Committee was established in Hangzhou City of Zhejiang Province in December
1949.
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levels constitute the skeleton of local administration in cities, which also is
complemented by several nationwide quasi-governmental associations. 24
Both the functional bureaus and quasi-governmental associations do not
extend down as far as the district level. The street office acts as a dispatching unit of
the district government, which itself aggregates the policies of the quasigovernmental associations into instructions for the street office. In other words, the
street office represents the lowest-level, day-to-day, direct administrative presence of
the state in Chinese cities. But it does not directly interact with residents on a regular
basis. 25 Rather than extend its administrative structure down into residential
communities, the street office has to get help from the Residents Committee.
The committee is thus present at the nexus of intensive interactions with and
between both ordinary residents and the state. It is the only non-governmental
organization that can legitimately claim to represent all residents within a Chinese
urban community. Correlatively, the intimacy that had developed between the
committee and the state over the past several decades had earned it trust form the
state as being a reliable “arm.”
Because of its critical position in the administration of Chinese cities, the
committee has often been treated as a “super-servant” of the state for a long period of
24

They include Family Planning Association [jihua shengyu xiehui], China Disabled Persons’
Federation [zhongguo canjiren lianhehui], China National Women Federation [zhonghua quanguo
funu lianhehui], China Caring Young Generation Committee [zhongguo guanxin xiayidai gongzuo
weiyuanhui], Chinese Communist Youth League, Chinese Youth Pioneers, and Health Care Committee
for Women and Children [fuyou baojian weiyuanhui].
25
The primary hurdle to do so is the limit human resources at the street office level. For example, the
Meiyuan Street Office where the Huashan Residents Committee is located has roughly five hundred
employees, including permanent and temporary ones. It is impossible for it to handle the infinite and
nuanced affairs of fifty-three thousand residents from neighborhood bickering to monitoring released
convicts. Similarly, the Pudong Street Office also has fifty thousand residents.
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time, despite its statutory power as a self-governing organization. This legal-practical
disparity in addition to its unique position hierarchically as a key intermediary
between the state and residents inevitably makes the committee an arena that is dense
with the fallout of issues that develop between the state and residents.

Table 2-3: Administrative Hierarchy of Tianjin City
Administrative level
District level
Street level
Heping District Government
• Street Office
o Residents Committee
Hedong District Government
• Street Office
o Residents Committee
Hexi District Government
• Street Office
o Residents Committee
Nankai District Government
• Street Office
o Residents Committee
Hebei District Government
• Street Office
o Residents Committee
Hongqiao District Government
• Street Office
o Residents Committee
Total

Residents
Committee

1
6
101
1
13
217
1
12
217
1
12
229
1
10
194
1
10
6

63

157
1,115

Source: Tianjin Statistical Yearbook, 2003.

Table 2-3 shows the administrative hierarchy in Tianjin City where I
conducted my field research. Tianjin City has one city government, six district
governments, and sixty-three street offices. It would be an obvious challenge for the
Tianjin government to manage 3.7 million urban residents with this limited number of
state units, if it did not rely upon the Residents Committees present in the city as the
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bridge between itself and ordinary residents (Tianjin Statistical Yearbook, 2003). The
committees are generally able to help the state implement its goals without
overstretching its thin resources. The 1,115 Residents Committees act as a powerful
instrument for the completion of this purpose.
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Residents Committee from Past to Present
When facing disparagement about the validity of her job, Ms. Liu Yixi at the
Huashan Residents Committee responded with boldly defiant language. Her manner
to a constituent she was supposed to serve and represent was offensive and negative
about the solution of a neighborhood squabble. However, she was right at least in her
understanding of the indispensability of her job to both the state and ordinary
residents. As Table 2-3 indicates, the Residents Committee is a crucial intermediary
between the state and ordinary residents in contemporary China. However, its
preeminent status is only a development of recent history. It had been largely
marginalized and even abolished for a long period of time before the 1978 reform.
The history of the committee can be divided into four periods (Figure 2-1).
1957-1965
Period of Setbacks
Socialist reconstruction and leftist fever
Great Leap Forward (1957-1959),
Economic hardship (1960-1965)
RC: marginalized as danwei system established
1966-1976
Period of Total Reverse
Political chaos
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)
RC: some paralyzed or abolished
RC: most merged with the state

1949-1956
Period of Foundation
Recovery from war
RC: created as non-governmental org
RC: social control & service provision

1st RC established in
Hangzhou City
of Zhejiang Province
on December 1949

1977-today
Period of Rejuvenation
Economic reforms
Danwei system gradually dissolves
RC: no longer marginal player

RC: merged with
street office
nationwide in 1957

"Organic Law of Urban
Residents Committees"
was stopped in 1967
RC: politicization
was temporarily
stopped in 1963

"Organic Law of Urban
Residents Committees"
was reintroduced in 1979

RC was called
to experiment
direct election in 1999

Constitution finally
ratified RC as
non-governmental
organization in 1982

"Organic Law of Urban
Residents Committees"
passed in 1954

"Organic Law of Urban
Residents Committees"
was revised in 1989

Figure 2-1: Timeline of the Residents Committee
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The Period of Foundation: 1949 – 1956
The Kuomintang government before 1949 maintained an urban grassroots
administrative system called “the Neighborhood Mutual Responsibility Policing
System” [baojia zhi], whose history can be traced back to the great reformer, Wang
Anshi (1021-1086) of the Song Dynasty (960-1127). 26 In 1949, the CCP abolished
the Baojia Zhi and created a municipal (urban) district power structure in cities.
Different cities adopted at least three types of grassroots administration that existed
under district governments: 1) “street-level government” [jiedao renmin zhengfu]
such as in Wuhan and Dalian; 2) “street office” [jiedao banshichu] which was sued as
the urban district government’s dispatch agent in Shanghai and Tianjin; and 3) “civil
affairs unit” [minzheng zu] that was set up in local police stations with no additional
administrative units being set up under the district government as was the situation in
Beijing and Chongqing. There was a power vacuum between the state apparatus and
the huge numbers of essentially unorganized urban residents in all of these three types
of urban governing structures. To effectively organize and govern urban residents,
many forms of grassroots self-governing institutions emerged in several cities with
diverse names, compositions, and functions.
It is often claimed that the first Residents Committee was established in
Tianjin City or in Wuhan City in March 1950 (Ling and Jiang, 2001). However, the
latest archives reveal that the first one was established as early as December 1949

26

In the Baojia Zhi, roughly ten households are complied into one Jia and ten Jia into one Bao. The
basic idea is that individual households are mutual responsible for each other's behavior and local
security (see Ch`ü, 1962).
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when Hangzhou City in Zhejiang Province promulgated an administrative order, “An
Order to Abolish Baojia Zhi and Establish Residents Committees” [guanyu quxiao
baojia zhidu jiangli jumin weiyuanhui de zhishi] (Zhao, 1998, p. 531). The Order
stated that urban grassroots management should be organized according to the
principle of self-governance. The Residents Committee was not part of the state
apparatus but instead was intended to be a self-governing institution elected by local
residents. It was responsible for: 1) representing urban residents, publicizing
governmental laws and orders, and strengthening connection between local
governments and residents; 2) assisting governments in urban management and
construction; and 3) managing grassroots affairs. It is by far the earliest government
order on record regarding the establishment of the Residents Committee. By March
1950, Hangzhou had established 571 Residents Committees and 3,802 “residential
teams” [jumin xiaozu]. 27
On June 8, 1952, Peng Zhen, one of the most vocal and enthusiastic promoters
in the CCP’s senior leadership of local self-governance and the rule of law, submitted
a report to the CCP Politburo, “A Report on Street Office, Urban Residential
Committees, and the Problems of Financial Outlays” [guanyu chengshi jiedao
banshichu, jumin weiyuanhui zuzhi he jingfei wenti de baogao]. 28 In his report, Peng
(1990), the then deputy director of the CCP Central Committee’s Political-Legal
Committee and the mayor of Beijing City, discussed the self-governing nature of the
27

A residential team usually consisted of ten to fifteen households, working under a Residents
Committee.
28
Peng Zhen has profound influence on grassroots self-governance and the rule of law in China. All
later laws and regulations regarding both the Residents Committee and the Villagers Committee could
find the imprints of his report in 1953.
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Residents Committee. Peng defined the committees as mass autonomous
organizations, not political (i.e., governmental) organizations.
The committee’s main goal was to organize those urban residents not
encompassed by work units (such as in the factory, school, government, and military),
improve their public welfare, popularize government policies and laws, mobilize
participation in state-sponsored activities, and represent their interests. Members of
the committee should be elected by residential teams and accept the guidance of local
governments. Since the committee was not part of any administrative organization,
local governments should not delegate extra burdens to it (Peng, 1990). The CCP
Politburo later ratified this report. At the end of 1952, the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MIA) issued two bylaws promoting the committee nationwide: “the Transitory
Organic Bylaw of Security and Safeguard Committees” [zhian baowei weiyuanhui]
and “the Transitory Organic Bylaw of People’s Mediation Committees” [renmin
tiaojie weiyuanhui].
In 1954, MIA issued an administrative order, “A Notice to Establish Street
Office and Residents Committees” [guanyu jianshe jiedao banshichu he jumin
weiyuanhui zuzhi de tongzhi]. In that same year, the Standing Committee of the NPC
passed the Organic Law of Urban Residents Committees, which finalized the
committee’s legal status as the urban grassroots self-governing institution. By 1956,
the committee had been widely established in most cities.
The Period of Setback: 1957 – 1965
During the Great Leap Forward (1957-1959), the starvation (1960-1962), and
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the following adjustment period (1963-1965), the Residents Committee suffered
significant setbacks. In the waves of nationalization, collectivization, and
communization, the committee was forced to merge with street offices in many cities
and become semi-state institutions.
During the founding period, the committee often participated in non-political
activities, such as public security and order (dispute and minor criminal justice
resolution), social welfare and disaster relief, social mobilization and donation,
management over vagrants and prostitutes, and illiteracy elimination. However, the
committee began being involved in a series of political movements, and was
gradually politicized after about the year 1957. For example, some committees
changed their subordinate dispute resolution committees to penalty committees,
whose main responsibility was changed from mediating civil disputes and minor
criminal justices to punishing, controlling, and reforming “criminals,” most of whom
were politically “dissident elements” [huai fenzi]. The trend of merging the
committees with street offices was temporarily stopped in 1963 as the CCP redecentralized its power structure. Even though it temporarily insulated the actions of
the committee from the infringement of the state, its operations had been significantly
politicized during this period.
The Period of Total Reverse: 1966 – 1976
In 1966, the Cultural Revolution quickly swept through China and all levels of
administration were “revolutionized” by various “Revolution Committees” [geming
weiyuanhui]. These Revolution Committees joined party and administrative systems
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together again, extending the state’s will down into every level of society. The
committee did not escape from this “revolutionary” storm. In the first two years of the
Cultural Revolution, many urban districts adopted militarily organized systems which
created a three-tiered quasi-military hierarchy under street offices: “company” [lian],
“platoon” [pai], and “squad” [ban], all of which were strictly political instruments.
Since the responsibilities and functions of the company and the Residents Committee
overlapped, many committees were actually taken over by company. They were
renamed as “the Revolutionary Residents Committees” [geming jumin weiyuanhui]
and lost their nominal independence and became “legs” of the state politics. The
internal structure of the Residents Committee was also altered to carry out political
duties such as political mobilization, political surveillance, and ideological education.
Those sub-committees once responsible for civil affairs, such as social service
committees and dispute resolution committees, were substituted with politically
oriented committees such as “learning groups” [xuexi xiaozu] and “mass dictating
groups” [qunzhong dangzheng xiaozu].
The Residents Committee’s politicization completely distorted its nonpolitical status. Because of its familiarity with residential affairs, the committee was
put at the frontlines of political control. As a result, great tensions rose between the
committee and its constituents (White, 1971). The negative reputation of the
committee and the bitterness it created in the Cultural Revolution produced longlasting distrust from local residents (Zhang, 1990). The image that the committee was
part of the state apparatus persists even today, which has greatly impeded its ability to

95

expand in the post reform era.
The Period of Expansion: 1976 – Present
The Cultural Revolution was a disaster for the committee since it profoundly
politicized the committee and even abolished it in many cities. Right after the end of
the Revolution, some cities started re-activating the committee’s civil functions so as
to handle the urban grassroots chaos that had erupted. In 1979, with the support of
Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, and other CCP seniors, the NPC reissued the Organic Law of
Urban Residents Committees (1954 version). Another fact also signified the
beginning of changes in attitude towards the committee. The management of the
committee-related affairs was transferred from the Ministry of Public Security to the
Ministry of Civil Affairs in 1980.
The 1982 Constitution was a milestone for the committee. For the first time,
the institutional nature and responsibility of the committee were ratified in China’s
fundamental law (Article 111). Based upon the Constitution and the Organic Law
(1954), the NPC passed the Organic Law of Urban Residents Committees in 1989,
which provided many detailed articles that helped the committee to grow. According
to that law, the committee meant to be an inherently grassroots democratic institution.
For example, in line with the priority of being self-governing entities, the top priority
of the committee is to “defend residents’ legal rights and interests” (Article 3, section
1). In addition, all adult residents are entitled to vote and to stand for the committee
positions (three years for each term) through direct or indirect election (Article 8).
The “residents’ assembly” [jumin huiyi], which consists of all adult residents (or

96

household representatives), oversees the committee’s operation, dismisses and
replaces its members, and determines what will be important issues (Article 9 and
10). The relationship between the committee and the residents’ assembly can be
likened to an elected executive committee responsible to its legislative board.
This round of legal recognition was accompanied by significant expansion of
the committee in practice. It was actively promoted by all levels of government,
especially the central government, as an important way to cope with changes at the
urban grassroots level. In 1997, the number of the committees reached 119,000, with
almost half a million members (Zhang, 1997). In the same year, the committees
created 133,253 residential welfare and service establishments, including 5,113
residential service centers and 307,226 service subdivisions. 29 Further, it became
involved in grassroots affairs at a much deeper level. Its target population was
expanded from former social dissociates to all residents. The committee’s
responsibilities were also greatly increased. Many committees were burdened with
more than one hundred agenda/issue, ranging from birth control, marriage and family,
social relief, neighborhood security, donations, collecting fees, to many other areas
(Jiang, 2004). Some residents even referred to directors of the committee as “lane
premiers” [xiaoxiang zongli]. So far, the committee has established complex
grassroots networks and a substantial amount of resources, and has become the
largest neighborhood institution in urban China.

29

Minzheng nianjian banji zu, China Yearbook of Civil Affairs (Beijing: Zhongguo minzheng
chubanshe, 1998). Those service subdivisions cover wide ranges of neighborhood issues, such as
laundry, barber, and neighborhood reading rooms.
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The discussions about the legal status and the history of the Residents
Committee demonstrate not only its key position in community affairs, but also the
paradoxical nature of this sandwich organization, in that it is at once responsible for
channeling state imperatives and residents’ self-ruling initiatives. They indicate that a
study on this organization needs to borrow from a bunch of well-established theories.
This chapter has presented both the theoretical framework and background
information, and suggested how to analyze empirical data collected in the field. In
line with this analysis of data, the appropriate research method will be discussed in
the next chapter.

98

Research Methodology
Chapter Three

Prologue
Besides learning about the Residents Committee and the grassroots politics
related to it, this project also has two broad theoretical ambitions. First, the study of this
Chinese version of the neighborhood organization is undertaken so as to explore the
broad portrait of the changing grassroots state-society relations in contemporary China.
Additionally, such exploration is also epistemologically beneficial in the sense that it
allows us to evaluate the intellectual lenses normally employed in this type of
investigation, particularly the liberal mantra, which dominates most of the discourse
about politics in the non-Western countries like China.
These inquiries are only viable at least when an empirical question of “How”
and another of “Why” are adequately addressed. How is the Residents Committee
interacting with the state and ordinary residents? Meanwhile, why does it behave in the
manner that it is observed to? The first question requests substantive knowledge of the
committee’s functionalities. The second question, correlatively, needs to deal with the
nuances of contexts and relations that the functionality of the committee resides in.
In accordance, then, with these purposes, this project is designed as a case study,
because this methodology is particularly useful for answering the “How” and the
“Why” questions inside dense and delicate contexts, like Chinese context. Yin describes
the advantage of a case study in the following way:
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A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. In other words, you would use
the case study method because you deliberately wanted to cover contextual
conditions – believing that they might be highly pertinent to your phenomenon
of study. … The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive
situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points
(Yin, 1994, p. 13)
There are important questions that surround the use of this methodology, all of
which have to be addressed in order to create a robust research design. The immediate
question is the generalization of a case study. Specifically, how many cases are needed
in order to address the stated concerns in a positivist, substantive way? How are they
chosen? What are the criteria for case selection? How can they be accessed? What kinds
of tools are used to collect data and information? Finally, what measures are taken to
protect the informants in this project?
This chapter is devoted to the above questions about methodology. In general,
this project is designed as a comparative case study. Four Residents Committees with
diverse characteristics are selected from Tianjin City. Multiple methods were used to
obtain access to the fields. Participant observation, interview, and documentation were
major tools used for data collection. Protecting the informants was a constant
consideration throughout the research. Each of the above statements is discussed below
in detail.
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Case Selection
Selection of City
This project selected all Residents Committees from a single city, Tianjin City.
The practical concern about money and time was a reason that prevented this
comparative case study from expanding to more than one city. More importantly,
selecting a single city rather than multiple ones follows the logic of the most similar
system design, i.e., it seeks to maximize common characteristics and to minimize
different ones that would be due to the differences across cities. By doing so, the
intersystemic city differences are minimized so that the Residents Committees can be
explained by the similarities and differences across them. In this project, common
systemic characteristics are controlled for whereas the systemic differences between the
committees can be labeled explanatory factors.
Tianjin City is located by the Yellow Sea (Figure 3-1). It is the biggest city in
northern coastal China, with a permanent population of more than ten million people. It
is also one of the four cities that are directly administered by the central government. 30
Tianjin City has been going through a period of tremendous transition in the
reform era. Demographically, its population increased by almost thirty percent between
1978 and 2002. 31 During the same period, the number of households increased by
seventy-four percent but the average size of the households decreased by twenty-seven
percent. Tianjin City is also one of the most economically advanced cities in China.

30

The other three cities are: Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing. They are officially equivalent to the
provincial governments.
31
The data in this paragraph come from Tianjin Statistical Yearbook 2003.
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With 0.7 percent of China’s population being located inside and immediately around it,
Tianjin City accounted for two percent of China’s GDP in 2002. Its GDP was 205
billion yuan in 2002––roughly twenty-five times more than in 1978.

Besides expansion of its economic volume, the structure of employment in
Tianjin City was significantly diversified. In 1978, nearly all urban employees worked
for either state-owned or collective-owned units. By 2002, nearly fifty-six percent of
them worked in private, foreign, or individual units. The urbanization of the city was
also accompanied by a rapid increase of personal wealth. Per capita annual disposable
income in 2002 was 230 times higher than in 1978. Tianjin’s infrastructure has also
been radically expanded and updated. For example, both the total floor space of
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buildings and the per capita living space of residential buildings have increased nearly
five times and three times, respectively, between 1978 and 2002. In addition, the
community service establishments of Tianjin City have doubled in number between
1995 and 2000 from 4,038 to 8,923. However, like the rest of China, Tianjin City also
faces growing challenges regarding urban governance, such as urban unemployment
and floating population.
Table 3-1: Changes of Residential Population in Tianjin City (1987-2002) 32
Permanent
Registered
Percentage of registered
population
population
floating population over
(10,000 person)
(10,000 person)
permanent population
(%)
832
829
0.37
1987
843
839
0.50
1988
857
852
0.54
1989
884
866
2.05
1990
909
873
4.16
1991
920
879
4.71
1992
928
886
4.76
1993
935
891
5.02
1994
942
895
5.27
1995
948
898
5.54
1996
953
900
5.87
1997
957
905
5.70
1998
959
910
5.42
1999
1001
912
9.77
2000
1004
914
9.86
2001
1007
919
9.59
2002
Sources: Tianjin Statistical Yearbook (1988-2003)

Table 1-3 has shown that the official unemployment rate in Tianjin City
skyrocketed from 0.37 percent in 1996 to 14.30 percent in 2002. Table 3-1 lists the
changes that the floating population of Tianjin City has undergone between 1987 and

32

Tianjin Statistical Yearbook started publishing the permanent population in 1987.
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2002. As the table shows, nearly all residents were under the effective control of the
state in 1987 as they were registered in the official household registration system.
However, about one of ten Tianjiners became “rootless” in 2002, and this number does
not include the great number of temporary residents who were not registered in the
state’s household registration system in the first place.
The challenges discussed above only reveal the tip of the iceberg of social and
economic problems that threatens to submarine the progress of the city in the coming
years. As with any other city in China, Tianjin City is experiencing profound change as
prosperity and crises are emerging side by side. And although this period of change
involves the potential for failures of governance and for the political fallout that comes
with the deepening of urban social ills, it also provides a useful context for exploring
the changing state-society relationship at the urban grassroots level. As Tianjin City is a
rapidly growing city with more than one thousand urban communities, one can find
various types of communities existing inside of it. Communities ranging form those that
have been newly modernized to those that are blighted and can barely survive can be
found and observed as individual yet interconnected parts of its urban web. In addition,
Tianjin City is one of the twelve cities chosen by the Ministry of Civil Affairs as
“experimental cities for neighborhood governance and community reforms” of 1999
(Tang, 2000, p. 262). It means that any successful experience had by Tianjin City would
be introduced to other Chinese cities in the future. That has been the common strategy
in the reform era. Hexi District in Tianjin City was listed as one of the first twenty-six
districts nationwide in 1999 that participated in the Residents Committee reforms,
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reforms which involved such things as greater fiscal assistance from local governments
and direct election. Therefore, Tianjin City can provide not only examples of regular
types of the Residents Committees––such as are found in most cities––but also the
reforming types that serve as “pilots” for future, more broad-scale nationwide
application.
In addition, it is conceivable that the diversity and sheer number of the Residents
Committees in metropolitan areas like Tianjin City can be a pretty good representative
sample of most types of committees that would be found in small and medium cities.
This is especially likely to be true given the highly unitary system of governance found
in China. As Read (2003) has found during his visits to several Chinese cities,
Residents Committees in the medium and large-sized municipalities in the
different parts of the country that I looked at displayed considerable consistency.
While specific details of Residents Committee organization and practices vary
somewhat, these institutions are governed by the same law, have similar core
duties, and are in many respects minor variations on the same theme (p. 47).
The biggest difference across cities, as Read finds, is the varying fiscal capacity
of various cities that supports the committees. It is often true that big cities have more
fiscal resources than smaller ones with which they can support their committees (Read,
2003, p. 47). However, this particular city-level contrast can somewhat be reduced
when intra-city comparisons are made. One can easily find committees of blighted and
affluent neighborhoods that match each other in terms of available fiscal resources (and
in terms of operational dynamics and functionality) in Tianjin City. There are plenty of
committees and communities in Tianjin City that probably to a large extent provide
representative samples of just about all kinds of urban communities and committees that
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are found elsewhere in China; and thus they represent materials for effective
comparison that would reasonably mimic comparisons made of any disparities between
cities.
To what extent are the findings from Tianjin City applicable to other Chinese
cities? The concern is plausible that the findings in Tianjin City would not account for
the cross-city differences. This concern should remind readers not to overstretch the
findings of this project without considering the fact of the particularity
methodologically involved in the city selection in this project. And for that matter, they
must always be generally conscious of the importance of constructing a representative
sample in such case-study investigations as this one. But the real value of this project
does not rest in surveying the geographic diversity of the Residents Committees across
China. Indeed, the knowledge found in the experience of Tianjin City can provide not
only substantive guidance for future across-city studies, but also it can provide a useful
body of information to be tested against the experiences in other cities. Therefore, it
would be instructive to expand the Residents Committee study from a single city to
multiple cities in future studies.
Selection of the Residents Committees
Tianjin City has 1,115 Residents Committees in its six urban districts. Again,
the challenge was not to find an exact match between my sample and the 1,115
committees. Instead, I attempted to identify several committees that can maximize the
possibility of learning about the changing state-society relations at the urban grassroots
level in Tianjin City.
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How many cases are enough for the project? This is an empirical question; the
answer of which is not only defined by issues of time and resources, but also by the goal
of the research. There is a clear trade-off between the deep knowledge that can be
gained from a few cases, and the generalizations that can come as a result of more
superficially investigating a multitude of cases. Since the literature tells little about the
contemporary Residents Committee, I decided to choose the deeper exploration rather
than a more general approach. In this project, I accordingly chose to study four
Residents Committees.
Like any other small-N study, this project attempts explanation of some of the
issues involved based upon information gained from a relatively small sample.
However, it does not mean that this project has to sacrifice too much as fare as its
ability to generalize. A well-designed sampling strategy can still maximize the diversity
found between the four committees while still keeping the focus on the research
question posted in the project. In order to accomplish this goal, I employ a mixed
sampling strategy: a combination of purposeful targeting and partial random selection.
The foundation of my case selection effort was to create a “purposeful rather
than random” sample (Miles and Huberman, 1984, p. 36). Instead of rolling dice, I
established some criteria to locate the four Residents Committees that were appropriate
four this project. The first criterion was adopted from the official standard used by the
Ministry of Civil Affairs to distinguish between the committees. The Ministry
categorizes the committees nationwide into three groups: those established in a
traditional urban neighborhood where housing property is publicly owned; those
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established in a modern neighborhood where housing property is privately owned; and
those in a neighborhood with a mixed property ownership.
The next second is the size of the community, including the number of
households and residents. The third criterion is the location, which includes three sets of
factors: (1) downtown vs. mid-city vs. outskirts, (2) urban districts, and (3) street
location. The final criterion is the history of the committees, i.e., when were they
established? These three criteria cover the major distinctions among the committees in
China, if the inter-city factors are excluded.
Certainly, given the large total number of the committees in Tianjin City, the
above criteria could not necessarily help me precisely pinpoint the four most
appropriate cases for this project. Hence, the process of final selection involved more
than what has been detailed so far. As mentioned earlier, ultimately I adopted a multistage strategy for locating the four cases.
The first stage contributes two committees before I entered the field: the
Huashan Residents Committee and the Jingtai Residents Committee. I began the search
according to the guidance of my in-country Chinese research partner, Professor Tang
Zhongxin. 33 He kindly agreed to offer me logistical support while I was in Tianjin City.
Before I went to the field, we worked out a plan to locate the committees. Per my
request, Professor Tang prepared two pools of the committees for me to choose. The
first pool included seventeen modernized urban communities that were composed of
33

Professor Tang Zhongxin, who teaches urban affairs in Tianjin Social Science Academy and Nankai
University, is a leading scholar in the area of the Residents Committee in China. He is also one of six
senior research fellows in the Ministry of Civil Affairs to make policy recommendations regarding the
reform of the committee. He has read my proposal and given me many useful suggestions on how to
make my project both meaningful in Chinese context and doable in a timely manner.
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only privately-owned property, and the second was made up of twenty traditional urban
communities that were primarily communities with publicly-owned property. The
candidate committees spread in different districts and streets across Tianjin City. From
each pool, I randomly picked one as my initial stage of field site.
This is only a partial randomization, since the two candidate pools were
relatively small. However, I believe that this measure was helpful in at least two
respects. By increasing the diversity of the committees, this partial randomization
reduces the concerns about the issue of generalization inherited in any case study. It is
difficult to include all qualified candidates in selection pools, due to limits of resources.
Additionally, all qualified candidates were not equally accessible. At the beginning
stage of my research, I could only realistically rely upon those committees where I
could use Professor Tang’s connection. Finally, the partial randomization involved with
my selecting from the two pools gave me the discretion over the final selection,
reducing the potential bias that would have been involved if Professor Tang simply
would have pinpointed two committees for me.
The second stage involved choosing the third committee after two months of
study in the field. Based on the experience I had on the ground, I chose the Shiyan
Residents Committee as my third case on my own. It is a community with a mixed
property ownership. More importantly, it is one of the two committees experimenting
with direct election in Tianjin City in 2003.
Finally, I selected the Dejia Residents Committee as the fourth case in the third
stage of my research. As in the second stage, I alone was responsible for the selection of
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the site. Both the Dejia and Shiyan Residents Committees belong to the Pudong Street
Office, which has a total of fourteen Residents Committees. Again, I randomly picked
out the Dejia Residents Committee from the rest thirteen committees excluding the
Shiyan Residents Committee. The Dejia Residents Committee is very similar to the
Shiyan Residents Committee in composition of residents, history, and location. But they
are different with regard to at least one key element: the Dejia Residents Committee
was not generated through direct election. This makes the potential comparisons that
can be made between the Dejia Residents Committee and the Shiyan Residents
Committee more analytically substantive.
Table 3-2 summarizes the characteristics of the four Residents Committees.
However, the diversity in the table is obviously by no means comprehensive enough to
be representative of the 1,115 committees in Tianjin City. Acknowledging this fact can
once again remind the reader of the limits of the project in terms of its generalization,
but the criteria used in this project can still represent major distinctions that can be
made between most Residents Committees in China. This insures that the basic
diversity of characteristics present between the four chosen committees have some
value, and thus gives value as well as this project.
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Table 3-2: Selection of the Four Residents Committees
Jingtai
Huashan
Dejia
Types of housing
property
Number of
households
Number of
residents
Location 1:
geography
Location 2:
District
Location 3:
Street
History
Partial
randomization

Shiyan

Private
ownership
680 34

Public
ownership
2213

Mixed
ownership
1578

Mixed
ownership
1100

2800

5923

4480

3511

Downtown

Suburb

Mid-city

Mid-city

Heping

Hebei

Hexi

Hexi

Weifang

Meiyuan

Pudong

Pudong

2002 (2000)

1985 (1983) 35

1950s 36

1952

Yes
(1/17)

Yes
(1/20)

Yes
(1/13)

No

Note: the actual names of the Residents Committees and their communities have been replaced
with arbitrarily chosen place names from elsewhere in China.

34

The numbers of household and resident in the Jingtai Square Community are questionable, since the
Residents Committee there does not keep accurate information.
35
The year in the parenthesis is the date when the community was built.
36
The exact year is not recorded. The former committee members told me that it was in the 1950s.
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Getting Access to the Sites
Once the sites were selected, the next challenge involved the issue of access.
Unlike the civic organizations in the liberal democracies, the Residents Committee is
often problematic in term of its openness to outsiders. Although it is not as exclusive as
some governmental agencies with national secrecy or political sensitivity, it is by no
means an open organization. Often a committee is like a mega database in which one
can find all kinds of information regarding its residents. It functions like a nerve center,
containing astonishingly detailed private information about its residents, such as name,
birthday, marital status, occupation, income, family composition, political affiliation, ID
number, medical history; sometimes the committees even have information about the
methods of contraception residents use. None of them makes the committee comfortable
with being easily open to any outsider. In order to fully access the sites, I had to employ
multiple strategies.
Formal Access
The first strategy was to present myself as an insider rather than an outsider as
much as possible. Being a student only would not be treated as an insider. Fortunately,
Professor Tang allowed me to participate in his research project as a research
collaborator. His project aimed to learn about the problems in community governance
and to give policy suggestions. It was a governmental project funded by the Bureau of
Civil Affairs of Tianjin City. That basically meant that all street offices were required
full cooperation, should their Residents Committees be chosen for investigation.
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Being a collaborator with Professor Tang in his project gave me entree, allowing
me to enter the chosen site as an insider rather than a strange outsider. I accessed the
Huashan Residents Committee in this way. Professor Tang informed the Meiyuan Street
Office two days before my arrival. Then, he, one officer from the Bureau of Civil
Affairs, and one from the Meiyuan Street Office accompanied me to the Huashan
Residents Committee on my the first day there and introduced me as a research
collaborator for the governmental project.
This is an access method relies on the existing top-down administrative
hierarchy. Approval from the higher-ups gave me free access to the complete dossier of
the committee. The committee members were also quite cooperative while I was there.
Seeking a legitimate identity in the formal hierarchy is perhaps the most effective way
to gain full access to the site with the least amount of hassle and resistance in
contemporary China.
The question remains, though, of how much I was truly accepted by the
committee members, despite their formal welcome. Would they tell me the truth or
simply constrain themselves from presenting their honest viewpoints, due to my
“official” identity? Could I trust what they told me? With minor reservations, I believe
that they engaged me under most circumstances in open and honest way for several
reasons.
First, my mission there was academic in nature, which involved little conflict
with committee members. Indeed, I intentionally emphasized my academic interest,
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which was so remote to their immediate concerns that no one seemed interested in my
project. As a result, they either treated my mission positively or with indifferent.
Second, I tried blurring my identification as an official researcher once I entered
the committee. Instead, I took pains to build personal trust with each of the members to
the best of my capacity. The trust-building process will be discussed further below. For
most of the time I felt that they regarded me as an intern or co-worker rather than as a
researcher.
Two examples show how little attention they paid to my “official” identity.
First, they often complained to me of with the Meiyuan Street Office in surprisingly
critical language, or they joked about the street officers by telling rumors and tales.
Second, I did not notice significant behavior changes during my four-week stay there.
Those who constantly came in late and left early behaved the same throughout the time
when I was there, and so did those who were known for treating residents harshly.
However, I did also encounter a few moments when members of the committee
were cautious about my identity. For example, when I conducted one-on-one
interviews, two members asked me whether I would report the transcripts to the street
office. Although I assured them that there was zero possibility of that, they apparently
still had doubts. As a result, they requested not to tape-record our conversations. In the
other case, the director of the committee, Mr. Cao Hui, regularly asked about the
progress of my research and about my impression of the performance of his committee.
Besides his desire to receive suggestions to improve his work, I could sense his concern
about what I saw and wrote down.
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Theoretically, my “official” identity might have caused a situation where the
“public transcript” was dramatically different from the “private transcript” (Scott,
1990), although I believed that was not the case in the Huashan Residents Committee.
As a matter of caution, however, I decided to use different means for accessing the
remaining three committees.
Informal Access
Professor Tang had established strong ties with many local governments as well
as the Residents Committees, particularly those in Tianjin City where he spent most of
his teaching and research time. 37 This informal network enabled him to conduct several
large surveys without relying on the government authorities for permission. My access
to the Jingtai Residents Committee and the Shiyan Residents Committee benefited from
the informal network that he had established. In both committees, the directors had
attended Professor Tang’s lectures. Therefore, when he introduced me to both
committees as his research collaborator, both committees accepted me happily, as
would be expected.
Unlike being treated as an official investigator in the Huashan Residents
Committee, my role in those two committees was one of a purely academic researcher
conducting a private project. Largely due to the influence of Professor Tang, I received
decent cooperation from most committee members. At those two sites, I did not worry

37

Professor Tang is a senior sociologist and the director of the Institute of Sociology in Tianjin Academy
of Social Science. He also serves as an adjunct professor teaching community development at Nankai
University, one of the top universities in China. Due to his reputation in the field, many local
governments across China have invited him to deliver lectures and train their government employees and
directors of the Residents Committee.
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that my subjects behaved differently because of my presence. In addition, the informal
status I had also made it easier for me to establish trust.
Finally, rather than totally relying on Professor Tang, I developed my own ways
to access the last committee, the Dejia Residents Committee. While I was doing
research on the first three committees, I noticed that an individual committee was not an
isolated organization, but rather maintained networks with other committees to varying
degrees. Members from different committees knew each other because they had many
opportunities to work together across neighborhoods. This is particularly true among the
committees that are under the authority of the same street office. Through fostering
good relations with one committee, one could actually open the door to relationships
with numbers other committees.
Since I found some distinctive patterns of functionality in the Shiyan Residents
Committee, I decided to select the Dejia Residents Committee for the sake of
comparison. As I discussed before, both have many similarities, so they make perfect
subjects for my “most similar comparative case” design. Since both committees were
located on the same street, I got access to the Dejia Residents Committee because of an
introduction I received from the director of the Shiyan Residents Committee, Grandpa
Zhao Fu.
Access through acquaintances is a commonly used strategy in field research,
especially for the sites that do not particularly welcome unknown “strangers,” and this
is true for the field of the Residents Committee as well. The decades of trust between
the two committees greatly reduced the possible suspicion that anyone may have had of
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my first arrival at the Dejia Residents Committee. Indeed, my research activity there
was well received, as essentially it was in the other three committees as well.
Building Trust
Once I entered the sites, the challenge was to maximize what I could gain from
my stay there. China is a society built upon intense human relations [renshi guanxi].
This is partially due to the fact of its dense population, but it is also because of the
Confucian cultural heritage the country has, as well. Like it or not, I needed to cultivate
a favorable microenvironment around myself. So what this meant for me in practice––
as far as the research was concerned––was that my existence there added a burden to
the committees. To some extent, my request for cooperation would take time when they
were occupied by various other everyday tasks of management and problem solving. So
in the interest of visibly and tangibly appreciating their sacrifice, I spent a lot of effort
trying to establish good relations with them based upon trust and cooperation.
Building trust not only made my research easier, it also became an integral part
of my findings. Through the trust building process, I was able to learn some deep and
subtle facts that I otherwise would have missed or not heard about the committees and
their members; facts which the members would not have initially released or been up
front about had I not tried as hard as I did to develop their trust. I used several
approaches in attempting achieve this goal.
The first and the simplest way I could development trust between us was to
appreciate their jobs. As the story in the Huashan Residents Committee in Chapter Two
indicates, most committee members I talked with were sensitive to people’s conception
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of their work. And my showing respect as such was not just me paying lip service to an
ideal. Rather it very much sprung from the fact that I truly do have an appreciation for
the difficult position that these people are in, with their imperatives being as split
between the state and the people the way that they are, and with how under-resourced
they often are as well. My experience there also enabled me to develop an even deeper
respect for them than that I had when I went in. from the first, I have always
acknowledged in theory that the committee members were sandwiched between two
powerfully demanding (and often conflicted) priorities. After I was finished with my
research, my acknowledgement became visceral, having been developed and
conditioned from what I witnessed face-to-face.
Secondly, I tried to actively involve myself in their daily operations. Those
committees were usually very busy, which provided me with good opportunities to help
as well as to learn by doing. Because of my willingness to help, all the committees
treated me more like a fellow worker than an outside researcher. I was often asked to
substitute for short vacancies or offer a hand to those members that were overloaded. In
most cases I was glad to help, and greatly benefited from it besides.
Besides being a helping hand in workplace, I also helped some committee
members with their personal issues. For example, I fixed a computer for Ms. Li Lan, the
director of the Dejia Residents Committee. I made it so that she now can talk to her son
(who is studying in Japan) through MSN Instant Messenger for an unlimited time with
no cost. Before that, she could only hear her son’s voice every one or two months. That
single act won not only her full support for my project, but also cooperation from other
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committee members as they saw their boss’s attitude. Additionally, I taught a committee
member’s middle school daughter about my methods of learning English and
mathematics. One committee member even asked me to write a sample essay so that her
son could memorize it in for his coming preliminary school graduation test.
Finally, I also attempted to establish trust in some non-traditional ways. For
example, I constantly responded to the requests for donations organized by the
committees. 38 Sometimes I took individual committee members out for lunches or
dinners, during which I conducted interviews or simply had casual talks with them. In
order to break the ice, I also invited all members of the Huashan Committee, the
directors from the Meiyuan Street Office, and the vice director of the Hebei District
Bureau of Civil Affairs to a big dinner on the first day I was introduced to the
committee. The feeling of strangeness quickly melted away at dining table.
Through all of these various ways, I established what appeared to be very sound
relationships of trust with all the Residents Committees I visited. As a result, my
requests for cooperation that involved everything from arranging interviews to
requesting permission to review documents were well served. There are really quite a
few things that illustrated the sot of relationship that I was fortunate enough to have
established and to have been a part of. In each committee, I was given the keys to the
committee office so that I could read documents after the working hours were over. I
was also allowed to bring most of their documents home to copy, although I only used
this option when absolutely necessary. While I was in Tianjin City, three committee
38

All donations were voluntary, usually costing very little. I participated in two donations, one called
“Mother in Poverty” and the other “Hope Project” to support rural girls who cannot afford schooling.
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directors invited me to their homes for family dinners. I even encountered situations
when two committee social workers (former committee members) began crying during
my interviews with them.
Ethical Issues with Trust
Trusting relationships greatly facilitated my field research. However, they also
posed a more dilemma for me in a few situations. For example, the Jingtai Residents
Committee members asked me from time to time to handle their duties while they left
for private purposes. I was often left alone to take care of potential circumstances that I
was honestly not capable of handling. Even more questionably, whenever residents
walked in or phoned in for whatever reasons, I had to cover for the committee members
on duty by claiming that they were out on normal business. 39 This kind of moral
dilemma also occurred when I was asked to help with “cooking” data. In this I believe
that I even witnessed some possible instances of fraud or corruption, which I will
discuss in the next chapter.
The above all represent classical situations that bring to light the ethical issues
involved with doing field research. I established trust for the purpose of finding truth,
but certain parts of the trust building process are indeed ethically controversial. The act
of serving a big dinner also falls into the grey territory of research ethic, as fare as I am
concerned. I was able to acquire very specific and sometimes privileged information
about the committee because of the trust I was able to establish. However, I ended up
having to do something that I would not do under normal circumstance.
39

The committee members were frank with me that they particularly worried that the street office might
learn about their absence from work for private purposes.
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Although I did not feel comfortable, I finally decided to do what they asked me
to do in the Jingtai case for one primary reason: my actions did not cause any
irreversible damage to anyone who called or walked in. as a researcher constrained by
time and cost, it seems that I also should have committed myself to the finding of truth
in the field. The Jingtai Residents Committee represented a unique example of a
Chinese grassroots organization, which is academically very important. Anyone facing
the same situation in any other committee would do the same thing, if he or she really
wanted this issued to be explored.
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Methods of Data Collection
After establishing an environment of trust at each of the sites, the data collection
became critical. I employed three methods so as to effectively obtain and process
information.
Participant Observation
Participant observation is a research tool that was used on a daily basis in all
four committees. This tool is especially suitable for understanding a particular
organization or problem, as opposed to those tools that demonstrate a relationship
between abstractly defined variables (Becker, 1958). The contemporary committee has
not been vigorously studied and therefore I had few preconceived notions about what
kinds of a reality I would find in the field. Participant observation was therefore a key
tool which helped me both to process the reality I encountered everyday and also that
helped me to refine my research design accordingly, particularly as far as my interview
questionnaire and targeting documentation were concerned. However, this does not
mean that I entered the field only to obverse everything that occurred. Given the
analytical structure that I had from the first in my mind, I adopted a method of
structured participant observation rather than a grounded approach, i.e., I concentrated
on the committee’s functions and the relationship between the street office and the
residents as it was channeled through the committees.
When an observer creates intense social ties with the subject he or she studies,
the data gathered is greatly enriched (Crano and Brewer, 2002, pp. 202-209). Based on
the trust I built, I was able to conduct a fully-fledged observation, i.e., I could actively
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participate in various operations the committee took on while I was there. For example,
as far as the issue of social control is concerned, I attended neighborhood security
meetings, joined the security patrol, helped to mediate some of the bickering that took
place in the neighborhoods; and I also visited released convicts, pregnant women, and
some members of the floating population. I also participated in various community
services, such as cleaning, social relief, donation drives, emergency services, and in
neighborhood entertainment and athletic events. As far as my involvement in activities
related to the neighborhood self-governance are concerned, I helped organize residential
residents’ assembly semi-annual meetings, contributed thoughts to the drafting process
of a neighborhood self-governing covenant, and joined the committee’s internal
discussions about accountability to residents. Through my intensive participation in the
above list of things, I have the opportunity to observe detailed, rich and sometimes even
sensitive information in the sites that was related to many of the more contentious issues
that currently face the committees. Being something of a quasi-worker also allowed me
to taste the real differences among the four committees, as the working experiences
were so vividly distinct from each other.
I always kept a notebook at my side and wrote down interesting facts while my
observations were ongoing. For those moments where taking notes were inappropriate,
such while I was involved in mediating neighborhood disputes or visiting released
convicts, I made sure to record it when I got home while my memory was still fresh. I
also took some pictures when possible, although the opportunities were few.
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Interviews
Depending on the preferences of the interviewees, semi-structured and
unstructured interviews, always with the goal in mind of attempting to learn the
specifics about each committee. Unlike neighborhood organizations in liberal countries,
the committee and its operations are historically closed to external study. Thus, it is
entirely possible that people working in the committees and the residents in urban
communities might fell uneasy when they are asked to answer questions by outsiders.
Given the sensitivity of some questions, such as those involving birth control and
household registration management, my interviews were designed in such a way that
attempted to make interviewees felt comfortable in telling the truth, or at least feel that
they were not required to provide untruthful but politically safe information. For
example, all interviews were conduced in private space. 40 Depending on the subjects’
preferences, interviews were variously conducted in residential houses, community
cultural centers, committee offices, restaurants, or even outdoor lawns. The interviews
were done in a one-on-one format and in a conversational manner. With the consent of
the subjects, I recorded conversations, in addition to taking notes. Table 3-3 summarizes
the types of interviews conducted in each community.

40

That does not include the chats with the residents, which often happened in the committee offices with
the presence of other persons.
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Table 3-3: Interviews Conducted in the Fields
Huashan
Jingtai
Dejia
7
3
5
Current committee members
1
2
Former committee members
Community social workers
2
1
4
Street Officers
1
1
Other governmental officers
5
3
8
Ordinary residents
2
1
6
Neighborhood activists
1
3
Other institutions

Shiyan
3
1
6
(4) 41
1
11
6
2

Interviews done for this project were aimed at collecting information pertaining
to three major subjects. Current and former committee members comprised the primary
source of information. The interviews with them were semi-structured so that they were
flexible enough to allow for the elaboration of ideals and facts, while all of the
conversations were confined to the areas what were interest to me. Due to the good
personal relationship I enjoyed with most of the subjects, most interviews went well,
except for two cases. In the Huashan Residents Committee, two members displayed a
sense of hesitation about my “official” background. In the Dejia Residents Committee,
my interview with its director, Ms. Li Lan, lasted nearly one week, as it was constantly
interrupted by some neighborhood affairs.
In order to understand the state-resident relations, I also interviewed with some
government employees. The main focuses as far as these were the director or deputy
directors of the three street offices. The deputy chief of the Bureau of Civil Affairs of
Tianjin was also interviewed. Additionally, I had intensely detailed conversations with
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The street officers interviewed for the Shiyan Residents Committee and Dejia Residents Committee are
same, as both committees belong to the Pudong Street.
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two junior bureaucrats who were directly responsible for community affairs in the
Pudong Street Office.
Finally, ordinary residents and neighborhood activists were also interviewed so
as to obtain information on the relations between the Residents Committee and the
resident. As fare as the interviews were concerned, this part turned out to be most
challenging, particularly in the Huashan Residents Committee and the Jingtai Residents
Committee. First, my sample of residents was small compared to the population of the
communities, due to time constraints I was facing. Second, interviewing residents
proved much more difficult than interviewing any other group of subjects, which was
out of my expectation. I tried to schedule my interviews in the night when residents
returned from work, but this was not productive. Many did not want to spend their offwork time on a project like mine that was largely irrelevant to them. In addition, many
residents I visited exhibited a sense of caution and reserve when they were asked to be
interviewed. That was perhaps related with the way I arranged these interviews. Since I
chose interviewees and arranged interviews without help from the committees, some
residents were suspicious of my motives when I contacted them, and thus simply denied
my requests. Their attitudes towards a stranger like me were understandable.
Interpersonal relations have become increasingly close-knit and intimate amongst the
residents; they are afraid of the rampant crimes in the reform era.
I initially intended to interview between ten to fifteen residents in their homes in
each community, which proved to be very difficult and time consuming. Instead, I
found other ways to partially substitute for the information I was unable to get from that
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particular avenue of investigation. For example, I was often able to observe those
residents who visited the committee for various reasons. Their interactions with
committee members yielded much knowledge that I had hoped to get from interviews.
In addition, I tried to chat with them while they were waiting or before leaving. That
strategy was indeed productive, probably because their suspicion towards me as a
stranger was reduced somewhat inside the office of the committee.
Neighborhood activists contributed another important source of information to
my research. They are a special group of residents who often serve as a link between the
committee and ordinary residents. The committees rely heavily upon these activists to
perform diverse community functions. And at the same time, these activists maintain
intimate relations with individual residents, most of whom are their next-door neighbors
or are people living in the same building as them. Therefore these activists possess a
detailed knowledge of neighborhood politics. In addition, as a special group of
residents, the activists and their various relationships to the committees were germane
to this project.
Besides residents, I also interviewed at several institutions that exist inside the
communities, including three property management companies, the Chinese Young
Men’s Christian Association of Tianjin (YMCA), a hotel, and a Chinese opera troupe.
These institutions have no formal ties to the committee, but they are important because
their existence in the community significantly affects the ways that issues arise between
the residents and the committees.
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Documentation
The third instrument that I employed in data collection was documentation.
Since the information generated from interviews and participant observation always
included subjective judgment and interpretation, the documentation I gathered from the
archives will complement the conclusion drawn in this project with hard evidence and
objectivity. Indeed, the documentation that I gathered for this project came primarily
from these archives, and was rather more detailed than I originally expected to find.
Initially, I doubted the possibility of even obtaining valuable documents from
these committees. I even doubted that there were any, given what I had heard about how
disorganized the Residents Committee were. However, all throughout the process of my
field research I was amazed by the quality and quantity of archives that are maintained
by the four committees, particularly since the mid-1990s. The Huashan Residents
Committee even kept a good archive of documents that went back as far as 1985––the
year that the committee was established. It was clear that most committees spent a fair
amount of time handling various documents and that they kept them in a rather decent
order. The archives turned out to be wonderful resources from which I was able to learn
much about both the current functions and the historical evolution of the four
committees.
I also relied on governmental documents for information. I was able to access
these documents at the street office and various civil affairs bureaus and they included
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regulations, policies, and research reports. None of them were classified as “national
secret,” “internal documents,” or “internal circulation.” 42

42

Those classified documents are restricted in access and citation without legal permission.
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Informant Protection
The general risk the informants who participated in my project faced regarding
their liability for revealing their thoughts and opinions was very low. However, they
might have encountered some potential risks in extreme cases when a few touchy issues
regarding social control were discussed, although it is highly unlikely that these
potential risks could ever become reality as a result of my project.
All informants participated in my study on a voluntary basis. However, it is my
responsibility to take measures so as to prevent the worst from happening, not merely in
order to fulfill the general ethical requirements involved with research, but also because
of my moral obligation to those informants who were kind and forthcoming enough to
support my study in the first place. There are several measures that I have taken to
achieve this goal.
First, I have used pseudonyms throughout the entire research process. The
participants’ names, institutions that they are affiliated with, and addresses are replaced
with different names that would be commonly used in a Chinese context. This
protection strategy has been employed throughout the entire research process, including
in data collection, data analysis, dissertation writing, project presentation, and final
publication.
Second, throughout my writing process, I have paid close attention to each
context for where sensitive information may be revealed about any of the informants.
Throughout the project and throughout every stage of the research I have conducted, I
have constantly considered changing the context if necessary so as to detach informants
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from any information they revealed that would connect their potentially sensitive
comments to their names, institutions of affiliation, or neighborhoods.
Third, I alone maintain the interview notes and other collected documents, and I
have not and will not transmit them through e-mail, fax, or telephone.
Finally, I only use public data throughout this project so that no extra risks will
be transferred to the participants of the research. The public data is not necessarily
derived from the records of the Residents Committee, but it is nevertheless relevant to
each of the organizations and to the committee in general. It includes sources that are
open to the public, such as laws, newspapers, articles, books, and government
regulations and policies.
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The Statutory Functions of the Residents Committees
Four Cases Compared
Chapter Four

Prologue
This chapter begins the main empirical analysis segment of this project. The
main goal of this chapter is to understand the functions of the four Residents
Committees, which is the first part of the research question raised in this project. It also
establishes the empirical basis for exploring neighborhood politics as they relate to the
committee, which eventually leads this project into tentatively inferring the broad
grassroots state-society relations in contemporary China.
The Organic Law of Urban Residents Committees requires the committee to
play three types of functions simultaneously: social control, service provision, and
grassroots self-governance. As a result, the committee is in a delicate position where it
must attempt to strike a balance between the prerogatives of the state and those of
ordinary residents. In the pre-reform totalitarian system, the committee tended towards
offering only unilateral solutions to problems, and thus qualified itself as being only a
penetrative instrument of the state. However, in 1978 China turned the page of history.
Its totalitarian politics have since evolved into a politics of political authoritarianism
and its planned economy has been replaced by one largely based on the principles of a
free market. The impacts of this macro transformation have been pervasive in Chinese
society, and have trickled down all the way to the urban grassroots as well. As the
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leading neighborhood organization, the committee has had to adjust itself so as to
accommodate the powerfully social and economic forces that have been pressing down
from above and vibrating up from below. This adjustment can come into effect vis-à-vis
the committee only insofar that its functionality changes accordingly. How are its three
statutory functions carried out today? This question is meaningful because in answering
it we learn about the ways that the transformation of the committee has occurred, and
we are also able to understand better the nature of the contemporary Chinese statesociety relations at the urban grassroots level.
The chapter addresses the question by comparing the four committees, Jingtai,
Huashan, Dejia, and Shiyan. The statutory functions that apply to each committee are
delineated. Social control is the major topic that is discussed with regard to the Jingtai
Residents Committee. In the Huashan Residents Committee, the focus is on its active
engagement in the neighborhood economy as well as on its functions related to social
control. As for the Dejia and Shiyan Residents Committees with comprehensive
functions, the emphasis is on the characteristics that define each committee best. The
former devotes itself to service provision while the latter has moved further towards
grassroots self-governance. The chapter is divided up by cases rather than functions so
as to provide a holistic picture of each committee. Functional comparisons are inserted
into the discussion as the case study moves along. Based upon the functions observed,
each committee is also compared to the dimensions of the four analytical models
discussed earlier.
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Jingtai – A Penetrative Residents Committee
The Jingtai Community is located in downtown Tianjin. It is relatively small
with only four fourteen-floored high-rising buildings and eight six-floored buildings.
The housing property of the community is privately-owned, the price tags of which
range from half a million to three million yuan (RMB). Since the community was built
in 2000, the Huaxia Property Management Company (HPMC) has provided
comprehensive services to Jingtai residents from 24-hours security attention to daily
property maintenance.
The community is a showcase of the upward mobility experienced by certain
Chinese citizens and communities during the waves of economic liberalization. People
living in the community belong to the elite in Tianjin City. Even though they constitute
only a tiny portion of Tianjiners, they are an important and unique slice of the urban
population that has arisen in the reform era. What occurs in the community is integral
for understanding the broad picture of grassroots transformation in China.
Jingtai Residents Committee
The committee itself has three female committee members. Its director, Ms.
Gong Pei, is a state employee from the Weifang Street Office. It is very common for the
street offices to send down public officials to lead the Residents Committees in China.
The primary goal is to “manage the Residents Committees and make certain that they
accurately execute the governmental policies and better serve their residents.” 43 Ms.
Gong Pei has a college degree, which is rare among those who work in the Residents
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Interview with Mr. Li Tie, the director of the Weifang Street Office.
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Committees. The other two members are not state officials. Before they joined the
committee, Ms. Hu Xiaoyan retired from a steel factory and Ms. Han Xue was a
unemployed textile worker.
The committee is unusual in many ways. It was created only recently in 2002, a
brand new committee with no historical burden. It is located in one of the most affluent
communities in Tianjin City, which provides it with superb business infrastructure that
support it. The committee has only three members, the smallest number of any of the
four committees I visited. However, the most notable aspect of the committee is its
simple functionality. It pays exclusive attention to social control and leaves service
provision and neighborhood self-governance largely unattended.
Social Control
Political Dissent. It was May when I was in the Jingtai Community. The months
of May and June have been politically sensitive times ever since the student protest of
June 1989, the largest political demonstration since the establishment of the PRC. While
many Chinese citizens can barely recall the incident fifteen years later, the government
is still taking necessary precautions every May and June so as to prevent a similar
incident.
The community has three former student protesters, who have become
successful businessmen and have purchased their houses in the Jingtai Community.
However, they are still closely monitored by the government. This monitoring is
facilitated by cooperation between the committee and the local police station. In one
morning in May, a police officer paid a special visit to the committee and asked Ms. Hu
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Xiaoyan to be extra attentive about the recent activities of those three residents until the
end of June. She was told to monitor what they were doing at home or whether they had
unusual visitors, etc. She was instructed to report any suspicious activity immediately to
the police station. The officer finally reminded Ms. Hu Xiaoyan to be very careful about
this business. If the subjects did something politically unacceptable, there would be
serious consequences for both the police station and the committee.
The same police officer visited the committee for the same issue again a week
later, and called several time to get updates. Ms. Hu Xiaoyan was quite responsive. She
paid a home visit to one of the subjects, and called the other two subjects so as to learn
their recent activities. In one case, one subject was out of town for business. Ms. Hu
Xiaoyan took notes about the location and the purpose of the trip from his family
members and quickly reported them to the police. Another surveillance measure she
took was to ask building leaders to pay attention to the activities of those three
residents. 44
Falun Gong Practitioners. Since 1990s, Falun Gong has led the largest antigovernment movement in the recent history of China. As a self-claimed religious
network with an independent organizational structure, communications system, and
financial base, Falun Gong is considered to be the largest single organization that has
challenged the Chinese government in the recent decade (Tong, 2002). Since declaring
Falun Gong as an outlaw manipulative cult in 1999, the government has launched
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Chinese neighborhoods are often divided into several clusters of small groups [jumin xiaozu], usually
according to their residential proximity. A building leader is usually a resident who serves himself/herself
as the Residents Committee’s liaison in a cluster.
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nationwide campaigns so as to uproot the organization and its influence on society
(Thornton, 2002).
On my first visit to the committee, I noticed two new blackboards with cartoons
at the entrance to the committee office. One cartoon celebrated the successful launch of
a Chinese manned spaceship, the Shenzhou 5. Another condemned the evil of Falun
Gong, which indicated its unusual interest in controlling Falun Gong practitioners.
One would not feel surprised to see such cartoons at the peak of anti-Falun
Gong campaigns between 1999 and 2000. The campaign has gradually waned since
then. The timing and placement of this cartoon is interesting, as the committee is the
only one that still displays such anti-Falun Gong cartoon today. Director Gong Pei
offered an explanation for this. The Jingtai Community has several Falun Gong
practitioners who refuse to give up their beliefs. 45 The cartoon is a good format to
educate those practitioners and the general public. In addition, displaying such a
blackboard would be considered an achievement and a thorough step towards the
committee efficiently carrying out its social control function by the Weifang Street
Office. As I found out later, there were almost no other “shining points” that the
committee could claim. The cartoon, then, is a precautionary measure and a small stop
that has been taken by the committee so as to––if only in a minor way––execute its
social control function. Finally, it is for self-protection. If those practitioners do
something bad, the committee at least has something to show that it tried.
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She did not give me the exact numbers. However, I suspect the number would be very small from my
conversations with her and other committee members. I also learned that all of the practitioners were
seniors.
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Besides this propaganda campaign, the committee also serves as the eyes and
ears of the local police station over those Falun Gong practitioners that live in the
neighborhood. The means by which they monitor them adherents are the same as those
employed to monitor the above-mentioned political dissidents.
Abnormal Gatherings. The term “abnormal gathering” refers to those
relatively large private meetings whose participants are convened for non-family
purposes as abnormal gatherings. According to Ms. Gong Pei, those gatherings are not
necessarily illegal, but might be potentially harmful in terms of social stability if they
were to get out of control. Surveillance over abnormal gatherings in the Jingtai
Community is a unique social control endeavor that I was not witness in the other three
communities.
There was one case on January 16th when a dozen people—mostly nonresidents—went into Room 102 of Building #12 in the Jingtai neighborhood. This
immediately aroused the concern of the committee. After two additional gatherings on
February 6 and 8 at the same place, the committee reported the activity to the local
police. The working diary of the committee shows eight total such gatherings that took
place between February and May. For each gathering, the committee wrote down quite
specific information, such as time, number of the participants and their demographic
composition, some of their activities, and even the ways they came in and left the
community. The committee finally found out that the gatherings were not for political
purposes, but were simply business meetings about a one-to-one marketing network.
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The committee though kept monitoring them closely, as they were requested to by the
local police.
The committee also recorded another case on April 18 when more than thirty
people joined at the Room 1202 of Building # 10. It turned out to be just a regular party
to celebrate the family’s son who just returned from France after studying there.
Released Convicts. The member of this particular demographic are generally
treated as elements of “instability” because of their past wrongdoings in China. The
Residents Committee is usually asked to monitor them for the sake of public safety.
There is currently only one released convict living in the Jingtai community, and he
currently has a stable job, so apparently the committee has stopped monitoring him
regularly, except by way of making a phone call to him every couple of months.
Family Planning (Birth Control) Policy. It has been the national policy to
contain overgrowth of population since the mid 1970s. A key reason for the success of
the policy is the state’s capacity for efficiently and systematically monitoring and
influencing the lives of individual citizens. The Residents Committee in general plays
important roles to assist the state in this area (Read, 2000). However, the Jingtai
Residents Committee in particular had done a very bad job. One simple fact tells all.
The committee does not have information about the number of female residents of
childbearing age in its community. Without that information, how could it be possible
to prevent violations of the policy? As Ms. Han Xue suspected privately, violations of
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the policy are probably not unusual in the community.46 The committee’s bad
performance is largely the result of its lax attention to another social control
policy/mechanism when it did equally poorly, the household registration system.
Household Registration System. In China, one has to obtain a permit from the
state to reside legally in a city. The state created the system in order to control the
population flow and to stop illegal residents from migrating to the cities. All urban
residents need to register at local police stations. However, the local police––because of
their limited resources––often ask the Residents Committees to track the legal status of
their residents. This gives the committee a good opportunity to gather, retain, and
control basic information about its residents. The household registration system is
indeed the information database upon which all information-based efforts of the
committee depend. A committee that deals with thousands of residents simply cannot
function properly without it.
Such an information system is totally absent in the Jingtai Residents Committee.
None of its three members even seemed to know or be able to approximate the exact
number of households and residents present in the community. One said 265 and 750,
while the other said 680 and 2,800 respectively. There is no way to confirm these
numbers without the basic household registration system. This also explains why the
committee cannot implement the family planning policy.
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Interview with Ms. Han Xue. According to her, violation of family planning policy is a big challenge
for rich communities like the Jingtai. The state usually punishes those violators with heavy fine today,
which is effective for peasants and poor urban residents. However rich people like the Jingtai residents
are largely not subject to this restraint.
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Effectiveness of Social Control. As is the case in most of the rest of the world,
the local police station in China often keeps a list of names on hand of residents who,
for various reasons, have been marked as potential troublemakers. However, the local
police station has many security issues to handle, besides controlling and monitoring the
activities of political dissidents. For example, the Weifang Police Station has forty-three
officers who are responsible for all the kinds of security-related problems that can arise
among 47,514 residents living in the Weifang Street––of which the Jingtai Community
is only one part. The police thus have to rely upon neighborhood organizations to
conduct the daily surveillance operations. The Jingtai Residents Committee is very
active and helpful in this regard.
Certainly, the committee is not a textbook case of a penetrative model in the
simple, commonsense definition of the term. It does not break into the homes of
targeted residents, interrogate them, employ any coercive means to gain compliance
from them, or inflict direct harm on them. However, it does contribute several important
elements to the state’s chain of political control by monitoring targeted residents,
reporting abnormalities, and coordinating with local police. Without its informationgathering input, the local police wound not easily be able to put their hands on so many
political targets.
However, the committee also displays severe shortfalls in its ability to perform
its social control function. Despite its effectiveness in controlling political subjects, the
committee fails to implement those control policies that involve large numbers of
residents, such as family planning (birth control) policy. It is relatively easy to monitor
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a few political targets. However, the committee performs far below the state’s
expectations in its management of its thousands of residents.
Alienation, Fraud and Suspect Corruption
Alienation. The committee is very isolated from its residents, although it is
supposed to be their organization. Most Jingtai residents would be pleased if the
committee did not exist at all. A few are indifferent towards its existence, but the
majority of residents seem to feel annoyed by the committee. There are structural
explanations for the stringent relationship between the residents and the committee, but
these will be discussed in the next chapter. However, at the functional level, the
committee cannot, or is not willing to, take on additional functions above and beyond
the most basic related to social control. For most Jingtai residents, the committee is like
a sort of empty shell or straw man, doing nothing to benefit the community.
Fraud. Although the committee offers little in the way of services to its
residents, it does carry out some administrative services. Most of those services require
it to engage with its residents, which is something that ostensibly the committee is
unable or unwilling to do. Under such circumstances, fraud can become rampant. For
example, in one case the committee was asked to report the number of children living in
the community of ages between 0-7 so as to arrange for immunization shots. This
information should come from the household registration system. Since it was missing,
the committee simply cooked a number.
In another case, the traffic police department conducted a survey to learn about
ordinary residents’ awareness of traffic regulation in order to decide the appropriate
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means for promoting traffic safety awareness. The committee was given fifty
questionnaires that were supposed to be randomly distributed to fifty households.
Instead, the committee members, two neighborhood activists, and I spent an afternoon
filling them out. According to Ms. Gong Pei, “it is a piece of cake, and it is not worthy
of residents’ time to do it.” The truth was that she could neither get enough residents to
fill the forms out nor die she want to bother spending time on it herself.
Suspect Corruption. The most embarrassing moment of my research was
when I asked Ms. Gong Pei for the committee’s financial books. Her face immediately
turned into cloud and she grew extremely suspicious of my request. I suddenly realized
that something was wrong, and the following moment of silence between her and me
was really uncomfortable. Later, Ms. Han Xue whispered to me that that I should never
ask for that type of information again. In the end, I never had a chance to read the
financial books. 47
The attitudes of Ms. Gong Pei and Han Xue made me cautious about the
sensitivity of the financial information in the committee. It was often that committee
members used the office phone for private purposes and this act––though seemingly
trivial––might have involved elements of serious corruption. However, some serious
corruption might occur. First, the committee creates a revenue source by offering one of
its offices for gambling. It provides tables and chairs, drinks, and air conditioning for
people to play Majiong every afternoon except Sunday. 48 In return, the committee
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It is the only committee where I could not get its financial information, even though I was treated as a
government-sponsored researcher.
48
Majiong is an extremely popular Chinese game, which is used for both gambling and entertainment.
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charges each table two yuan for each round of play. The room has five tables, which are
often occupied fully throughout the afternoon. Therefore, it would not be hard to collect
fifty yuan each afternoon. This is big money since the Weifang Street Office only
appropriates 450 yuan per month for the committee’s operating budget. And the
committee would of course never record the revenue earned from such activities in the
financial books, especially since the government has recently banned Majiong tables
and the holding of other gambling in a public space.
In addition, the committee leases out one of its offices to a trading company as a
warehouse. No one but the committee director knows the leasing price. The space
leased out is 70 m2 with a market value of roughly 3,000 yuan per month. Ms. Han Xue
believed that the company only paid 350 yuan per month.
Summary
The Jingtai Residents Committee is exceptional because of its commitment only
to the function of social control. Although it is only two years old, the committee plays
quite an active role in surveillance of politically-sensitive targets that live in the
community. Meanwhile, it makes no effort to serve or to represent its constituents. In
general, the Jingtai Resident Committee is rather reminiscent of the old imagine of the
pre-reform era: it looks quite a bit like a penetrative social control instrument. However,
being an alienated and marginalized player, the committee has rather limited control
capacity: it did little regarding birth control, the household registration system, or
administrative services.
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Nevertheless, it is still enlightening to see that the committee has a rather
primitive style of political functioning… yet it happens to sit in one of the most
economically advanced communities in China. The committee is not substantively
different—in terms of functionality—from the traditional politics of the previous
totalitarian system. However, the Jingtai Community is a completely new neighborhood
in terms of what it has become since economic liberalization. It is a fortunate thing that
I was able to study the committee when I was, because the timing is critical for
interpreting the coexistence of the seemingly incongruent elements that made up the
functionality and context of the committee. The Jingtai committee seems to present a
kind of continuity with old politics, but it does this inside of a dramatically new context
that has almost nothing in common with the politics of old. This kind of politicking
existing inside of this kind of dramatically different environment exemplifies what has
broadly been called “China Paradox.” The presence of a free economy in tandem with
authoritarian politics truly challenges one’s imagination. The fact that the Jingtai
Residents Committee falls into the penetrative model suggests one major thing:
profound economic transformations have changed little the dynamics of the grassroots
interactions between the state and ordinary citizens. Is this lesson applicable to other
communities? The Huashan Community offers its own story.
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Huashan – A Corporatist Residents Committee
If the Jingtai Community has been an economic winner in the reform era, the
Huashan has clearly been a loser. Bumpy roads, broken windows, rampant rubbish
weed, litter, and dark stairways marked this huge blue-collar neighborhood with nearly
6,000 residents. The community has twenty-eight six-floored buildings, all of which
contain public apartments owned by the local government housing department. The
community was built in 1983 to accommodate workers who came to work for several
new manufacturing plants at the outskirts of the Hebei District. Most Huashan adults
worked for the Xinhua Bicycle Factory and the Tianjin Number Eight Textile Factory.
The former went bankrupt in 1997, and the latter has cut its labor force nearly eighty
percent from its peak level of employment. As the result, the Huashan Community has
been hard hit economically and has not recovered.
Huashan Residents Committee
The Huashan Residents Committee was created in 1985 primarily for the
purpose of curbing thefts and robberies that occurred in the newly built Huashan
Community. 49 Since then, the committee has gone through puzzling integration,
separation, and reintegration with its two neighboring communities, Yuanshan and
Tongshan. The committee finally came into being as it is today in 2001.
The committee has seven members. The director, Mr. Cao Hui, is a state
employee from the Meiyuan Street Office. He took the position during a very difficult
time when the Huashan residents clashed with the committee and the Meiyuan Street
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Interview with Grandma Liu Jiafeng, the first director of the Huashan Residents Committee.
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Office over a disputed road project on May 1, 2003. 50 All of the other committee
members are female; two are retired workers and four were formerly unemployed. The
committee occupies a 40m2 apartment, which is too tight to even house all of its
members. Indeed, one can barely find a place to stand in the office, and the committee
has to divide and share some obsolete office furniture that was purchased in the 1980s.
And although the new committee under Mr. Cao has been subjected to some very tough
changes since 2003, this section of the project primarily discusses the functions of the
committee as they were before 2003.
Social Control
The economic downturn in the Huashan neighborhood has greatly worsened the
security situation in this blue-collar community. The community currently has 833 laidoff workers and this number is likely to grow, as the textile factory will apply for
bankruptcy soon. As a result, the Huashan Residents Committee faces the toughest
social control challenges among all the four committees.
Falun Gong Practitioners. The community is home to twenty-one dedicated
Falun Gong practitioners, some of whom are even repatriated from protesting in
Beijing. Comparing to the Jingtai Residents Committee, the Huashan Residents
Committee is more effective in this area for two reasons.
First, the local police set up a dispatch security unit inside the community in late
1999. The unit has two security guards that assist local police in monitoring those
practitioners and other politically sensitive subjects, and that assist in dealing with

50

It will be discussed in the next chapter.
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ordinary crimes. Second, the committee is able to mobilize its 101 building leaders and
other neighborhood activists to join in on surveillance operations. These activists have
more accurate and timely information about the activities of the practitioners, too, so
they are a great resource for the committee to be able to deploy in its effort to maintain
social order.
The committee, with the dispatch security unit and neighborhood activists, is
capable of arranging 24-hour surveillance over the practitioners. For example, it takes
such a measure during major holidays and big political events, such as the Spring
Festival or the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress. This partially
explains why no practitioners have gone to Beijing to protest since 2000. 51
The stories of both the Jingtai and Huashan Residents Committees show that the
state still maintains the effective means for controlling political targets in contemporary
China. Both committees are rather supportive of the state’s control policies. As a result,
the local police are well informed, and can therefore allocate their forces efficiently. In
the Jingtai Community, the police completely rely upon the Jingtai Residents
Committee for control, as only a few practitioners reside there. In contrast, the police
built more capacity in the Huashan Community, as the community was once home to a
local chapter of Falun Gong and still has many diehard practitioners for residents today.
Other Socially Discontented Individuals. Street protests in China have
exploded in frequency in recent years, which reflects the increasing tension in
contemporary Chinese society (Tanner, 2004). Although these street protests are not
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politically motivated, street protest is still considered a threat to social stability. 52 Local
governments are particularly against them, as the protesters’ main goal is often to gain
sympathy from higher state officials, hoping that these officials will help to alleviate
their personal sufferings that are often blamed on the policies of local government.
These local governments thus try very hard to contain discontented individuals that they
think may have the intention to protest.
The Huashan Community is home to “famous” street protesters. Mr. Cao Hui
complained that his committee has had to work like firefighters. Whenever there were
troubling signs, the committee would first arrange close surveillance and then rush to
prevent the trouble. The job was not easy, since no one would consider protesting unless
there were no alternatives. Protestors thus—in the experience of the Huashan
Community—are a difficult lot to please. This means that the committee has to spend
tremendous effort in trying to convince the individual(s) to give up.
In one case, Grandpa Niu, a 78 years old resident, threatened to protest in
Beijing. He had a dispute with the Gaoyang County Court as the later failed to follow
through on granting him a compensation plan for three years. The committee knew that
Grandpa Niu’s threat was credible, since he had protested in Beijing in 2002 when the
Sixteenth National Congress of the CCP was convened. His intention put great pressure
to the Meiyuan Street Office.
In order to put out the “fire,” the committee and local street officials first tried to
persuade and even discourage Grandpa Niu, but failed. In the end, Mr. Cao Hui and a
52

Most street protests target issues pertained to individual lives, such as personal injury, salary in arrears,
land dispute, and medical malpractice.
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local street official had to travel twice to Gaoyang County Court to explain the
seriousness of the issue. Under pressure, the court decided to pay 3,500 yuan and to
offer a verbal apology to Grandpa Niu, which finally defused the crisis.
This is not an example of a mediation case involving only ordinary residents (or
other non-state players), which has little or no political consequences. Threatening a
street protest implies a potential conflict between the state and residents (or non-state
players), which clearly does have political consequences. In this regard, the committee
is doing a political favor to the state by stabilizing the neighborhood.
Released Convicts. The same strategy used for monitoring potential protesters
is also applied to released convicts. The committee has maintained a watch list of those
released within five years. 53 Among the thirteen residents on the list, most of them are
stable, except for one who has recently been involved in a dispute with his parents. The
committee has notified the building leader to watch him very carefully and to report any
abnormal activity.
Family Planning (Birth Control) Policy and Household Registration System.
The committee is much more effective than the Jingtai Residents Committee as far as
these functional areas are concerned. The committee maintains very detailed records
vis-à-vis the household registration system. For example, it has a file for each female
resident of childbearing age, including her ID number, age, and family composition; it
even contains information about her career, her close relatives, the means of
contraception she utilizes, etc. The committee also prepares a list of so-called “key
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persons”, including unemployed women, self-employed women, and women who were
remarried but not qualified for an additional child. Assisted by neighborhood activists,
the committee can easily find out who violates the family planning policy. And
according to the records, there has been only one violation of the family planning policy
in the history of the Huashan Community. That occurred during a transitional time
when the committee was regrouped and re-constructed in 1997. 54
Neighborhood Mediation. Because of how widespread conditions of economic
hardship are, the community is witness to lots neighborhood bickering and fighting. The
story about the “beheaded” mulberry tree in Chapter Two is an example of only a minor
dispute. There are consistently many much more serious disputes that take place on a
regular basis that require the committee’s mediation. This kind of mediation prevents
neighborhood squabbles from becoming criminal activities, which could ease the state’s
burden in terms of public security.
Table 4-1 shows the number of cases mediated by the committee over the years.
These cases have covered a wide range of neighborhood issues, involving everything
from marriage to issues of heritage rights to how best to support seniors to
neighborhood disputes… some have even involved adultery.
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The committee member responsible for the failure was laid off, as I was told.
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Table 4-1: Cases of Neighborhood Mediations in the Huashan Residents
Committee (1985-2003)
Year
Number of mediations 55
1985
n.a.
1986
52
1987
n.a.
1988
36
1989
21
1990
30
1991
26
1992
8
1993
21
1994
13
1995
15
1996
n.a.
1997
n.a.
1998
22
1999
44
2000
29
2001
64
2002
40
2003
52
Community crime. Even if the above-mentioned social control jobs are still
manageable, fighting community crime seems to be a “mission impossible” for the
committee. According to the committee’s report to the Meiyuan Street Office, seven
crimes occurred in the community in the first quarter of 2003, five burglaries and two
robberies. In a public notice to residents, the committee and local police station together
warned all residents to be very vigilant and to be on the lookout for any suspicious
person and activity inside the community, since seventeen crimes occurred between
October 1 and December 15 of 2003. The committee and local police believed that
outsiders committed most of those crimes.
55

Cases before 1997 and cases in 2000 only cover the Huashan Community, not including the Yuanshan
and Tongshan Communities. The rest includes the three communities, i.e., the Huashan Community after
regrouping.
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There are many reasons for this level of neighborhood insecurity. First (and
most obviously) the economic deprivation in the whole area is a key factor. However,
Mr. Cao Hui also pointed his blame-finger at local governments as well as his
predecessors. The community has seven gates and none of them are guarded. “We are
living in a defenseless castle. It is like a house with its door unlocked. One can come in
and leave freely. How can we expect to have a safe community while we do not guard
our gates?” he complained. 56
The street office and police station refused to provide money to put guards at
gate or to extend the hours of neighborhood security-watching patrol. Soliciting money
from residents was also impossible, not only because of how poor and economically
depressed the residents of the Huashan Community had become, but also because of the
bad reputation Ms. Cao Hui’s predecessors had left the committee with. In the year
2000, the then committee director had solicited 10 yuan per household in the name of
putting guards at each gate. However, only two empty sentry boxes were built
eventually.
Service Provision, Neighborhood Economy and Cozy Politics
The committee’s function in service provision can best be analyzed by being
broken down into two sections: first, there are those administrative services that have
been consistent from 1985 to today, and there are those that existed only before 2003.
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In China, many urban communities are closed from the outside by walls and gates, like the Jingtai,
Dejia, and Shiyan Communities. Even the Huashan Community has walls and gates, although they are
poorly maintained.
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Administrative Services Persisting until Today. These include governmental
evaluations (and examinations or appraisals), neighborhood cleanup campaigns, charity
and donation activities, government-sponsored censuses and surveys, and many other
things. They come down from local governments and often require participation from
ordinary residents.
The apathy from residents as far as these services are concerned creates
difficulties for the committee. Despite their reluctance to deal with these types of
initiatives that come down from above, the committee does not deal idly with those
assignments. I participated in a governmental survey involving all types of
organizations in and around the neighborhood, including schools, clinics, convenience
stores, and small businesses. It was an exhausting job, since many organizations
refused to cooperate. They worried that the survey might lead to their being assigned
new financial expenses for them in the future, such as taxes and fees. It often took more
than twenty minutes to get one survey done. However, unlike the Jingtai Residents
Committee, the Huashan Residents Committee carried out the survey seriously without
cooking or forgery.
Service Existing Only Before 2003. This is the area of operation and services
that most clearly defines the way in which the Huashan Resident Committee is currently
operating and defines the way that its current structure has evolved. The committee had
committed most of its energy to the so called the “neighborhood economy.” 57 It had run
a group of neighborhood businesses and treated them as its absolute priority (Table 4-2).
57

The Meiyuanzhuang Street Office defined it as neighborhood economic activities that could serve
residents and reduce the street office’s fiscal burden.
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This experience is unique, as the Dejia and Shiyan Residents Committees have
participated in economic activities only on a very limited basis, and the Jingtai
Residents Committee has never participated in anything similar. 58
Table 4-2: Neighborhood Economy Managed by the Huashan Residents
Committee (1986-2003)
(yuan)

Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Income
11,197 59
7,052
6,082
790 60
4,202
14,218
7,902 61
15,322
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

Expenditure
10,650
4,922
5,023
657
867
8,828
n.a.
1,890
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

Net income
547
2,130
1,059
133
3,335
5,391
n.a.
13,433
12,354
17,168
12,750 62
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
17,928
n.a.

Generally speaking, the committee ran quite a successful business. It generated a
net profit of 547 yuan in the first year, and the monthly income was only seven yuan for
the director and five yuan for other committee members. 63 By 1993, the net income had
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The businesses in the Dejia and Shiyan Residents Committees were terminated in 1997.
All numbers are rounded up.
60
The numbers in 1989 is only for the January. The numbers for the whole year were not available.
61
The number in 1992 covers only from January to October.
62
The number in 1996 covers only from January to August. The target of net revenue was set to 20,400
yuan.
63
The expenditure in 1986 was extremely high because of the cost of initial investments.
59
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reached 13,433 yuan, an amount that could have allowed the committee to hire seventyfive committee members. 64
The initial businesses that were run by the Huashan Residents Committee
included repairing bicycles and selling milk and bread. Those services proved to be
extremely popular in an age of scarce goods and services. The success of the business
surprised the committee, since it did not realize that making money was so easy. 65
However, problems quickly emerged, as the business continued to grow. Operating the
business started to consume much of the committee’ time. For most of the time, the
committee had to assign three of its members to running the business. There was a
period between 1992 and 1994 when all the members were directly involved in the
business. This greatly compromised the committee’s capacity to handle other
neighborhood affairs, such as neighborhood security and cleanups.
To make things even worse, the neighborhood economy had changed form a bit.
Over the years, its orientation shifted from providing residents with convenient services
to seeking profit and selling products wherever and however it could (Table 4-3). Some
of the newer businesses that had appeared in the Huashan neighborhood—such as the
various shoe workshops, garment workshops, and plastic workshops—produced bulk
goods primarily for outside consumers rather than for Huashan residents. The electronic
gaming center that had also appeared was more controversial, as many residents were
not comfortable with how much the center seemed to be creating a dangerous new kind
64

The monthly income for a committee member was 15 yuan in 1992, according to the committee’s
annual report.
65
Interview with Grandma Gao Xuxia, a former committee member in charged of neighborhood
mediation.
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of indulgence for their children to engage in. It was however a very profitable 2,000yuan business for the committee. The noises from the plastic and shoe workshops were
also very annoying to neighborhood residents.
Table 4-3: Types of Neighborhood Businesses in the Huashan Residents
Committee 66
Types of services
Year of creation
Bicycle repairing
1986
Bicycle rental
1987
Shoe repairing
1986
Shoe workshop
1990 (closed in 1992 for losing money)
Appliance repairing
1986
Barber shop
1986
Draining service
1986
Milk, bread, candle, and stamp
1986 (later expanded three convenient stores)
Tailor store
1986
Lunch for students
1988 (later expanded to a cafeteria and three
restaurants)
Garment workshop
1991
Neighborhood cleaning
1987
Entertainment rooms
1991
Nursery
1986 (later expanded into four)
Drug store
1993
Plastic workshop
1989
Electronic gaming center
1992 (closed in 2001)
Flower shop
1993
Home decoration shop
1997
There were several even more contentious issues that soured and antagonized
the committee’s relationship with its residents. Many residents blamed those outsiders
who worked in the community’s businesses for how insecure the community had
become in terms of crime. The committee was thus essentially accused of being doubledealing as it expressed concerns about neighborhood security on the one hand while it
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The table is not a complete list of what the Huashan Residents Committee was doing. In addition, each
type of service might change from time to time in its content and scale.
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also allowed and even seemed to invite so many outsiders in to work and live in the
community.
Another issue that arose between the committee and the residents involved the
ten commercial bungalows that were built on the public land of the community—in
accordance with the lobbying efforts and permission of the committee. The Huashan
residents deeply resented the committee’s decision, as they thought that it was they who
owned the public land, and not the committee. Accordingly, the residents believed that
if these bungalows were to be built that the profits from them should be public property.
They not unexpectedly became even more upset and cynical, then, about the fact that
the committee had never publicized any details about either its own economic activities
or about the usage of the profits from the bungalows. It was widely believed among the
residents that the committee must have many “secrets” that could not be admitted
publicly about where the money was going.
The committee’s businesses also provoked another type of resentment. Because
of heavy unemployment in the community, the working opportunities at the
committee’s businesses became quite attractive, particularly to the unemployed women
of the community. 67 However, a very few residents were actually hired. The committee
preferred outsiders to its residents, as the latter were often accused of being privileged,
choosy, and hard to be managed. 68 But residents believed that this argument was only a
pretext for the nepotism that they perceived to be occurring in the hiring process. They
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There were around fifty working positions either through the committee’s direct hiring or through those
who rented the commercial bungalows for business.
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Interview with a former director of the committee, Grandma Liu Jiafeng.
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complained that only neighborhood activists or other connected persons were hired.
Even those peasants who collected garbage in the community were thought by the
residents to have needed some sort of kinship with somebody in the committee to get
their job.
This resentment from ordinary residents quickly fermented as the committee’s
business continued to grow. Some residents attempted to spill the beans about what they
perceived to be the “secret business” of the committee by writing disclosure letters to
local governments. Their effort proved futile. Despite the widespread malcontent of the
residents and the rumors that made their way to them, local governments—particularly
the Meiyuan Street Office—sheltered the committee indiscriminately.
An Interest Symbiosis. The Meiyuan Street Office had been the key partner in
the committee’s business endeavors over the years. It was the street office that ordered
the committee to start neighborhood businesses in the first place. The committee
initially opposed the idea. However, the street office made the successful establishment
and operation of such businesses the primary item that the committee’s over all
performance would be evaluated in terms of. Since each committee member’s stipend
was tied to the evaluation, the committee was actually pushed to “xiahai” [jump into the
ocean] as far as these businesses were concerned. 69
The street office also provided critical logistic and material support for these
committee-run businesses. It provided all of the start-up and all the subsequent financial
supports that were required. In addition, it brought in goods for the committee to sell in
69

Xiahai was a catchword in 1980s, describing the act of starting engaging in business outside of the
planned economic system.
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the community. It even arranged for outside buyers for the plastic goods, shoes, and
clothes that were made in the community.
When the disputes over the bungalows and the public land rose, the street office
repeatedly reminded Huashan residents that all property of the community––including
the apartments and public land––was owned by the state. On its public posters to
residents, the street office upheld the committee’s decision to build the bungalows and
“kindly” told the residents not to stall the process. It also strongly backed the
committee’s effort to stop the few residents who intended to use their apartments for
convenience stores or small dining rooms. The street office even threatened to take back
their apartments if those residents insisted on using them commercially.
So, why did the street office so unconditionally support the committee? The
committee’s annual reports to the street office disclosed the reason. There was a“4-1-5”
revenue sharing plan between the committee and the street office. According to the plan,
the committee took forty percent of the net income from all of the business operations
in the neighborhood. The street office got ten percent, and the remaining fifty percent
was put into a “depository fund for neighborhood betterment,” which was to be
managed by the street office. That is to say, the street office actually acquired sixty
percent of the revenue from the establishment and operation of these committee
businesses.
Since the Huashan Residents Committee was a top revenue contributor among
the seventeen Residents Committees that were subjected to the authority of the Meiyuan
Street Office, the street office certainly made an all-out attempt to shield the committee
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from the complaints of Huashan residents. Indeed, this interest symbiosis was not a
secret to residents at all. What they did not know was how exactly the profit was
divided. There was no complete information available that they could use to locate the
final destination of the profits. However, one could still assemble a pretty clear picture
about the situation by amalgamating various pieces of information. For example, a
former director of the Meiyuan Street Office was dismissed in 2000 for alleged
corruption that was associated with the depository fund. The rumor was that he was
largely innocent, since he did not embezzle the fund for himself, but distributed it as
bonus to the street office employees. The committee’s documents also showed that the
businesses had greatly increased the benefits of the committee members and
neighborhood activists. For example, the committee distributed 452 yuan to its
members in July of 1988. The monthly stipend for a committee member was less than
10 yuan at that time. In January 1990, the committee spent 1,393 yuan “for its
members.” Precise breakdowns for how this 1,393 yuan was spent were not available.
During the first three months in 1992, the average committee member received more
than 25 yuan per month, and they also received year-end bonus of 210 yuan.
Neighborhood activists received year-end bonuses of 28 yuan each in the same year.
Summary
As far as the area of social control is concerned, the Huashan Residents
Committee has a very similar nature to that of the Jingtai Residents Committee, even
though they each operate in two dramatically different communities. The former
committee is obviously stronger than the latter as far as implementing the state’s
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political and administrative control imperatives is concerned, anyway. However, this
fact only reinforces the argument that the state is still capable of penetrating the urban
grassroots level in an economically liberalizing society. The Huashan Community faces
greater challenges in terms of social control, so the state has established more of a
presence in that community. The local police even established a dispatch security unit to
maintain effective control.
However, this does not imply that the Huashan Residents Committee simply
repeats the story of the Jingtai case. The Huashan Residents Committee still managed to
provide some administrative services, although they were of limited scope. What really
distinguishes the Huashan Committee from the other three committees is its deep
involvement in economic activities. This committee, with strong support from the street
office, was able to create vibrant businesses that made considerable profits. The
committee operated daily businesses while the street office was essentially the
guarantor both of a monopoly status and the necessary logistics and resource supports
for the committee. In the end, the interest symbiosis of the street office and the
committee shared the profits. This type of collusion is more closely comparable to the
structure and dynamics described by the corporatist model of governance, rather than to
the dynamic of strict domination exhibited by the type of governing-entities that are
described by the penetrative model.

For ordinary Huashan residents, this interest symbiosis was very problematic.
Since the interests of the committee directly relied upon its business operations, the
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committee had quickly metamorphosed into a semi-commercial entity only concerned
with making a profit. Its business operations consumed much of the energy, attention,
and resources that could otherwise have been devoted to serving its residents. More
controversial was the nature of the collusion between the street office and the
committee, because the symbiosis they had only cared to fatten itself. The symbiosis
occupied public land, favored relatives and close patrons, prohibited other competitors,
and concealed its operations and profit from public scrutiny. This exclusive symbiosis
benefited a few but clearly sacrificed the larger public interest of the community.
It is widely recognized that Chinese local governments are actively engaging in
economic activities by cultivating a corporatist network with private capital. Some
believe that this corporatist structure is a key institutional factor in explaining China’s
rapidly economic expansion (Oi, 1992). However, mobilizing a Residents Committee
into moneymaking businesses is an inherently flawed venture, particularly so if the
operation is carried out in a corruptive way. As the Huashan case shows, the cozy
nature of political and economic interests displaced the committee’s normal duties,
ruined its reputation, alienated its ties with residents, and created a distrustful and even
conflictive neighborhood environment.
So far, both the Jingtai and Huashan cases indicate that the relationship between
state and society only runs one direction. The communist state continues to manipulate
society either through traditional top-down penetration or through the insulated quid pro
quo of corporatist structures of governance. Both cases also reveal a significant tension
between ordinary residents and the state’s persistent top-down influence at the urban

163

grassroots level. This fact points to a pessimistic end regarding the outline of the broad
“China paradox” between a liberal economy and a politics of authoritarianism. Is the
system passively responding to social and economic pressures with domination and
containment only? The following Dejia and Shiyan cases provide rather different
scenarios.
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Dejia – A Synergistic Residents Committee
The Dejia Community is a quiet residential compound located on the Pudong
Street. It was once one of the best communities in Tianjin City in the mid-1990s.
Nowadays, it has become a typical living place for upper-middle class residents, like so
many more advanced communities like the Jingtai Community have lately become.
The community has thirty-four six-floored and seven-floored concrete buildings,
hosting 1,578 households and 4,480 residents. It has a mixed structure of property
ownership. Two-thirds of its apartments are privately owned, and the remaining are
state-owned and leased out at discount prices to those so-called huiqianhu, the wentbackers. 70
Dejia Residents Committee
The Dejia Residents Committee was created in the early 1950s. At that time,
members of the committee were often jobless and illiterate grandmas, working for the
state voluntarily. However, the committee’s responsibilities have completely changed in
the reform era, as has its structure.
The Pudong Street Office dramatically reorganized the committee in 1997.
Today, the committee has five members. The director, Ms. Li Lan, is a state employee
from the street office. Three members are retired workers and one was formerly
unemployed. This is an efficient team that serves its residents in many ways. As a
former committee member, Grandma Xue Xiulan, joked, “I would meet [Karl] Marx
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The went-backers were the original residents of the Dejia Community, who often have low-income
status. They were allowed to return to the community at the government-subsidized price when the
community was completely rebuilt in 1993.
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very quickly if I was working under Li Lan. The committee has so many things to do. I
would rather save my old bones and take care of my grandson.”
Social Control
Neighborhood Security Network. The security network of the Dejia
Community is built around the committee. The network has one leading team and four
groups. The core of the network is the neighborhood security promotion team, which
consists of members of the committee, neighborhood activists, police officers, and
representatives from working units around the community. The team meets once a
month to discuss security problems. Ms. Li Lan, the team leader, can convene the team
when she deems it so necessary.
The first group under the team is the help and education group, which targets
politically sensitive subjects and released convicts. The group includes committee
members, police officers, building leaders, and parents or relatives of subjects. The
second is the mediation group, which aims to prevent neighborhood disputes from
escalating into criminal cases. It includes committee members, building leaders, and
those residents who are respected in the community, such as retired high-level officials
and teachers. The third group is the floating population control group. Community
members, local police, building leaders, and neighborhood activists join the group to
handle the increasing numbers of floating population that move in and out of the
community. Finally, there is also the neighborhood patrol group, which consists of
committee members and neighborhood activists. In its daily security patrols, the team is
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watchful for many things including crime, outsiders, fire, gas and sewage leak, litter,
and neighborhood disputes.
The four groups have a division of labor, yet the functions of their members
partially overlap from time to time. They and the leading neighborhood security
promotion team together have built a robust social control network in the community.
The committee is therefore able to maintain very effective social control in multiple
areas.
Falun Gong Practitioners. The three Falun Gong practitioners that live in the
community are observed by the help and education group. The group is supposed to
visit them at least once a month so that they can learn about their latest thoughts and
activities. The committee also arranges for special control measures against them during
the observance of major Chinese holidays or political moments, which includes setting
up 24 hour surveillance over them.
The committee has expressed some reluctance related to this issue. In the eyes of
many on the committee, these practitioners are not bad people, but are merely ordinary
residents who happen to be members of a cult. It would be inappropriate for the
committee as a neighborhood organization to punish its residents for these sorts of
reasons. 71 Some committee members have insisted that local police take over
responsibility for the surveillance of the practitioners of Falun Gong. As a result, the
committee often only winks at this issue. It has greatly relaxed its security measures
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Interview with Ms. Wang Xiaomin, the committee member responsible for social control.
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against the practitioners since 2001. For example, the once monthly home visit has been
reduced in frequency to only four or five times a year.
The committee’s attitude does however contain some ambiguity related to this
issue. Although the committee supports the state’s policy to abolish the practice of
Falun Gong, it does not believe that surveillance duty should fall on the committee
itself. At least, the committee feels that the three practitioners in its community are not
dangerous or evil. They should be treated as residents, not as the enemy. 72 The rift
between the committee and the state related to this issue reflects the rising selfconsciousness of the committee.
Released Convicts. While the committee only muddled through its assignment
regarding Falun Gong practitioners, it earnestly tries to help the three released convicts
to reintegrate into the community. The committee adopts very humane but effective
means for doing so. For example, the group members frequently pay home visits and
help to solve their practical problems. All three released convicts had financial
problems. On each home visit, the committee brought some living items like cooking
oil, flour, and meat. The committee even helped the released female convict to find a
job at a nearby publishing house. The group also teamed up with the convicts’ parents
or spouses to influence them morally.
All three released convicts now have jobs and feel very grateful to the
committee. One of them, Mr. Shi Hongpo, told me how the committee helped set up a
family meeting in prison with his sons and wife. “At that moment [when his wife told
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him about the hard life the family had] I felt so much remorse and guilt for the harm I
did to my family. I felt that I would be worse than a pig, if I did not rectify myself,” he
said. Mr. Shi Hongpo and the other male released convict have now become building
leaders and serve their neighbors voluntarily. They are also very active in many
committee-organized activities. Mr. Shi Hongpo was even rewarded 2,000 yuan by the
Pudong Street Office for his bravery in single-handedly stopping three car thefts in
August 2003.
The committee also makes quite a few efforts to help a young resident that is
currently imprisoned in juvenile detention facilities. The committee—along with his
parents—often visited him, and even wrote a letter appealing for a reduction in his
prison term.
Family Planning (Birth Control) Policy and Household Registration
System. During my research, I was introduced to a story that was very telling about the
committee’s performance on these issues in particular. One day the local ward police
officer came to borrow the committee’s household registration book. He needed that
book so that he could adjust his records of household registration, as an inspection team
from the Ministry of the Public Security was planning to visit his local police station.
Because of the solid household registration system that the Dejia Residents Committee
had in place, there has been no violation of the family planning policy since 1997.
Neighborhood mediation. Table 4-4 lists the number of mediation cases that
the committee has engaged in over the years. The low number of mediation cases may
suggest that there is a low amount of neighborhood bickering and fighting in the Dejia
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Community, and this might partially attest to the congenial nature of many of the
residents of the community.
Table 4-4: Cases of Neighborhood Mediations by the Dejia Residents Committee
(2001-2003)
Year
Number of mediations
2000
14
2001
9
2002
8
2003
16
A special characteristic of the committee’s mediation job is to rely on
neighborhood “celebrities” who have moral influence, such as senior governmental
officials or schoolteachers. They often have a good reputations and are trustworthy in
the community, therefore they serve the mediation role well.
Neighborhood Crime Prevention. The Dejia Community once had suffered
greatly from burglaries. It lost twenty-one bicycles and a taxicab in 1999, which pushed
the committee to build a gate and establish a neighborhood patrol group. The patrol
group originally consisted of seniors only and later was expanded with the inclusion of
some welfare beneficiaries, such as Mr. Shi Hongpo. Today the group has thirty-nine
members that are all assigned different time slots for patrolling the community. The
patrol also gets extended late into the night during major holidays. Burglaries have been
drastically reduced since the creation of the patrol group. Later, the patrol group
expanded its mission from purely crime watching to many non-security related areas.
Over the years, it has helped the disabled and the elderly, battled with littering,
prevented fires, reported sewage leaks, and helped with other emergencies.
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Floating Population Control. There are some outsiders that live in the Dejia
Community, and sometimes they bring trouble with them. For example, there was an
apartment that was leased to several young ladies who often held loud parties that went
far into the late hours of the night. Some residents suspected they were underground
prostitutes. Residents also reported other outsiders destroying the garden and other
public facilities. However, the committee had little to do with these complaints, except
insofar that it tries to make these outsiders aware of what behaviors were expected of
them while they were living in the community. Ms. Wang Xiaomin said, “We do not
have the legal power to check on them or ask them to leave. All we can use is persuade.
Sometimes we bluff them and hope to intimidate them into going away, but that usually
doesn’t work.”
In fact, the committee admits that it cannot keep its information up to date given
the constantly changing numbers of outsiders in the community. Ms. Wang Xiaomin
suspected that the number was increasing as she saw many unknown faces regularly.
“This is a pitfall of our jobs, and we have to find ways to trace them regularly,” she
said.
Service Provision
It the committee does well in its social control function, it really performs
excellently in its function of service provision. In fact, using Ms. Li Lan’s words, the
committee is a “Service Committee.” The committee keeps its door open all year
around, including weekends and even during the Spring Festival. Such a schedule
literally means that each committee member has only one day off in each week. In
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contrast, the Jingtai and Huashan Residents Committees are open only five days a week,
and are closed on holidays and weekends. 73 One thing to mention additionally is that the
committee members do not have overtime pay. Their stipends are fixed at 450 yuan per
month.
Administrative Service. The committee provides a wide range of services to
local governments.
Governmental Censuses and Surveys. The committee does not welcome these
jobs in particular, as they are time-consuming, particularly the population census. 74
However, the committee treats them seriously. I participated in a survey about public
behavior with regard to donation and charity. This five-page long questionnaire often
took one hour to fill out. Ms. Zhao Chunhui, the committee member responsible for the
survey, spent three days finishing the survey. One story illustrates her earnest attitude.
One of the selected survey interviewees, a 92-year old grandma, was incapable of
answering questions. Instead of cooking the answer, Ms. Zhao Chunhui called the
governmental bureau to work out a substitution.
Donation and Other Charity Events. The committee is often asked to solicit
donations for disaster relief, poverty relief, and blood donations. Some residents suspect
that government officials might abuse their donations by not actually giving them to the
needy. Others apparently feel troubled by too many solicitous events. In order to boost
donations, the committee members often model themselves by contributing first. In
73

The Huashan Residents Committee keeps eight hours per working day, while members of the Jingtai
Residents Committee only work five hours a day.
74
The population census every three years is the largest and most strenuous survey done by the
committee. It requires the committee to visit each household to get accurate demographic information.
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addition, the committee always publicizes the result of each charity event so as to
increase their transparency.
Collecting Fees. The committee is regularly asked by local governments to
collect fees on their behalf, like cleaning fees, electricity bills, etc.75 It is one of the jobs
the committee least wants to do, since it gets no compensation at all. In addition, there
are always some misers that the committee has to visit repeatedly even for collecting as
little as one yuan or two. The committee complained several times to the street office
hoping to get them to drop this particular duty, but did not succeed.
Self-Governing Service. This refers to the committee-sponsored activities for
the benefit of the residents. These kinds of activities have very little to do with the state.
“Ten Good Things Project.” Starting in 2002, the committee promised to solve
ten practical problems in the community each year. The to-do list is posted in
neighborhood billboards and also sent to residents’ homes in flyers.
Most of items on the list are directly related to the well being of the community
(Table 4-5). Ms. Li Lan believed that it was a bold idea to publicize the to-do list, since
the committee was then more compelled to fulfill the promise once it went public.
Fortunately, most of the items promised were accomplished and well received. The
committee continued working on the few remaining items until they were finished.

75

They include electronic bill, water bill, gas bill, cleaning fee, and some other ad hoc fees.
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Table 4-5: “Ten Good Things Project” in the Dejia Residents Committee
2002
2003
1 Gifts to residents in poverty before the Constructing four out-door exercise
Spring Festival
machines
Painting a total of thirteen buildings
2 Establishing fresh milk distribution
center
Establishing two additional senior
3 Fixing all electronic bulbs in all
building corridors
entertainment rooms
4 Solving the noise disturbance of Rongli Digging and cleaning forty six
Restaurant
cesspools
Installing warm gases for ninety-three
5 Establishing a functional base for the
Chinese Communist Youth League
families in the building # 21 and 22.
6 Cleaning up the dead corner behind the Organizing a join summer party with the
building # 10
local military camp
Organizing a community sporting
7 Standardizing automobile parking
meeting
Building three cobblestone massage
8 Organizing a summer evening party
pathways
9
Setting up three billboards
Celebrating with those centenary
residents
10 Solving sewage leak in the building
Regulating pets and animals in the
#10
community
Cultural Activities. The committee spends a lot of time organizing neighborhood
cultural activities, such as summer evening parties, civilian-military gather-together
parties, neighborhood sporting meetings, etc. Its cooperation with the YMCA needs
special attention. The committee has established cooperative relations with the local
YMCA chapter that is part of the Dejia Community. Most of the cultural activities
mentioned above are jointly sponsored. In addition, the two organizations create several
small neighborhood cultural groups, including a Yangge dancing team, a painting and
calligraphy society, a harmonica team, a kriegspiel team, a weaving and basketry group,
and a literature society. The relations between the two organizations are interesting. The
committee is a neighborhood organization with close ties with local governments.
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Inversely, it has organizational capacity and connection with ordinary residents. The
YMCA is a typical civic organization that has the financial resources and expertise
necessary for promoting cultural-related community activities. Together the committee
and the YMCA are able to complement each other for the benefit of ordinary residents.
This type of grassroots cooperation was hardly seen in earlier Chinese society, which
reflects the increasingly complex interactions of the once divided and state-dominated
urban community.
Helping the State to Serve Residents. This is the area where the committee
spends its major energy to promote the state’s initiatives that eventually benefit both the
state and local residents.
Social Welfare Programs. There are many social welfare programs in China that
require cooperation from grassroots organizations like the Residents Committees. The
Dejia Residents Committee is a strong facilitator of these programs, which makes it so
that the committee has a significant influence on those residents in poverty.
One such social welfare program is the minimum living standard program which
is designed to help urban residents in poverty. In order to get assistance from the
program, residents have to prove that their level of income is below the minimal living
standard set by the municipal government. Although the Bureau of Civil Affairs has the
final say in terms of establishing the eligibility requirements for the program, the
committee plays a critical role regarding who qualifies. It is responsible for verifying
the living conditions of the applicants, pre-screening their applicant packages, and
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making annual recommendations about whether or not current program beneficiaries’
benefits can or should be extended.
The committee widely publicizes the existence of the program in the community
and also identifies qualified applicants from its household registration records. When
applicants come in, the committee helps them prepare the application materials, which
is a very tedious job. “Some of our applicants simply cannot fill out these complicated
forms and gather the required supporting documentation. If we did not help them, they
would not be enrolled even if they were well qualified,” said Ms. Zhao Chunhui. She
also acknowledged that there were some “tricks” that can be employed in case
preparation. It does not necessarily mean that information is fabricated, though. “I have
to balance the state’s guidance and the needs of our residents. There are some inbetween cases. What we do is to make the arguments (on behalf of certain residents
receiving benefits) appealing to the civil affairs guys.” The committee is also able to use
its own “discretion” in the annual review process to keep the current beneficiaries in the
program.
If the Bureau of Civil Affairs turns down some applications, which happens
regularly, then the committee can decide to appeal certain cases based upon their merits.
In one case, Ms. Zhao Chunhui visited the bureau four times in order to reactivate the
benefit for a 75-year old grandma. The bureau believed that the daughters of the old
lady in question could support her without government assistance. Ms. Zhao Chunhui
successfully proved that the grandma would be in danger if her benefits were not
reactivated. Finally, the grandma got a 161-yuan per month subsidy.
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The number of the Dejia residents enrolled in the program has steadily grown
over the years (Table 4-6). In 2003, more than three percent of Dejia residents were
benefiting from the program, which is unusual for such an upper-middle class
community. The deputy chief of the residential section of the Pudong Street Office, Ms.
Jiao Aixia, once joked about how the Dejia Community could became “poorer” year by
year. She had worked in the committee before she was moved up to the street office;
and apparently she knew the tricks and did not mind at all, as the money was not
coming from her street office.
Table 4-6: Dejia Residents Enrolled in the Minimum Living Standard Program
Year
Household
Individual
Annual subsidy (yuan)
1999
36
92
95,736
2000
42
110
122,374
2001
43
113
124,013
2002
47
124
131,582
2003
52
135
140,913
There are also some other welfare programs that are designed to assist special
groups, such as the families of veteran, retired cadre officials, seniors with disability,
and disabled children. For most of these programs, the committee tries to use the
advantage it has in terms of information over the state bureaus to channel more
resources to those residents that experience economic hardship. “We would need to find
money from other places to help them, if these programs do not cover them. Our goal is
simple: to enroll as many as possible. We can use the money saved in other areas,” said
Ms. Zhao Chunhui.
Re-Employment Project. This is another statewide governmental program that
the committee tries to take advantage of. The Dejia community had 214 unemployed at
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its peak time and nowadays it has only 108. The committee has helped 75 residents find
jobs over the years.
The community has three small companies that are involved in household
decoration, sewage draining, and escorting elementary students back and forth from
school. The committee helped to enlist these companies as “informal employment and
labor organizations” in the Re-Employment Project. Under such a title, the government
gives 3,000-yuan start-up assistance to the three companies and offers them full
exemption from taxes and other fees. The three companies together hire fifteen
unemployed local residents. The committee also helps those jobless residents who have
decided to sell minor grocery items at sidewalk stalls to apply for exempt status from
taxes and fees.
In addition, the committee employs a few part-time workers itself, such as the
night guards that are posted at the at the community entrance. Finally, it serves as a
liaison between unemployed residents and outside employers. It brings employment
information into the community and introduces it to its residents for free. One
advantage to this for residents is that outside employers often trust persons that are
introduced to them by the committee.
“Starlight Senior Center.” Most visitors to the community would immediately
notice the “Dejia Starlight Senior Center” that is located next to the office of the
committee. This well-equipped 150m2 center was built in 2002 primarily so as to allow
Dejia seniors to engage in various activities. It was funded through the “Starlight Senior
Program,” a governmental program to help seniors throughout China. The Dejia
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Starlight Senior Center was the first one established in all thirteen communities of the
Pudong Street. The committee regarded it as a reward for being consistent in lobbying
the street office.
Grassroots Self-Governance
Residential Representation. The opening story in Chapter One shows how the
Dejia Residents Committee defended community interests when they came to be in
conflict with the economic interests of its power neighbor. However, similar cases are
few and are far between. It is not easy for any committee to stand up against the state.
The simple fact is that the “commander” of the committee, Ms. Li Lan, is herself a state
employee. This explains why she strongly opposed some residents’ suggestions to
physically block government buildings or to take even more radical measures. The
reason she insisted on legal actions being taken against the Tianjin No. 1 Rest House
was simple: if she did not do it, angry residents would have organized a demonstration.
This would have created a backlash against her and her committee, anyway. As Ms.
Wang Xiaomin said privately, “We felt lucky that the issue was able to be solved
peacefully. Director Li [Lan] was under a lot of pressure at that time. I bet she would
not know what to do if the Congress [the People’s Congress of Tianjin] were to discard
our petition.”
Participatory Management. The committee has done three things to increase
the involvement of residents in neighborhood affairs.
Financial Openness. The committee has posted its monthly financial statement
at the entrance billboard to inform residents of its financial situation since February
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2003. It also posts information about donations and other special events, like, for
instance information about the special fund that is raised through the contributions of
residents for neighborhood maintenance. This openness sharply contrasts with what the
Huashan Residents Committee does.
The Assembly of Residential Representatives (ARR). According to the Pudong
Street Office’s regulations, the ARR should be the highest authority in a community. It
consists of numerous residential representatives. 76 The committee convenes the ARR
twice a year. In these meetings, representatives listen to each committee member report
about the substance of her activities, they discuss the committee’s future plans, and they
evaluate the performance of each member as well as of the committee. It is normal for
the committee and its members to receive positive evaluations at these meetings.
Residential Hearing and Ad Hoc Meetings. The committee also holds special
meetings in order to hear the suggestions, opinions, and criticisms of residents. I
participated in a hearing about an environment project called “Para-Ecological
Community.” It was a pilot project sponsored by the municipal government to improve
the ecological situation of the city. The Dejia Community was chosen to do the
experiment. According to the initial agreement between the committee and the
government-backed company, the company would invest five million yuan to improve
the environmental system of the community. Since this would be a big project that
would cause potential problems and inconveniencies for many residents, the committee

76

Details of the meetings are discussed both in the next chapter.
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called the hearing so as to get residents’ opinions on this issue. Residential
representatives and some residents listened and debated the project.
Summary
The Dejia Residents Committee is very different from the other two committees
discussed so far. As far as the social control arena is concerned, the Dejia Residents
Committee does not fit the penetrative model in terms of the way it operates. Indeed, it
behaves quite differently from how a neighborhood organization would be expected to
behave if it fit with the predictions and dynamic outlines laid down by the penetrative
model. The committee treats its political control function perfunctorily, as is seen in the
way that it conducts its surveillance of the Falun Gong practitioners that live in the
community. However, it is very effective as far as its ability to be in control
administratively; specifically, this can be seen in how the committee handles issues
involving family planning and the household registration system. Correlatively, it gives
equal importance to the imperative of creating a safe and less-frictional neighborhood
environment through the administration of a tight neighborhood security network. The
committee is also very supportive and effective in handling and monitoring the released
convicts that live in the Dejia community. Rather than simply monitoring them, the
committee spends extra effort in helping them to reintegrate into the community.
As was the case with the penetrative model, the type of functionality described
by the corporatist model is inaccurate for characterizing the operation of the Dejia
Residents Committee. Although the committee has a close relationship with the street
office, it has not developed the cozy kind of political/economic interest-collusion that
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characterizes to differing extents the Jingtai and Huashan Residents Committees.
Instead, the Dejia Residents Committee’s connection with the administration often ends
up benefiting ordinary Dejia residents. It is the committee’s cooperation with the state
that successfully brings resources from the state into the community, as is seen in the
various cases of the minimum living standard program, the re-employment program, or
the Starlight Senior Program.
Furthermore, the committee’s endeavors involving self-governing services and
neighborhood self-governance are also difficult for either the penetrative or corporatist
model to explain. In general, the synergistic model explains the committee better than
the other models discussed do. The committee has displayed comprehensiveness in
terms of its various functionalities, which contributes to this assessment of synergy, as
such. More importantly, both the community and the street office benefit from the
committee’s interactions with the state. As the synergistic model predicts, it is neither
the state nor the committee alone, but the cooperation between them that contributes a
key institutional factor for understanding grassroots political development. The Dejia
case indicates that the benefits that accumulate from synergy can be greater than they
would be in a situation where the two actors (state and committee) function separately.
This discussion of the Dejia Residents Committee reveals a different possibility
for the “China Paradox,” in which the authoritarian state and the urban neighborhood
may engage in non-zero-sum cooperation that spans the public-private division and
benefits both sides. In the Dejia Community, one won’t find the level of tension
between residents and the committee (and the street office) that are observed in the

182

Jingtai and Huashan Communities. The grassroots political situation in general seems to
be headed in a positive direction in the Dejia Community, where cooperation rather than
penetration or collusion dominate the interactions between the state and local residents.
The next Shiyan case further exemplifies this point, and it enriches the substance that is
and could be found upon conducting further investigation in this direction.
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Shiyan – Another Synergistic Residents Committee
The Shiyan Community is just few blocks away from the Dejia Community and
is divided into two parts. The larger part consists of twenty five-floored and sevenfloored buildings that were constructed in 1985, which are jointly owned by residents
and their working units (or by the housing department of the state). Residents living in
them belong to the middle-to-lower classes of Tianjin City. The smaller part of the
community is called the Sinmiao Condominium, which consists of one fifteen-floored
high-rising building and two twenty-floored ones. The condominium (which was built
after 1998) is one of the most luxurious private compounds in Tianjin City. Like Jingtai
residents, people living in the Sinmiao Condominium are part of the elite of the city.
The two parts together contain 1,100 families and 3,511 residents.
Shiyan Residents Committee
The committee dated back to 1952. Like the Dejia Residents Committee, the
Shiyan Residents Committee was also completely reorganized by the Pudong Street
Office in 1997. Between that time and 2003, the committee was headed by Ms. Liu, a
guileless and steadfast street office employee.
The current committee differs from the other three committees discussed above
in many ways. The average age of the committee members is 69, compared to the
average age of roughly 46 in other committees. Four out of the five members of the
Shiyan Residents Committee are male, while there is only one male member to be
found in all three of the other committees combined. 77 In addition, most of the members

77

Mr. Cao Hui in the Huashan Residents Committee.
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of other committees are either unemployed or blue-collar workers. In contrast, members
in the Shiyan Residents Committee were prominent persons before they joined the
committee. 78 However, what really distinguishes the committee from the others is that
the committee is one of the only two experimental committees in Tianjin City whose
members were directly elected by residents in 2003. The new committee is still in the
middle of a transitional period. While it follows conventions in some respects, the
committee has displayed some unique and politically significant characteristics.
Social Control
Neighborhood Security Network. The committee has established a similar
neighborhood security network to that of the Dejia Residents Committee. The
comprehensive security promotion team consists of twenty-three members that al have
diverse background; the team includes committee members, neighborhood activists, and
representatives from nearby working units. 79 The team has three other sub-groups that
fall under its authority: a neighborhood patrol group with thirty-nine members; a help
and reeducation group with fourteen members, and a security watching group with
seventy members. Most of the members of these teams are just ordinary residents that
volunteer.

78

For example, the director, Grandpa Zhao Fu, was the President of the Tianjin Foundry Association
(1984-1991) and the Manager of the Tianjin Steel Factory (1977-1984). Grandpa Liu Yunhan was the
President of the China Motor Corporation (Tianjin). Grandpa Liu Jingyu had served as the Chairman of
the Teacher’s Union at Aiguodao Middle School and later the vice President at Xinanlou Middle School.
Grandpa Cong Peiguo was the vice President and later senior consultant of the Tianjin International
Engineering Corporation. Even Grandma Liu Baolan, who has the least prestigious position, had served
as the Chief of the Residential Section in the Xinanjiao Street Office.
79
An interesting aspect is that the team does not have police. Indeed, the Shiyan Community is the only
one where I did see local police when I was there.
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This neighborhood security network enables the committee to exercise effective
control in the areas of family planning, neighborhood dispute mediation, and the
household registration system. These are policies that the new committee strongly
promotes in the same way that its predecessor did. Linking the fact of that these policies
have this kind of continuity in the Shiyan Residents Committee with the fact that the
other committees had similarly supportive attitudes towards them seems to imply the
likelihood that these policies have real support at the grassroots level. 80 The state has
thus perhaps successfully fostered consent for most of its social control policies at the
neighborhood level without resorting to coercive means.
The Shiyan Residents Committee applies its security network to social control
efforts differently from the other committees.
Falun Gong Practitioners. There are two Falun Gong practitioners living in the
Shiyan Community, and they are directly handled and monitored by the local police.
The committee has successfully persuaded the local police that surveillance of those
practitioners is against the Organic Law of Urban Residents Committees. 81
This case clearly displays a rift between the state and the committee. Like the
Dejia Residents Committee, the Shiyan Residents Committee dislikes the prospect of
having to be responsible for the surveillance of the Falun Gong practitioners. The
difference between them is that the Shiyan Residents Committee was able to express its
differing opinion on the issue and eventually was able to get off the hook.

80
81

The Jingtai Residents Committee is abnormal as it lacks capacity to implement those policies.
Interview with the committee director, Grandpa Zhao Fu.
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However, the rift between the state and the committee cannot be blown up into
something it is not. It does not even come close to qualifying as civil resistance. Unlike
the dissenting organizations of the former communist countries of Eastern Europe, the
Shiyan Residents Committee, like the other three committees, supports the
government’s political decision to ban the practices of the Falun Gong. The rift over
whether or not it is appropriate for the committee to respond to the directive of the state.
As a grassroots self-governing organization with no legal authority, the committee does
not feel that it should function like an arm or a part of the local government hierarchy. It
disagrees with the state which says that its functions should involve the carrying out of
the directives of the state. The committee does not disagree or act in defiance of the
state, it just does not see itself as legally bound to execute this particular government
policy … as it would be doing if it were to engage in the surveillance of the
practitioners.
Political Education. Since December 2003, the committee has sponsored two
political education events that have targeted the children of the community. One has
been the ceremony of raising the national flag on the first day of each month, and the
other involves a ceremony where the committee invites military veterans to tell their
stories about the era of revolution. The committee hopes to teach kids to cherish the life
of good fortune that is available to them in contemporary China, and also to increase
their patriotism and maturity through the events. These events certainly serve the state’s
interests well. However, they are different from the old type of political education that
was common in the pre-reform era in two respects. First, the committee puts on the
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events on its own, rather than according to the orders of the state. And second, unlike
the old practices, these events are not compulsory for kids to participate in. Many
parents welcome both events, as they agree that today’s kids are too coddled and hard to
manage. In fact, it is often parents who send their children to attend the events, and they
even contribute the funds for the mast and the national flag.
Legal and Security Lectures. The committee regularly holds lectures about
legal and security matters for adult residents. Since the lectures cover a wide range of
issues close to daily lives, they are well received in the community. Lectures that are
related to legal issues are given on subjects like the Constitution, the Marriage Law, the
Inheritance Law, the Women and Children Protection Law, the Senior Protection Law,
the Law of Contract, and the Administrative Appeal Law. The security lectures cover
subjects related to juvenile crime prevention, self-protection techniques, fire protection,
burglary prevention, and gas leak prevention. Most of the lectures are attended about
seventy audience members. Few lectures have ever had more than two hundred
attendees.
“Drug-free Community.” The committee also actively advocates a campaign
to increase drug awareness in the community. It began at an ARR meeting in December
2003 with the acknowledgement that drug abuse amongst juveniles was increasing.
“Our community did not have drug offenders. However, we worried that drugs would
infiltrate our community if we did not take the proper precaution steps to educate our
residents, especially our kids,” said Grandpa Liu Jingyu who sponsored the anti-drug
initiative. The committee has since undertaken several measures in the campaign,
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including holding lectures about drugs and crime; brining into the community an
exhibition of pictures and documents about the consequences of using drugs; and the
circulating of an anti-drug signature solicitation.
Service Provision
The Shiyan Residents Committee has also adopted a year-round working
schedule. However, unlike the Dejia Residents Committee that focuses on working with
the state so as to serve its residents, the Shiyan Residents Committee puts more
emphasis on self-governing service provision.
Administrative Service. Rather than carrying out governmental assignments ad
infinitum, the committee has a different approach to those assignments that do not
benefit the community very much. As Grandpa Zhao Fu said, “We are trying to clarify
responsibilities with them [local governments]. We are not supposed to take care of
everything, but only those things that are relevant to our residents. For those
[governmental] assignments that benefit our residents, we would help the government
out. However, as for those that are of little interest to our residents, they [local
governments] should take care of them themselves, and we should not be responsible.
We are not here to baby-sit everyone.”
The committee has declined to accept some assignments from local
governments, such as assignments that involved collecting donations and conducting
surveys. The Shiyan Residents Committee has also begun getting paid by the state for
conducting several of the assignments that other committees conduct for free, such as
selling state lotteries and collecting fees, the committee is paid from the state. For
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example, the Pudong Street Office agreed to leave fifteen percent of cleaning fees to the
committee as compensation for its collection effort.
Helping the State to Serve Residents. The Shiyan Resident Committee
welcomes those governmental programs that eventually benefit its residents. However,
rather than treating these programs as the top priority in the same way that the Dejia
Residents Committee does, the committee treats them differently. As Grandpa Zhao Fu
stated, “We could facilitate those programs, depending upon our time and resources.
However, the government should be ultimately responsible for them. If it was really
serious about those programs, it would devote more resources to the community down
here.” For instance, he believed that the Bureau of Civil Affairs should hire social
welfare coordinators to work at the community level so that they could directly manage
the programs of the state. The Shiyan Residents Committee could assist them, but could
not function as a replacement for the state workers.
Table 4-7 shows how the Shiyan and Dejia Residents Committees treat the
welfare programs differently. In terms of the percentage of residents that received
welfare benefit out of the total population, the Shiyan Residents Committee enrolled
less than half of what the Dejia Residents Committee did… and this disparity would
probably be even greater if the income levels of the two communities are taken into
consideration. Additionally, there is no evidence that shows that the Shiyan Residents
Committee did better than the Dejia Residents Committee in promoting neighborhood
re-employment.
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Table 4-7: Welfare and Re-Employment Assistances Between the Shiyan and Dejia
Communities (2003)
Shiyan
Dejia
Total population
3,511
4,480
Numbers of residents enrolled in the minimum
50
135
living standard program
Total amount of money from the program
2,866
11,742
(yuan per month)
Unemployed residents at peak time
228
214
Re-employed residents
122
106
(those helped through the Residents Committee)
(n.a.)
(75)
Self-Governing Service. The Shiyan Residents Committee has initiated a wide
variety of services that are tailored to the community. Many are innovative and are well
received by residents.
“Sunshine Community Hotline.” This is the first community hotline that has
been established in Tianjin City, aiming at providing instant services to its residents.
The hotline has had numerous calls since its opening (Table 4-8). Some of the calls ask
for minor assistance with a variety of different things. For example, a five-year old boy
called asking for a tin opener for a bottle of Coca Cola. Others calls are rather serious,
involving everything from preventing bicycle thefts to saving people’s lives. In March
2004, the committee’s quick response to a call helped save the life of an old lady who
was in a coma because of a cerebral hemorrhage.
Table 4-8: Sunshine Community Hotline in the Shiyan Community
Number of calls
December, 2003
42
January, 2004
79
February, 2004
54
March, 2004
61
April, 2004
77
May, 2004
73
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Senior Service. The community has 824 residents that are over the age of sixty,
which represents nearly a quarter of its total population. The committee spends a lot of
effort in trying to help and support them. In July 2003, just one month after the direct
election, the committee established the Association of Shiyan Seniors. The goal was for
the association to work with the committee to promote the interest of seniors.
The committee conducted a survey and a hearing in August 2003 to learn about
the difficulties and needs of seniors in the community. Several programs were launched
according to the findings.
The committee organized several free medical examinations for seniors where
their blood pressure and weight were checked, and where medical personnel were able
to consult with them personally for the sake of educating them about health protection
measures. The committee also arranged for free haircuts for those seniors that had
difficulty moving from one place to another. And to those residents that are eighty and
older, the committee gives small gifts such as “Longevity Noodles” and flowers to them
during the Spring Festival and on the National Senior Day.
In order to encourage seniors to join outdoor exercises, the committee and the
senior association sponsor a unique daily walking project, called the “10,000 Meters
Walk Project.” So far, nearly 130 seniors have participated in the project. The Chinese
Senior Daily released a special report about the project. The Tianjin General
Commission on Sports even called all Tianjin communities to learn about the project.
Children and Juvenile Service. The lectures on drugs and political education are
good examples of services the committee provides to its your residents. In addition, the
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committee has created an organization called the “Young Falcon Troop.” The kids that
take part in this organization help to protect lawns and trees, collect litter, clean
stairways, and assist seniors and the disabled. The committee also provides internship
and labor education opportunities for students from neighboring elementary and middle
schools and from the Tianjin Normal University.
Community Citizenry School. This school targets the general public in the
community. Based upon residents’ interests, the committee invites scholars, teachers,
doctors, lawyers, and other experts to give lectures or to teach classes. The classes cover
a wide variety of issues, including contemporary hot social and political topics, health
protection and nutrition issues, cooking, gardening, dancing, literature, Chinese
calligraphy, English and Japanese, music instruments, and Yue Opera. Some of the
classes, such as the ballroom dancing and Japanese studies classes, require tuition, but
most classes offered in the school are free and open to everyone, even including
residents from other communities. Most of the classes are held during evenings or
weekends to encourage more participation.
Neighborhood Diversionary Clubs. In order to sustain and deepen the various
cultural activities that go on independently in the community, the committee encourages
and supports residents who form various groups for the purposes of enjoying
themselves in leisure or diversionary activities. Nowadays, the Shiyan Community has a
Yue Opera team, two Taiji martial arts teams, a body mechanics team, a dancing club,
an English club, a Chinese calligraphy club and a literature club. The eight teams have
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nearly four hundred active members, which greatly enhances the cultural environment
inside the community.
“Sunshine Neighborhood Games.” This is another unique social activity that can
be found in the community. The games are organized as buffet-style events, and they go
for six months between April and September. Each month, the committee organizes
three different games. All games are tailored to be cheap but interesting and suitable for
everyone. For example, the committee invents a game, jiaqiu, where each player needs
to walk towards a destination while holding a basketball against their back. Many
residents—particularly children and seniors—enjoy the games a lot. The winners
usually receive small prizes, such as pencils or toothbrushes.
“A Hundred Community Stars Campaign.” This is a campaign sponsored by the
committee that attempts to promote neighborhood harmony and unity. During this
campaign, residential representatives elect a total of about a hundred community “stars”
every half-year, including the Civilized Family “Star,” the Good Resident “Star,” the
Good Daughter-in-Law, Good Mother-in-Law, Good Building Leader, Good Youngster,
Good Learning-Style Family, and the Outstanding Volunteer. Each star represents a
type of good ethic or behavior that is advocated in the Community Covenant. All stars
are then publicly honored. Their names are posted at each entrance to the community.
They also get small gifts as prizes.
Grassroots Self-Governance
While the committee has displayed many unique characteristics in terms of both
social control and service provision, it is best defined for its progress in grassroots self-
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governance. In Grandpa Zhao Fu’s words, “We are the first directly elected Residents
Committee in Tianjin City, and our goal is to create a true self-governing organization,
not an ornament.” To achieve that goal, the committee has undertaken serious effort to
promote self-governance in the community.
Residential Representation. As an elected body, the committee works hard to
represent and defend the interests of the community.
Defending Residential Interests from the State. There is a symbolic event that
takes place every so often which shows how the committee stands with its constituents.
The street office has two old bungalows in the community, which are leased out for
grocery and audio/video shops. The street office receives a 6,000-yuan rent from each
store. The noisy audio/video store has been very troublesome to nearby residents for a
long time, but the street office repeatedly ignores their complaints.
In January 2004, the Housing Safety Bureau of Tianjin ordered the two
bungalows to be torn down in a month for safety reasons. The street office planned to
rebuild two new commercial building there. However, it met with strong opposition
from Shiyan residents that had been organized by the committee this time. After
considering different opinions from its residents, the committee advocated putting a
garden in the space instead of new commercial buildings.
The deputy director of the street office was deeply annoyed by the committee’s
action. 82 In the following weeks, the street office tried to persuade the committee to
give up its position. However, it quickly found out that the new committee was no not
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Interview with Ms. Jiao Aixia.
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as obedient as its predecessor. Eventually, the street office gave up its original plan. For
obvious reasons, it also turned down the committee’s request for money to build the
garden.
This case reveals a different type of relationship between the committee and the
street office. Rather than simply following the orders from the street office about the
usage of the land, the committee stuck to its position. The street office lost face, first of
all, and perhaps even more importantly it lost real financial interests. Grandpa Zhao Fu
explained why the street office backed off from its position. From the perspective of
ordinary Shiyan residents, the committee was able to organize them into a stronger,
more cohesive voice. This forced the street office to re-assess its situation, and to weigh
the tradeoff that it would make if it went through with the deal for the commercial
buildings and achieved a 12,000-Yuan per year revenue, but then also simultaneously lit
the fuse of a possible confrontation with Shiyan residents. The street office was forced
to consider what the consequences of such a confrontation would be.
As already mentioned, the Shiyan Committee has a special significance. It has
been an experimental case for what direct election would or could look like in Tianjin
City. Several very senior administrative officials have been watching the committee
closely and have been hoping that the experiment is successful. 83 This fact certainly
provides both incentives to the street office to cooperate with the committee and a great
deal of pressure. The success of the Shiyan experiment therefore had to be viewed as
much more of an over-riding interest in the eyes of the street office than the interest it
83

In fact, the experiment in the Shiyan Community has even raised interests from the Ministry of Civil
Affairs.
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had in simply expanding its revenue base a bit more. This fact of course gave some
bargaining leverage to the committee over the dispute, since the street office did not
want to do anything that would jeopardize its relationship with the Shiyan Committee or
with the administrative higher-ups that were watching the Shiyan experiment with great
interest.
Defending Residential Interests from Non-State Actors. The committee has also
defended the interests of its residents from non-state organizations, such as real estate
developers, construction companies, retailers, taxi companies, etc. I witnessed the
whole process of one of these kinds of cases. Grandma Hu had a dispute with the largest
real estate development chain in Tianjin City, Shunchi Development, Inc. She wanted
the entire 4,000-yuan down payment she had made for her apartment back, since
Shunchi had sold her an apartment without a land certificate. However, the Shunchi
refused to return her money as it blamed her for violating her contract. 4,000 yuan is a
huge sum of money for a 72-year old lady in China. Grandma Hu had gotten very
desperate as she was facing such a powerful real estate company. The Shunchi had even
openly derided her by “encouraging” her to file a lawsuit. In China, it cost at least 8,000
yuan to hire an attorney for this type of case.
The Shiyan Residents Committee sympathized with Grandma Hu’s situation,
and decided to represent her and to negotiate with the company on her behalf. The
whole process was very difficult and exhausting, as the company was disdainful of the
committee’s capacity from the beginning. In order to achieve this goal, the committee
had mobilized various formal and informal influences that it had at its disposal, such as

197

the local Consumer Association, free legal consultants that it knew of, and even the
local police. It had two meetings with the Shunchi agents and made numerous phone
calls to the Shunchi leadership. The committee’s persistence finally reaped a reward:
the company returned 2,500 yuan to Grandma Hu.
Participatory management. Without participation from residents, the idea of
grassroots self-governance is simply empty talk. Therefore, the Shiyan Residents
Committee has treated residential participation as the basis and top priority of all its
efforts. 84 For the committee, participatory management means the establishment of
“Four Rights” for ordinary residents: the right to be informed, the right to speak out, the
right to participate, and the right to supervise. Ever since its election, the committee has
publicly promised to consistently secure and defend these “Four Rights” for its
residents.
The first of the Four Rights—the right to be informed—focuses on establishing
an openness and transparency with regard to the committee’s operations. Financial
information about the committee’s affairs is readily publicized. The committee posts its
financial accounting information at the community billboards every month. It also
reports on its financial situation at the semi-annual meetings of the ARR. Furthermore,
the committee creates a special column on the major undertakings of the community in
its bi-weekly community newsletter, called Minshen [Voices of Residents]. Nowadays,
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Interview with Grandpa Liu Jingyu.
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the newsletter has become very popular; it has become a great way for ordinary
residents to learn about the operations of the committee. 85
The second of the Four Rights is “the right to speak out.” The way that the
committee secures this right to speak out for residents is by encouraging ordinary
residents to express their concerns, requests, and criticisms through three channels.
Hearings and surveys are employed so as to obtain residents’ opinions on particular
issues that are critical to the community, such as how to help seniors, whether to reduce
the number of entrances to the community, whether to allow the street office to rebuild
the two commercial bungalows, how to remodel the trashcans of each buildings, and
how to control pets in the community.
The committee also from time to time holds issue forums where residents can
come and talk through the issues with each other and with the committee members.
These forums are not necessarily held so as to solve particular issues, though. Instead,
they are meant to be informal meetings where the residents and the committee members
sit together to discuss things of mutual interest. The committee employs this channel
only so as to identify problems in the community.
“Appraisal meetings” are often held during the ARR meetings. These are formal
meetings in which the representatives of residents cast votes so as to rate the
performances of the committee and social workers. In these meetings, the
representatives also have the opportunity to openly ask questions or to raise concerns
about any member of the committee or any aspect of the committee’s work.
85

The editor of the Minsheng Newsletter is Grandpa Wang Hui, the former President of the Tianjin Social
Science Academy. The newsletter covers diverse topics related to the community.
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The third right is the right to participate, and what this boils down to
functionally is the committee guaranteeing opportunities for residents to participate in
some aspects of neighborhood management. The committee promises that any resident
who wants to contribute to neighborhood affairs will have the opportunity to do so. In
addition, all residents are entitled to the services provided by the committee, such as
lectures and neighborhood games. It is not difficult for a resident to get to serve as a
building leader, a member of a community patrol group or other security group, as a
residential representative, or simply as a member of some other diversionary clubs.
Finally, the right to supervise promises every resident the right to monitor the
operations of the committee through multiple means. A resident can drop a letter in the
suggestion box or visit the committee office in order to have direct discussions with
committee members. They can also question the committee during any of the various
meetings that have already been mentioned… whether it be during any one of the
various ad hoc neighborhood meetings or whether indirectly through representatives
during the ARR meetings.
Community Covenant. This was passed in December 2003, and it did several
things. It stated the desirability of allowing cultural values to flourish in the Shiyan
Community, and it laid out what was considered proper behavior for Shiyan residents.
Unlike Western societies that often prioritize individualism, Chinese society primarily
relies upon collective identity and norms to determine proper rules of interaction.
Therefore, although it is not legally binding, the covenant can be considered a moral
contract that establishes what expectations are in terms of ethics for the community. The
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covenant is made up of five subject headings which are as follows: community goals,
family and traditional Chinese ethics, relations among neighbors, individual behavior,
and cultural lives in the community.
The committee sponsored the covenant in order to discourage improper behavior
in the community. “We have a few residents whose wallets are swollen, but their ethical
standards are lax. They occupy public space, littering, playing loud music, and letting
their dogs shit freely. We also have residents that never bother to get to know their
neighbors. How can we help each other if we do not even know or trust each other?”
said Grandma Liu Baolan. The committee believes that the covenant is helpful for
cultivating reciprocal, trusting, and supportive relations among Shiyan residents.
The covenant does not outline specific punishments for any violation. Therefore,
its effective impact on the community is rather minor and exists only nominally.
However, the covenant itself is a breakthrough, since it symbolizes the gradual
emergence of community identity through collective actions. The Shiyan Community
has now become more than simply a geographic place where one’s family happens to be,
as the Huashan Community arguably is. Conversely, Shiyan residents have started to
come out from their individual family cells and have begun to identify themselves with
the community. In this sense, the covenant represents a self-governing exploration of
collective identity.
Summary
It is easy to discard the explanatory value of the penetrative model when the
organization in question openly gives up political assignments like surveillance over

201

Falun Gong practitioners. There is also no such state-committee collusion as is seen in
the Huashan Community. Instead, we find a committee that is capable of publicly
defending its interests against its once directly superior entity, the street office. The
committee’s relative independence derives from the legitimacy of its popular election.
The committee identifies itself as the representative of its constituents, and in fact goes
so far as to gradually dis-identify itself as merely “an arm of the state.”
However, this increasing consciousness as a self-governing organization lends
little to the liberal interpretation of events in China. Although the committee has shaken
off its political control assignments and is willing to defend the interests of its
constituents from the street office, labeling its situation as an instance where we see the
civil disobedience model of grassroots political behavior in action would be labeling it
incorrectly. Labeling it as such would certainly overestimate the rift that actually exists
between the Shiyan Residents Committee and the state. This self-consciousness does
not prevent the committee from actively promoting some of the state’s initiatives in the
arenas of administrative control and service provision. The committee even voluntarily
sponsors political education that adds to the legitimacy of the state.
Therefore, neither labeling it a scenario of top-down domination nor a scenario
of bottom-up revolt is appropriate for the Shiyan case. Rather, the word “synergy” best
characterizes what is happening in the Shiyan Community. indeed, the functions of the
Shiyan Residents Committee illustrate even more clearly what has already been
discussed in the Dejia case. If the Dejia Residents Committee is in the early stages of
establishing a new type of cooperation between the state and ordinary residents, the
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Shiyan Residents Committee represents a testimony to what the same kind of process
can look like at a later stage.

This chapter has thus far discussed how the four Residents Committees carry out
their statutory functions. While it is not feasible to lay out all the details, Table 4-9
summarizes the major function(s) each committee has and the model that best fits and
describes them.
Table 4-9: Statutory Functions, Ideal Models, and the Four Residents Committees
Neighborhood Models
Residents
Social Administrative
SelfselfCommittee
control
service
governing
service
governance
Jingtai
X
Penetrative
Huashan

XX

X

Corporatist

Dejia

XXX

XXX

XX

X

Synergistic

Shiyan

XXX

X

XXX

XXX

Synergistic

The four committees each display distinctive functionalities inside the contexts
of their own communities. The Jingtai Residents Committee is functionally simple and
weak, as it does little beyond spying on a few political subjects. The penetrative model
appropriately characterizes the committee, as it is no more than an instrument of the
state’s apparatus of political control.
The Huashan case presents a scenario that is similar to the corporatist story that
widely exists in Chinese economic sectors. In this instance, the corporatist connection
occurs between the street office and the Huashan Residents Committee. Both closely
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work together to explore economic opportunities in the community. Despite very
controversial in the eyes of ordinary residents, such an exclusive interest symbiosis also
proves to be relatively effective in the area of social control.
A synergistic model is much more useful for discussing and understanding what
the Dejia and Shiyan Residents Committees are doing. Both have exhibited a relatively
strong capacity to carry out a comprehensive list of functions for the benefits of both the
state and ordinary residents, although the Dejia Residents Committee leans towards
administrative service and social control while the Shiyan Residents Committee focuses
on self-governance. The two committees evince a possibility of new relationship with
the state, which are based less on domination or collusion than on cooperation that
spans public-private divisions for mutual enhancement.
The civil disobedience model finds no fit with the four committees. None of
them really functions like a “parallel polis” or “street parliament.” Even the Shiyan
Residents Committee, with its high level of independence, is still willing to work
intensively with the state. Indeed, some of its activities benefit the efficacy and
legitimacy of the state, as is demonstrated by the fact of the political education and legal
lectures that the committee offers to its residents.
Ultimately, there is no simple conclusion that can be drawn about the
operational dynamics that characterize the Residents Committee in contemporary
China, as these four cases have demonstrated. These committees play different
intermediary roles between the street office and ordinary residents, and therefore, they
are best characterized by three different theoretic models. These models point to
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different interpretations of state-society relations, which all together are congruent with
the multi-faceted reality that is and has been the “China Paradox.” In general, the Jingtai
and Huashan cases retain many elements of the traditional type of top-down
management dynamic that has characterized Chinese politics for a long time. Indeed,
this kind of politicking has been around far longer in China than just since the CCP took
over China in 1949. In contrast, the Dejia and Shiyan cases have introduced elements of
cooperation to the status quo grassroots hierarchy; and these elements of cooperation
have coincided with the economic liberalization and social openness that have
characterized China since the late 1970s. The next chapter begins to explore the factors
that exist behind the functional diversity of the four committees, and based on that,
makes an effort to probe the grassroots state-society relations in urban China.
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Neighborhood Politics
Structure and Grassroots State-Society Relations
Chapter Five

Prologue
“Modern (history) is the urbanization of the countryside, not, as among the
ancients, the ruralisation of the city” (Marx, 1965). Although this statement was originally
made with reference to the social transformation that took place in Western European
countries, particularly Germany, in the 17th and 18th Centuries, Marx’s observation is
equally applicable to contemporary China. China is a country with a long and splendid
history of civilization but has lagged behind Western nations in terms of being on the
cutting edge of modern history. A “city” in China has never been anything more than a
symbol of political control throughout her long history of mostly agricultural civilization.
The tall ramparts and isolated compounds that were once the most recognizable features of
Chinese cities were essentially nothing more than symbols of the extension of centralized,
authoritarian controls out into the middle of the wide agrarian land and culture that had
always been China. Chinese cities were still more or less relics of traditional political
control even throughout most of the 20th Century. Tangible ramparts were torn down; yet,
intangible ones still pervaded. Numerous separate and self-sufficient state-owned Danwei
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confined urban residents into various bounding walls. These Danwei stifled the vitality of
cities, which forced the reform of the late 1970s to begin in the countryside again. 86
A key consequence of the current Dengist reform has been the abolition of various
tangible and intangible “walls” that previously constrained China’s development. Because
of the massive construction that has come along with the abolishment of these “walls,”
Chinese cities are experiencing unprecedented growth. Population, capital, demand,
openness, and many other elements of industrial civilization are quickly becoming
concentrated into cities. In contrast, the old monotype of state penetration which has
always dominated the affairs of cities in China is being uprooted, as the Danwei system
has gradually dissolved since the late 1980s. Birth control, crime, the floating population,
urban unemployment, social welfare, civil disputes and many more such challenges have
created a situation where the various urban communities as well as local governments––
particularly the street office––have come under tremendous pressure. This changing
situation calls for new models of governance at the urban grassroots level. Understanding
this background is imperative for understanding the Residents Committee and the urban
grassroots state-society relationship in China. With this large picture in mind, this chapter
first attempts to explain the functional diversity that was found in the four committees in
Chapter Four, and then draws inferences about the grassroots state-society relationship in
contemporary China.
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The first revolution led by the CCP to found the PRC in 1949 took the historically unprecedented form of
harnessing the revolutionary energies of the peasantry in the countryside to “surround and overwhelm” the
“conservative” cities. The latest reform since 1978, “Reform and Openness,” is believed as the second
revolution. Interestingly, it started from the countryside again.
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History, Personal Factors, and Functional Diversity
The four Residents Committees discussed in Chapter Four displayed distinctive
functionalities in addition to some similarities. This section examines how the observed
patterns can be explained by the committee’s history and personal factors, such as
professionalism and leadership style.
History as an Explanation
As an organization that has been witness to more than five decades of history, the
path traveled by the Residents Committee affects the way the landscape of its operations
looks today.
Social Control. This is perhaps the area where these four committees have kept the
closest conformity with their histories. History shows that social control was established as
the over-riding priority of the committee since its creation. It is clear that the four
committees all still actively perform this function today, although their agendas are
different. The Jingtai Residents Committee focuses exclusively on political control, and
therefore it is mostly consistent with the traditional type of the penetrative committee that
had been the norm in China before the Dengist reform. Political surveillance is also carried
out effectively in the Huashan and Dejia Residents Committees. The Shiyan Residents
Committee, contrastingly, spends negligible energy on political control. However, it is
very active in participating in administrative control measures that are in keeping with the
state’s social control agenda.
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History also persists insofar as many old social control techniques are still
employed today, such as neighborhood security patrols, relying upon peers for
information, and screening and identifying potentially troublesome issues and persons, etc.
Administrative Service Provision. Besides social control, service provision
represents another area where the four committees display a certain degree of overlap.
History can partially account for it. As Grandma Liu Baolan, a veteran that has been a
member of the Shiyan Residents Committee for more than three decades, told me, the
committee in the 1950s and early 1960s was responsible for some administrative services
such as poverty relief, donation, neighborhood cleanup, and campaigns against
superstition. Although those services were greatly reduced in the wake of several political
campaigns, they persisted even through the more extremely politicized periods like the
Cultural Revolution (Salaff, 1971).
In general, history can account for some of the functional similarities that can be
seen across the four committees, but it explains little about the differences. The Jingtai and
Huashan Residents Committees were established in the reform era, and even the other two
committees—that had much longer histories—were so dramatically reshuffled in 1997 that
they were hardly the same committees as before. This project aims to understand
contemporary neighborhood politics. What can account for the difference between the
traditional penetrative model of committee operation and the diverse models we find
today? The historical approach can say little in this regard.
There are several particularly important puzzles that have been left unsolved. Why
has the Jingtai Residents Committee—which has had absolutely no experience of
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totalitarian history—developed the greatest conformity to the old political model? What
explains the corporatist collusion in the Huashan Community? Finally, what accounts for
the functional differences between the Dejia and Shiyan Residents Committees, which
have almost identical histories? The explanations cannot be singularly extracted from
history, and they must come from elsewhere.
Personal Factors as Explanations
One place to look is at the personal characteristics that are often used to explain
organizational performance. This project examines two such characteristics,
professionalism and leadership style.
Professionalism. The Residents Committee has been witness to dramatic
improvement in this area in the reform era (Table 5-1). The pre-reform committee was
often joked about as being a group of mostly jobless and illiterate housewives in their
sixties, and they were called “tootsie grandma” [xiaojiao laotai]. Now, the average age of
members in all four committees is below fifty. 87 There are even several members that are
in their early thirties. In addition, the education level has significantly increased. Most
members are high school graduates and some even have college degrees.
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The members in the Shiyan Residents Committee are directly elected through ordinary residents. In the
Shiyan Community, being old is actually an advantage to take positions in the committee. Unlike those
younger residents who have to struggle for a living, those seniors have plenty of spare time. Therefore, they
are more willing to participate in neighborhood activities.
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Table 5-1: Professionalism across the Four Residents Committees
Jingtai Huashan
Dejia
Shiyan
Shiyan
(Social workers)
46.3
47.3
46.8
69.4
46.5
Average age
Average level of
education 88
Average years of
experience

(4.3)

4

3.6

3.4

4.4

4.5

2

3.1

5.2

1.8 (5) 90

4.7

89

Can age or education account for the functional disparity found between the four
committees? Unfortunately looking at the age factor—which shows virtually no
differences between then four committees—cannot help. The education factor likewise
helps little. There is also no consistent pattern between a committee’s functions and its
members’ level of education. For example, if education accounted for good performance in
the Shiyan case, it could not explain either bad performance in Jingtai case with roughly
equal level of education or good performance in the Dejia case with the lowest education
level.
Table 5-1 also enlists the average work experience of each committee as a whole.
The Dejia and Shiyan members are more experienced than the members of the other two
committees. Chalmers Johnson, Robert Wade, Peter Evans, and other developmentalists
have long argued that the expertise from a long-term career is a key factor which can
explain developmental performance in certain countries (Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1982;
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The scale is assigned as follows: illiterate – 1; elementary – 2; middle school – 3; high school – 4; college
– 5.
89
Two members had worked many years in other Residents Committees before they joined the Jingtai
Residents Committee in 2002. The number in the parentheses accounts for their previous experiences.
90
Among the current five members, only Grandma Liu Baolan had work experience as a former committee
member. However, the other four members are experienced as they had actively participated in neighborhood
activities as building leaders, leader of neighborhood security patrol team, or residential representatives. The
number in the parentheses accounts for their pre-election experience.
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Wade, 1990). One would think that this idea would be equally applicable to the committee.
Longer experience often implies better acquaintance with neighborhood affairs and better
working skills, which would be valuable assets for those interested in being committee
members to have.
This factor can partially account for the performance of the Dejia and Shiyan
committees vis-à-vis the Jingtai: the first two committees have rather comprehensive
functions while the latter has no real function but political surveillance. The experience
factor offers no explanation for the differences between the Dejia and Shiyan cases,
however. It also cannot explain why the Huashan Residents Committee has taken on more
functions than the Jingtai Residents Committee when the former is ‘less-experienced’ than
the latter. More importantly, it still cannot explain why a committee chooses specific
function(s), given its members’ work experiences. For example, even though the Jingtai
Residents Committee is the least experienced, why does it select political surveillance
rather than administrative service? Why has it achieved little progress after two years of its
creation?
The Leadership Style. Like professionalism, leadership matters for organizational
performance as well. Let’s start by discussing Ms. Li Lan of the Dejia Residents
Committee and her very well-developed leadership style.
Ms. Li Lan has eight years of experience in working with the Residents
Committees, seven of them having been spent with the Dejia committee. She has very
detailed preferences and very strong resolve, as exemplified by her actions in the earlierrecounted story of the dispute with the Tianjin No. 1 Resting House. She is also a leader
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who has a sense of responsibility. Whatever requirements she sets for her subordinates, she
meets and exceeds first on her own. For example, she is on duty during the two-hour noon
break from Monday to Friday, so that others can go home to prepare dinner for their
families. This amounts to her working ten hours of overtime in a week, which is twice the
amount of overtime that the other committee members work during the weekend.
The comparison between Ms. Li Lan and Ms. Gong Pei from the Jingtai Residents
Committee is telling. Ms. Gong Pei had no experience in neighborhood affairs before she
took charge of the Jingtai committee in 2002. Her college degree and younger age have
helped her little, as she ultimately lacks commitment to her job. This fact was not hard to
surmise. There was a week she completely missed when I studied in her committee, and
she monopolizes fiscal operations, such as can be seen in the shady way that she was
responsible for leasing out office space. It is fair to say that Ms. Gong Pei sets a bad
example for her committee members and for Jingtai residents. Ms. Han Xue once
complained, “In Jingtai [Residents Committee] we have lots of spare time. However, I
would rather work in my former committee. I was always very busy there, but I felt
pleased. Here, I have nothing to do, but dawdling.”
Many agree that the Dejia Residents Committee would not have achieved so many
things without Ms. Li Lan’s strong leadership, as exemplified by the comprehensive
security network and the Starlight Senior Center. Perhaps her deepest mark has been made
in that she has attempted to shape the committee into a “Service Committee,” which
sharply contrasts with the Jingtai Residents Committee.
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Notable though this is, however, it does not directly help to answer the central
questions of this project. For example, why did Ms. Li Lan choose “Service Committee”
rather than self-governance as the linchpin ideal for her committee? How can we explain
the similar performance and achievements of the Shiyan Residents Committee where no
such a charismatic leader exists? Indeed, Ms. Li Lan’s leadership style is not the only
effective way to run a committee. In thinking about the successful businesses managed by
the Huashan Residents Committee in that impoverished neighborhood, one cannot doubt
the leadership ability of its previous director(s). Similarly, no one would question the
leadership quality present in the Shiyan Residents Committee. All five members of that
committee retired from leading positions in organizations much larger than a committee.
However, they chose to focus on neighborhood self-governance.

In terms of analysis, the elements of history and personal factors are useful for
discussing some similarities, but neither of them is sufficient for providing systematic
explanations for the diverse functionalities that have been observed to exist across the four
committees. Both explanations concentrate on the committee itself, yet they essentially
ignore the structural settings that surround the committee, i.e., they do not discuss its
unique position as an intermediary between local governments and ordinary residents. As
the next section will show, structural factors have a much more systematic and stronger
effect on the function(s) committees can have than the factors that have already discussed.
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Structural Relations Behind Functional Diversity
This section treats the sandwich-structure of neighborhood politics as an integral
system consisting of three organic elements: the state (which for the purposes of this
project is best represented by the street office), the Residents Committee, and residents
(including individuals and other neighborhood organizations). The upper and lower layers
of the sandwich are discussed separately, followed by a holistic examination.
State–Residents Committee Structure
China has a long tradition of being ruled by a strong state, which has been greatly
expanded and fine-tuned in the new Republic. The Residents Committee is one channel
that the state can use to impose its will in cities. In recent history, an intimate relationship
has consistently existed between the committees and the street office. In fact, the
committee’s functions were exclusively defined by the street office in the pre-reform era.
Since then, at least three prominent dimensions have arisen that can be examined that are
pertinent to the contemporary state of the relationship between the street office and the
committee.
Personnel Management. The hiring and firing of committee members and staff
used to be the most effective means by which the street office exercised its control over the
Residents Committee. The situation has now begun to change.
Creation of the Residents Committee. The Weifang Street Office created the Jingtai
Residents Committee in a rather traditional way by directly appointing its three members.
None of them are Jingtai residents. Ms. Han Xue recounted to me the story of her first days
in the community. “We were like paratroopers, have landed here but knowing nobody.
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They [residents] knew nothing about us, either. We were baseless and that gave us a lot of
trouble,” she said.
The Meiyuan Street Office adopted a more decentralized approach with regard to
the Huashan Residents Committee. It only designated one of its employees as the director
of the committee. The director then selected the rest of his members, upon the approval of
the street office. The idea was to leave the director the full discretion to assemble a team
that could do businesses with him effectively. 91
According to the regulations of the Pudong Street Office (vis-à-vis the Dejia and
Shiyan Residents Committees), all of its committees have to be elected indirectly or
directly by local residents. In the Dejia community, the street office nominates the
candidates before they have been approved by the Dejia residential representatives in a
single-candidate election. The Shiyan Residents Committee before 2003 followed the same
procedure. However, in the recent direct election, individual Shiyan residents nominated
and eventually voted in all five members of the committee on their own, with no
intermediary representatives involved.
Management over the Director of the Residents Committee. The directors in the
Jingtai, Huashan, and Dejia Residents Committees are all state employees who came from
the respective street offices in charge. This was not a common practice before the 1980s,
since a state employee costs more. 92 The Meiyuan adopted this practice in the mid-1980s.
The primary goal of this was to enhance the business activities of those committees
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The street office set the profit goal for each committee and then held its director accountable.
Interview with Mr. Zhao Tong, the director of the Meiyuanzhuang Street Office.
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through their own officers. The Huashan Residents Committee even temporarily had two
street officers acting as director and assistant director in 1992. 93
The Weifang and Pudong Street Offices adopted the same practice, but for a quite
different reason. All the street offices in Tianjin City were ordered to cut down the size of
their overly large staffs in the mid-1990s. Instead of firing these redundant officers, the
street offices found many covert ways to resettle them. Sending them down to the
Residents Committees was one of the solutions employed by the Weifang and Pudong
Street Offices. 94
The Pudong Street Office often keeps its committee directors tenured for a long
time. For example, Ms. Li Lan has worked on the Dejia Residents Committee for seven
years. Ms. Liu Shufang was the director of the Shiyan Residents Committee for more than
eight years, until the direct election of committee members took place in 2003. 95 On the
other hand, the Weifang Street Office rotates its sending-down directors every three years.
This policy leaves more control in the hands of the street office, but it may also prevent
those directors from fully engaging the concerns of their neighborhoods, since they are
only temporarily stationed.
Finally, the Shiyan Residents Committee deserves particular attention with regards
to this subject, since it has employed direct election as a means of staffing its committee.
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That was not successful, as they could not cooperate together. The assistant director was then moved away
from the committee.
94
They were still state employees, but working in the committees rather than in the street offices.
95
Ms. Liu Shufang became the director of the Shiyan Social Work Station (SWS), an organization under the
dual leadership of the Pudong Street Office and the newly directly elected committee. The SWS is discussed
shortly.
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Its director, Grandpa Zhao Fu, is not a street office employee and thus the Pudong Street
Office has little ability to control him.
Fiscal Structure. According to the Organic Law of Urban Residents Committees
(Article 17), local governments need to provide necessary financial support to the
Residents Committees, including stipends and operating budget.
Stipend. Since the committee is considered a mass organization, the local Bureau of
Civil Affairs only pays small amount of stipend to members of the committee. 96 In 2003,
the monthly stipend for Jingtai and Huashan members was 300 yuan, the standard level set
by the Tianjin Municipal Government. 97 In additional to that, the Pudong Street Office
paid an extra 150 yuan per month to its committee members to reward their hard work. The
money for this comes from the street office’s operating budget. The current members of
the Shiyan Residents Committee receive no stipend at all, since they consider themselves
to be volunteers working for their neighbors.
Operating Budget. This money comes from the street office as well, and lately has
been very much insufficient. The Weifang and Pudong Street Offices each provided 450
yuan per month to their committees in 2003. The Meiyuan Street Office gave only 370
yuan per month.
The street offices also impose different restrictions regarding the usage of the
money they provide to the committees. The Jingtai Residents Committee needs to get
approval from the Weifang Street Office for any spending item that costs more than 50
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The directors of the Jingtai, Huashan, and Dejia Residents Committees get salaries as government
employees, which are often four times higher than stipends paid for other committee members.
97
The minimum living standard was 450 yuan per month in Tianjin City in 2003.
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yuan. The Pudong Street Office only approves those spending items of 200 yuan or more.
The Shiyan Residents Committee is treated differently, however. It gets its operating
budget on a lump-sum basis and is not required to report on how it is used to the Pudong
Street Office. The Huashan Residents Committee has a similar amount of discretion to the
Shiyan Residents Committee regarding the usage of operating funds from the street office.
Neither does it need to get pre-approval for all of its spending decisions.
Profit. This aspect of the relationship between the street office and committee
applies to the Huashan Residents Committee only. According to the profit-sharing plan
that was discussed in Chapter Four, the Huashan Residents Committee only retained forty
percent of the profit it generated from neighborhood businesses. There were a few
members who complained that the committee should receive a larger share. However,
nearly all committee members appreciated the Meiyuan Street Office for honoring the
promised sharing plan. 98 The committee enjoyed a high level of independence regarding
the distribution of the profit in hand, and this fact is part of what made the committee
happy overall with their forty percent of profit share.
Division of Labor. The Organic Law applies to the Residents Committee’s selfgoverning status, which technically only subjects them to the guidance of the street office
rather than to directly following its orders. The street offices unfortunately treat the
committees as if just the opposite were the case. This tradition still persists, but at different
levels of intensity today.
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Interview with Grandma Liu Jiafeng.
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The Weifang Street Office simply adheres to the old practices. The street office
allocates assignments and the Jingtai Residents Committee has to execute them
immediately. In contrast, the Pudong Street Office took two measures to reduce burdens of
its committees in 2003. First, it redefined four types of activities: (1) activities for the street
office only; (2) activities that require cooperation from the committees; (3) activities for
the committees only; and (4) activities that should be handled by private or other
intermediary organizations. Second, instead of allowing all sections of the street office to
communicate with the committees directly, the street office centralized this power into the
residential section of the street office. All other sections that needed assistance or
cooperation from the committees should submit their requests to the residential section
first. The residential section would then allocate all of what it considered to be reasonable
requests to the committees. These two measures proved to be popular. Although there have
been many inadequacies in implementation, nearly all the committee members I
interviewed admitted to seeing a reduction in the number of assignments from the street
office.
The division of labor situation as far as the Meiyuan Street Office is concerned is
very complicated. It has provided various measures of fiscal assistance to the Huashan
Residents Committee, but it has largely refrained from intervening the committee’s
business decisions. In this area, it has established a clear division of labor with the
committee. However, the committee has received very little authority or independence in
other areas. As is the case with the Jingtai Residents Committee, the Huashan Residents
Committee has to follow the orders from the street office. There are more than ten
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operational sections that make up the street office, such as the civil affairs section, the
education section, the family planning section, etc. Each section can directly give orders to
the committee. This scenario is typical in urban China, where the committee is simply
treated as “a cheap arm” of the street office. 99

So in summation, the street office-Residents Committee structure relationship
frames the way that the will of the state is channeled into each community. It also specifies
and defines the manner in which a committee can respond to top-down influence.
Generally speaking, the street office maintains a strong influence over the committees; and
this influence seems to be important to local governments entities like the street office in
that in allows them to carry out the imperatives of the state that they receive from above.
However, the degrees of control maintained over the Residents Committees vary
from one street office to the next. The Weifang Street Office has the most centralized
control over the Jingtai Residents Committee in all three areas mentioned above (i.e.,
personal management, fiscal structure, division of labor). In contrast, the Huashan and
Dejia Residents Committees enjoy a more decentralized situation where they are allotted
more decision-making power and somewhat lighter workloads. The Huashan Residents
Committee has acquired significant independence with regard to its business operations. It
was able to make decisions regarding its personnel, its operating budget, and usage of the
profits it retained. The Pudong Street Office has further decentralized its power to its
99

Mr. Cao Hui at the Huashan Residents Committee used it to describe his situation. He complained several
times about the arbitrariness and arrogance of the Meiyuanzhuang Street Office. Right now, the various
sections in the street office give his committee too many assignments, which contributes at least seventy
percent of the committee’ workload, according to him.
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committees by clarifying responsibilities and restructuring its connections with the
committees.
Finally, it is interesting to compare the Dejia and Shiyan Residents Committees to
each other. The Pudong Street Office still maintains the means to exercise direct and
comprehensive influence over the Dejia Residents Committee, despite the fact that it has
allowed for a significant degree of decentralization. In contrast, its influence over the
Shiyan Residents Committee is indirect and weak. Members of the Shiyan Residents
Committee are directly elected, not appointed by the street office. None of them are state
employees, and therefore subject little to the street office’s authority. They do not even
receive a stipend from the street office. All of these differences contribute to the Shiyan
Residents Committee having the highest level of independence of all the four committees.
Resident-Residents Committee Structure
This is the bottom layer of the earlier-mentioned sandwich structure, where equally
distinctive patterns of interaction can be found across the four committees.
Structural Relations in the Jingtai Community. Despite its affluence, the Jingtai
Community is rather simply structured. Its structure includes primarily the committee, the
HPMC, and ordinary residents (Figure 5-1). The committee and ordinary Jingtai residents
have a one-dimensional, vertical, and strained relationship. Jingtai residents did not
appreciate the arrival of the committee and its activities. They even feel uneasy about the
committee’s official color. Despite this however, the Weifang Street Office insisted on
establishing the committee for the purpose of managing the nearly three thousand Jingtai
residents. The relationship was rocky even from the beginning, but what ultimately soured
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the committee-resident relationship was the dispute that erupted over the committee’s
current two-level office, which was originally designed to be part of the community
entertainment center. Currently, the committee pays no rent and other utility bills for its
occupancy there. Jingtai residents and the HPMC complain that the committee covertly
seized their property, because they paid the building costs and have since paid the
maintenance fees of the office. However, complaining is the only course of action that they
have been ale to undertake so far. 100
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Figure 5-1: Structural Relations in the Jingtai Community

100

According to the building code in the Tianjin Real Estate Development, all residential communities must
leave certain space for the Residents Committee.
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Ostensibly, the committee has had very hard time with its residents ever since its
controversial establishment. There are several reasons for this in addition to those that have
been mentioned so far. None of the committee members are local residents, and several
incidents that have come to pass since the committee’s establishment have made the
situation even worse. For example, the Weifang Street Office has constantly used the
committee’s office for meetings and entertainment events that have had no connection with
the community. Jingtai residents have loathed these activities, as they have perceived them
to be intrusions into their private community. In another case, the street office decided to
use part of the committee’s office space for storing donated clothes and quilts for an
earthquake relief effort that was undertaken to assist Gansu Province in 2003. These
donations were mostly used items that had been collected from other communities. This
act elicited complaints from many of the Jingtai residents, as they worried that the
donations would contain the bacteria that spread SARS. 101
As a result, the committee has never won recognition or earned legitimacy from its
residents. It even fails to find enough neighborhood activists to fill its twelve building
leader positions. Without neighborhood activists, the committee’s ability to connect with
ordinary residents is fragile and fractured. Nobody should expect the committee to achieve
anything spectacular while it is attempting to deal with thousands of residents alone. A
further consequence of this situation is that the weak linkage between the committee and
its residents greatly dilutes and compromises the capacity of the Weifang Street Office to
exercise its prerogatives of top-down control.
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SARS stands for the Severe Acute Respiratory Disease, which was prevalent at that time in China.
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The difficult relationship between residents and the committee is further weakened
because of the strong ties between residents and the Huaxia Property Management
Company (HPMC). Each Jingtai household pays a monthly property-managing fee of
roughly seventy yuan to the HPMC. In exchange, the company provides housing
maintenance, 24-hour security, neighborhood cleaning, and other services to the residents.
Similar services are often carried out though the committees in other less affluent
communities. The Jingtai Residents Committee hence loses important opportunities to
interact with its constituents by bequeathing these services to the HPMC.
The HPMC was established two years earlier than the Jingtai committee, and the
services it is responsible for are delivered quite professionally. Largely because of this the
HPMC has established a stable and relatively good relationship with most Jingtai residents
over the past four years. Their relationship has even gradually expanded to include some
non-business interactions, interactions which again could and should perhaps exist between
the committee and its residents. For example, some residents now contact the HPMC for
many emergencies, and some of these ‘emergencies’ (like those which involve
neighborhood disputes) are clearly beyond the capacity of the company to handle. The
HMPC is often responsive to most of these requests, however. It hopes to ‘indigenize’
itself in the eyes of Jingtai residents so that it may become a familiar fixture of the
community. Perhaps this is a difficult objective for the HPMC given the fact that it is part
of a nationwide management chain, but a good relationship with residents makes it easier
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to collect the monthly maintenance fee from them, which is often a problem in many other
affluent communities. 102
The HMPC attempts to find its way into the good graces in other ways, as well. It
has made arrangements with the local police station to help residents change their
identification cards, and, in addition, the HMPC has held a Mid-Autumn Festival Party to
entertain local residents since 2001. This party has become a joy-filled tradition of the
community, so perhaps in looking at this particular instance the HMPC is succeeding in its
efforts to indigenize itself. To hold something like the Mid-Autumn Party would be totally
beyond both the fiscal and organizational capacities of the Jingtai Committee. The cost for
the 2003 party alone was more than 40,000 yuan, nearly ten times the annual operating
budget of the committee.
In general, the HPMC and Jingtai residents have developed a horizontal
relationship that is fundamentally different from the traditional top-down penetration type
of relationship that can often characterize interactions between the state and ordinary
residents in China. This new kind of lateral relationship—which is essentially based upon
the market principle of economic exchange—greatly weakens residents’ potential ties with
the committee. It even wipes out possibility for the committee to repair its thin and
strenuous relationship with Jingtai residents.
In the end, this kind of ‘horizontal connection’ seems to have become the only
viable kind of connection that can exist between residents and any other entity inside the
Jingtai community. In the present context there is almost no interest overlap between the
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Interview with Mr. Zhu Jun, the manager of the HMPC at the Jingtai Community.
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committee and its constituents, which greatly compresses the committee’s functional
space. This has basically resulted in a status quo situation where the committee has been
marginalized and has become irrelevant, impotent, and even troublesome to the
community.
Structural Relations in the Huashan Community. The Huashan Residents
Committee is the power center of the Huashan Community, unlike the Jingtai Residents
Committee which ostensibly has to deal with a competitor like the HPMC, (Figure 5-2). 103
The Huashan Residents Committee has to take care of a variety of residential affairs,
which provides plenty of opportunities for the committee to cultivate dense and favored
relations with its constituents. However, the relations in the Huashan Community between
residents and the committee are much more antagonistic and tense even than those in the
Jingtai Community.
As a de facto business entity, the Huashan Residents Committee faces lots of
resistance from ordinary residents. In order to implement the state’s policies, the
committee has to heavily rely upon neighborhood activists. In contrast to the strained
relationship that it has with ordinary residents, the committee has built close ties with
neighborhood activists—mainly with building leaders and those participating in its
business operations. Although there are some activists whose primary goal is to help their
neighbors, the reputation of neighborhood activists in general is negative, as many
residents feel that they are not “clean,” or that they have impure motives for attempting to
help them. It is not a secret that these activists periodically receive cash, living items, and
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The discussion about the Huashan case covers the period until 2003.
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gifts from the committee. Some activists bring their relatives or friends to work in
neighborhood businesses, much to the consternation of residents. There are even few
activists who directly run businesses with the resource support encouragement of the
committee. For example, the gaming center was owned by a building leader who happened
to be a relative of a former deputy director in the street office.
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Figure 5-2: Structural Relations in the Huashan Com m unity (1985-1999)

The committee’s close relationship with neighborhood activists has contributed to
effective governance in some areas of committee functionality, however, such as is the
case regarding family planning policy. As is not the case with the isolated Jingtai Residents
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Committee, neighborhood activists in the Huashan Community greatly enhance the
committee’s capacity for collecting information and execute policies.
The dispatch security unit established in 1999 further strengthens the committee’s
social control efforts (Figure 5-3). Although the unit answers directly to the police station
and has no formal relationship with the committee, both organizations work intensely
together to promote the interests of the state. As the result of its dense connection with
neighborhood activists and the dispatch security unit, the committee has even been
designated as an exemplar in the Meiyuan Street Office for its good performance in both
the areas of business and social control.
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Figure 5-3: Structural Relations in the Huashan Community (1999-2003)
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Huashan residents have tried to express their discontentment in a few different
ways. They often write letters of disclosure and get into verbal skirmishes with the
committee, but none of them had any real impact until the explosion that occurred on May
1, 2003.
The incident began because of a decision made by the street office to build a road
that would run through the community to a nearby newly developed luxury living
compound. 104 The proposed road would have cut the community in half in addition to
bringing noise, pollution, and insecurity to the community. The street office never
attempted to consult Huashan residents, and so to the moderate surprise of the committee,
the decision inspired the community and residents to block the plan. The street office did
nothing to mollify the situation. Instead—as usual—it posted warning posters, and the
committee began trying to “educate” its residents to back off. On May 1, the International
Labor Day, a few officers from the street office, accompanied by the Huashan committee
members, visited the community to issue an ultimatum. Their attitudes only ended up
fanning the flames. Violence broke out after a grandma fainted because of anger. 105
Agitated residents beat the director of the street office, and for two hours they also laid
siege to the office of the committee, where the street officials and committee members had
retreated to. This went on for nearly two hours until the police arrived and broke up the
mob of residents.
This incident raised great concern from the municipality, as it worried that similar
kinds of riots would spread. The municipality quickly shut down the road project and
104
105

As a return, the real estate developer agreed to “donate” some apartments to the street officials.
She died later in hospital.
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punished the street office. A vice director responsible for the road project was dismissed.
The street office was also ordered to give 30,000 yuan to the family of the grandma who
died in the hospital later as a result of a heart attack. Upon the request of ordinary
residents, all of the committee members were dismissed. All of the businesses that were
run under the auspices of the committee were either dissolved or taken over by the street
office. The new committee has been prohibited from engaging in any business activity. 106
The incident ended as a tragedy for both the committee and ordinary residents. The
ripple effects of the riot still trouble the new committee, which is now led by Mr. Cao Hui.
“ ‘Rome is not built in one day’ [bingdong sanchi, fei yiri zhihan]. When you scarified the
interests of residents, why should they let you off quickly?” said he.
Structural Relations in the Dejia Community. At first glance, the structural
relationship between residents and the committee in the Dejia Community looks like a
combination of those seen in the Huashan and Jingtai Communities (Figure 5-4). In one
sense, the Dejia Community processes a similar vertical power chain to the Huashan
Community, which (to-to-bottom) links the street office, the committee, neighborhood
activists and organizations, and ordinary residents. In another sense, though, the linkage
from residents to residential representatives functions a parallel power chain, which is
somewhat similar to the horizontal connection between the HPMC and residents in the
Jingtai Community.
However, a closer examination reveals a different story. Let’s begin by examining
the Assembly of Residential Representatives (ARR), the highest authority in the Dejia
106

Indeed, the municipality has banned such activities since 1997. The district government felt very angry to
learn that the Meiyuanzhuang Street Office still allowed such things.
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Community. As is the case in a situation of separated legislative and executive power, the
ARR makes decisions for the committee to execute.
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Figure 5-4: Structural Relations in the Dejia Community

The ARR in the Dejia Community has ninety-eight members. It is convened twice
a year to evaluate the performance of the committee and each committee member. It also
discusses the committee’s work plan for the coming half year and other issues it deems
important. I attended an ARR in July 2004. Ninety-five representatives were present at the
meeting. The committee even invited some locally prominent political figures to the
meeting, including two representatives of the People’s Congress of Tianjin City and
Director Wang Yun from the Pudong Street Office.
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All committee members treated the ARR very seriously. 107 The Pudong Street
Office states in its policy that any committee member who fails to receive sixty
percentages of the votes during the ARR will be dismissed. If the committee itself receives
less than a sixty percent vote of confidence, then the director of the committee is removed
from his/her post. Although the Dejia Residents Committee has received a no-confidence
vote as such, they have happened in the other committees. 108 The ARR, therefore, becomes
the key institution for holding the committee accountable in the Dejia Community.
Members of the ARR from all thirteen communities in the Pudong Street are also
invited to evaluate the performance of the various sections of the Pudong Street Office on
an annual basis. Although their evaluation has only suggestive value, different sections of
the street office still feel pressure to avoid negative evaluations. 109
Unlike the HPMC that keeps no connection to the Jingtai Residents Committee, the
ARR in the Dejia Community acts a bridge between ordinary residents and the committee:
residents can impose certain controls over the committee and can even influence the street
office through the ARR. This arguably more balanced and accountable bottom-up structure
is distinct from the domineering top-down structures found in both the Jingtai and Huashan
Communities.
The neighborhood activists and organizations in the Dejia Community also differ
sharply from those of the Huashan Community. First, they work for the committee on a
volunteer basis, not because of any kinds of economic incentive. They cooperate with the
107

I spent a whole weekend to help Ms. Zhao Chunhui and Wang Xiaomin to prepare their working reports.
The street office usually will not dismiss those committee members with low evaluation scores
immediately. Instead, it transfers them to other communities for a second chance.
109
Interview with Ms. Jiao Aixia.
108
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committee because they want to serve their neighbors. The committee does not “buy” these
activists into its favor. Rather, it has to win consent from them in terms of what it wants
them to do. Second, there are some neighborhood organizations that operate in a distinct
place between the committee and ordinary residents in the Dejia Community, such as the
YMCA and other diversionary clubs. Although they sometimes receive support from the
committee, ultimately these organizations operate independently of it. The voluntary
neighborhood activists and independent organizations set a tone of cooperation, not
domination, in the Dejia Community. The committee is more like a partner than a
commander as it deals with neighborhood activists and organizations.
In general, there are dense, pluralized, and reciprocal linkages between the
committee and Dejia residents, which are channeled through the ARR, neighborhood
activists, and organizations. They sharply contrast with the thin, discrete, and displaced
relationship between residents and the committee in the Jingtai Community, and also with
the exclusive, one-dimensional, and contentious relationship found in the Huashan
Community.
It is important not to understate or to give short shrift to the intricacy of the Dejia
power structure. It truly is a remarkable and complex affair. It is clear that the committee
is subject to both the influence of the street office and ordinary residents (through the
ARR). The power balance between these two entities is, however, asymmetric. The
horizontal connection that exists between Dejia residents and the committee does not
necessarily imply that there has been a zero-sum decrease in the amount of vertical
sovereign control that the Pudong Street Office can exercise over residents. Although the
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ARR evaluates the annual performance of the street office, its impact on the operation of
the street office is minimal at best. The street office can act with little constraint from the
ARR.
In addition, the impact of the actions of the Dejia Residents Committee on ordinary
residents is more significant than the effect of the residents on the committee. Ordinary
residents can best influence the committee through the ARR, but they do not handpick the
representatives that take place in the ARR. Instead, members of the ARR are often those
neighborhood activists who are invited by the committee to serve in the ARR (Figure 5-4).
Since the committee has won recognition from these activists over the years, it is able to
maintain an intimate relationship with most of those who participate in the ARR. It is
certainly not the case that the committee manipulates the ARR, but any oversight authority
that it has over the committee must be understood in the context of the kind of relationship
that exists between the ARR and the committee. Additionally, the ARR only meets twice a
year, which compromises its decision-making capacity.
These facts add a new and important facet to what has been discussed thus far as
the overall structural dynamic of local governance in the Dejia Community. While an
elements of cooperation is certainly a key characteristic of the structural relationship
between residents and the committee in Dejia, the committee is still the de facto power
center. It makes the actual decisions and then executes them. The power balance still leans
towards the committee rather than towards ordinary residents.
Structural Relations in the Shiyan Community. The committee-residents
structural relationship in the Shiyan Community is very similar in many ways to that of the
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Dejia Community. This is true insofar that in Shiyan such things are found as an ARR and
voluntary-based neighborhood activists and organizations (Figure 5-5). However, as a
state-labeled ‘experimental community,’ the Shiyan Community has also displayed many
features that distinguish it from the Dejia Community. f
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Figure 5-5: Structural Relations in the Shiyan Community

Again, let’s begin by discussing the new actor that has not been seen in any of the
other communities––the Social Work Station (SWS). It was created after the direct election
in June 2003. Of the six workers in the SWS, four are former members of the Shiyan
Residents Committee and two were hired later. The SWS simultaneously serves two
“superiors”: the newly-elected committee and the Pudong Street Office. The real
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implications of the presence of the SWS can only be understood as they are connected to
the ‘experimental’ changes that have comprehensively altered the way the committee
functions in Shiyan.
Shiyan residents directly elected the committee in 2003. All its members are local
residents and they work for the community on a voluntary basis without income. Unlike
the other three committees, the Shiyan Residents Committee has no formal connection to
the street office. The committee derives its legitimacy from Shiyan residents and does its
best to function as though its interests overlap with those of its constituents. As a result, the
committee maintains a high level of independence from the street office.
The committee’s independence from the state and its identification with its
constituents creates a basis for understanding its position within the community. Ordinary
residents are able to influence the committee in two major ways: through direct election
and the ARR. The former means is unique to the Shiyan Community. In addition, the
Shiyan ARR is elected by its residents and its size has been reduced from seventy-nine to
the current number of forty-two. This situation is obviously different from the situation
detailed above about the Dejia ARR. The fact that ARR members in the Shiyan
Community are elected increases the size of the arena in which residents are able to be
represented. Add to this the fact that a small ARR can be easily convened for any
particularly important issue in the community, and it becomes clear that the dynamic of
grassroots governance in the Shiyan Community (vis-à-vis the ARR and direct elections) is
very different from the grassroots dynamics that have been discussed in the cases of the
other committees.
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The above two means go a long ways toward guaranteeing that the committee will
act more in the interests of its constituents than most other Residents Committees. The new
Shiyan committee is no longer just an “arm” of the state, as the Jingtai and Huashan
Residents Committees arguably are. It also differs from the Dejia Residents Committee in
that it is much less beholden to the influence of the street office, and is instead accountable
to the desires and preferences of ordinary residents. Understanding this context of
accountability is a prerequisite for being able to in turn understand the SWS, since it is
ultimately an outgrowth of the self-governing dynamic that is newly present in the Shiyan
Community. This ‘self-governing dynamic’ has affected all spheres of interests and
influence in the community including the committee itself, the ARR, neighborhood
activists and organizations, and ordinary residents.
Examining the SWS closer reveals some interesting and very compelling things
about the way that the street office and the committee interact in the Shiyan Community.
The street office prepares a pool of candidates for SWS positions, and all applicants have
to pass the street office’s examination in order to get their job candidacies. The committee
then makes the final hiring decision from the pool. Additionally, in order to dismiss any
SWS member, the street office and the committee have to reach a consensus.
This interesting dynamic of interaction and cooperation is also visible in other
areas. The street office provides important financial resources to the SWS, such as its
operating fund, but the committee decides how the operating fund will be used. The
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committee also controls the daily operations of the SWS, although it must make sure that
the SWS takes account the concerns of the street office as well. 110
Such acts of cooperation and power-sharing benefit both the committee and the
street office. First off, the committee needs the SWS because it does not have the energy to
implement its decisions—all of the members of the committee are in their seventies. In
addition, the committee cannot support the SWS financially. And as far as the street office
is concerned, the SWS helps to clarify the division of labor between the street office and
the committee, which reduces the functional burden that the street office has to be
concerned with. The street office essentially has access to and jurisdiction over a
professional organization that can and does implement its policies, and it is able to leave
the remaining neighborhood affairs to the committee. 111 This division of labor eliminates
the accusation that the street office intervenes in neighborhood affairs too much, and thus it
also lines the dynamic of reform in Shiyan up with the goals of those who are pursuing and
studying existing and potential administrative reforms that can make for more accountable
and efficient grassroots governance in China.
In fact, many issues handled by the SWS require close cooperation between the
committee and the street office. For example, the committee must seek the administrative
support of the street office in attempting to prosecute instances of illegal construction that
take place inside the community. Also, the committee relies on the street office’s support
in holding its many activities, such as neighborhood sports events, etc. Reciprocally, the
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This information comes from the SWS Management Code and the interviews.
The street office can peel off some responsibilities, such as neighborhood security and environment
cleaning.
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street office heavily depends on the help of the committee as it attempts to implement and
enforce state policies like the family planning policy. Therefore, the SWS is a true symbol
of cooperation and reciprocity between the committee and the street office. While both are
able to maintain their independence, they can also realize their goals through cooperation
at the SWS.
Understanding the Functional Diversity from the Sandwich Structure
So far, the Residents Committee’s structural relationships with both the street
office and its residents have been discussed separately. It is time to discuss these upward
and downward connections/relationships together in the interest of trying to understand the
different functionalities that were observed to exist between the four communities in
Chapter Four.
Jingtai – A Penetrative Residents Committee. The Jingtai Residents Committee,
as stated before, falls into the penetrative model of grassroots governance, because its only
real function involves political control. The committee’s unique functionality derives from
two facts about its context: on the one hand it is subject to the centralized-control auspices
of the Weifang Street Office, and on the other it has essentially alienated itself from its
community. The street office’s strong influence forces the committee to take the state’s
will as its first priority, such as in matters of social control and administrative service
provision. Most of these kinds of state-derived responsibilities (such as those that involve
the implementation of population policy or the conducting of governmental surveys)
require intensive involvement or cooperation with ordinary residents, and the committee’s
weak relationship with the community undermines its capacity to engage with its residents
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effectively as such. The wealth of Jingtai residents allows them, however, to buy services
from the market, rather rely upon the state or the committee to provide for them. The
HPMC, a private business corporation, is hired to provide necessary services. This also
contributes to the marginalization of the committee, and helps to explain why fraud occurs
regularly in the carrying out of some governmental assignments. Finally, the workload
involved with monitoring a few political suspects is light and does not require the
committee to interact with large numbers of residents. Political control thus becomes the
only viable function through which the committee can prove its usefulness to street office.
Huashan – A Corporatist Residents Committee. The Huashan Residents
Committee is defined as a corporatist committee because of its collusion with the Meiyuan
Street Office in the management of and involvement in neighborhood economy. The street
office has great influence over the committee, as is seen in the fact that it was the street
office that pushed the committee to develop neighborhood businesses in the first place.
However, the street office does not fetter the committee. Instead, it significantly
decentralizes economic power to the committee and—as is the case with many local
governments in China—the street office plays its “developmental” role rather effectively.
It leaves major decisions to the committee, it provides monetary and policy supports to the
committee’s businesses, it secures sale channels, and it also honors a profit-sharing
agreement with the committee. This decentralized economic structure provides both
pressure and incentives to the committee to make more profit. In contrast, ordinary
Huashan residents are stuck in something of a stress-position between powerful forces. The
top-down connection that dominates affairs in the neighborhood excludes residents from
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the benefits of the neighborhood economy, except insofar as they are consumers. The
committee, backed by the street office, has established a monopoly over economic issues.
Its close relationship with neighborhood activists has further consolidated its control over
the neighborhood economy. Together, these factors explain why the committee was able to
operate its businesses for such a long time, despite tremendous resentment from ordinary
residents.
In addition, the street office’s influence has also determined the fact that the
committee has to carry out social control and other administrative services. In this regard,
the Huashan case simply repeats the story of the Jingtai case. However, the Huashan
Residents Committee is much more effective than the Jingtai one in matters of policy
implementation, although the former faces an obviously tougher situation than the latter.
The secret is the Huashan Residents Committee’s close ties to neighborhood activists.
These ties, which are primarily based upon the cronyism of cozy economic relations, helps
to enable the committee to overcome the alienation and impotency observed in the Jingtai
case.
Finally, the absence of any kind of self-governing mechanisms in either the
Huashan or Jingtai Residents Committees also results from the way their structural
relationships function. As far as the upward structural relationships of these two
committees are concerned, the street offices have kept the two committees under tight
control, which leaves neither the incentive nor the space for them to advocate the interests
of ordinary residents. Regarding the downward structural relationships maintained by these
two committees, the alienation and even antagonistic relationships that have developed
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between them and their residents provides no historical basis that could allow the
committees to identify themselves with their constituents or to become recognized as selfgoverning organizations.
Dejia – A Synergistic Residents Committee. The Dejia Residents Committee
dynamically fits with the synergistic model of grassroots governance for two reasons: first,
because of the comprehensive number of functions it has taken responsibility for and
second because of its focus on building a “Service Committee.” Both of these reasons are
deeply connected to the kind of relationship it maintains both with the Pudong Street
Office and with its residents. On the one hand, the street office, though it is still very
influential, has decentralized certain powers to the committee. On the other hand,
neighborhood activists, independent neighborhood organizations, and an influential ARR
together constitute a participative and dense network of interests that exist together within
the community. This network counterbalances the committee’s hierarchical connection to
the street office. As a result, the committee cannot simply serve the street office only and
ignore its residents. Instead, it has to try to find a balance that is able to satisfy both the
street office and its residents as often as it can.
The vertical connection it has to the street office prompts the committee to take on
social control and administrative service issues, while the horizontal connection it has to
the other above-mentioned interest-actors pushes the committee to address the interests of
the community. The coexistence of these vertical and horizontal influences defines the
comprehensive functionalities of the Dejia Residents Committee. The delicate balance
between these interests further accounts for the peculiarity of each function the committee
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has taken on. For example, the committee’s connection to neighborhood activists greatly
facilitates its capacity for handling social control issues. However, the same linkage has
also allowed the committee to rethink its position on some less popular social control
activities, such as monitoring Falun Gong practitioners.
Even though it has found new ways to carefully attend to the agenda of the state,
the Dejia Residents Committee has made some effort to extend and deepen mechanisms of
neighborhood self-governance in the community, as is seen in what it’s tried to do to
establish financial transparency in its affairs. Its efforts as such are limited in scope, due to
the intimate relationship it has with the street office. Ultimately, the committee is unwilling
to take on touchy issues that involve the state. Even in the opening story in Chapter One,
the committee did not challenge the powerful No. 1 Rest House of Tianjin City until angry
residents threatened to protest in the street.
Certainly, the best example that can help to explain the nature of these upward- and
downward-dynamics is the idea of a “Service Committee.” It is clear that the presence of
horizontal connections compels the committee to pay attention to its constituents.
However, since its vertical connection to the street office ultimately presses down on it in a
very influential way, the Dejia Residents Committee does not advocate a “Self-governing
Committee.” Instead, it deliberately promotes those administrative services that are
sponsored by the state but that tangibly benefit its residents as well; services such as socialwelfare programs and the Starlight Senior Project. These services are such that both the
state and ordinary residents are essentially benefited. The state gains legitimacy in the eyes
of residents, and the residents obviously are able to receive certain social legs-up because
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of the state. Therefore, the committee can satisfy both sides without putting itself into an
either-or situation.
Shiyan – Another Synergistic Residents Committee. The Shiyan Residents
Committee is consistent with the predictions of the synergistic model as well. Although
both the Shiyan and Dejia Residents Committees perform equally comprehensive
functions, they also operate in substantively different ways in the field of nearly every
function they have thus far taken on. And these differences, of course, can be attributed to
the different structural relationships that have developed around the two committees.
The Shiyan Residents Committee enjoys the highest degree of decentralization
from the street office of all four committees. Because of the direct election, the Pudong
Street Office has lost many of its formal ties to the committee. Legitimacy is now
conferred on the committee by its constituents, and not in the de facto agent-of-the-state
type way that it once was by the street office.
The amount of autonomy that is thus allowed the Shiyan Residents Committee is
directly tied to the way it interacts with its residents, and thus (as one would expect) the
Shiyan Community is also witness to the most participative arrangements between
committee and residents of any of the four communities that have been discussed. The
committee’s loose connection as such to the street office and its self-identification with
residents enable it to avoid political responsibilities like monitoring Falun Gong
practitioners; and for the same reasons, the committee is able to refuse some administrative
services that benefit the community little. They also explain why the committee is even
less enthusiastic than the Dejia Residents Committee in undertaking even those
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administrative services that might eventually benefit local residents. Its autonomy allows
the committee and the community at large to think outside the box, so to speak.
The Dejia Residents Committee functions as a compromiser between the street
office and ordinary Dejia residents. It faces a delicate situation where it has to satisfy both
groups. In contrast, the Shiyan Residents Committee is more heavily influenced by
ordinary residents than by the street office. Being an elected entity, the committee
primarily needs to make its constituents happy. As a result, the committee devotes most of
its energy to issues of community self-governance. It identifies and promotes those selfgoverning services that suit the idiosyncrasies of its community. It also takes concrete
measures to encourage and institutionalize the process of neighborhood self-governance. In
return, the progress toward self-governance reinforces the independence of the committee
and insulates it from outside infringement.
However, the self-governing tendencies in the Shiyan Community do not imply
that the committee will become a “challenger” to the political establishment. The power
structure around the committee marks out a cooperative rather than confrontational
relationship with the street office; this is exemplified by the way that the SWS is able to
work with the street office, and not against it. The SWS is subject to the authority of both
the committee and the street office. This dual leadership dynamic manifests itself in a very
synergistic way. For example, the street office often needs to obtain the cooperation of the
committee in order to effectively implement its policies, since the committee monitors the
daily operations of the SWS. The committee is thus in a strong bargaining position,
relatively speaking. Under these circumstances, it is usually willing to help the state in
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exchange for its continued financial support of the SWS. This state of affairs is really very
ideal in many ways. The committee does not push its envelope too far, and it probably
does not desire to. Cooperation is in the interests of both players, except for a few issues
where they are forced into confrontation, as was the case with the issue of commercial
bungalows.
Structure and Functions in Summary
There is no doubt that the street offices still have enormous influence on the
Residents Committees, which is attributable partially to the historical intimacy that has
generally existed between them, but it must be acknowledged that the phase ‘street office’
is not a generic term that merely refers to an organizational apparatus of the state. The
phase ‘street office’—wherever it is employed—carries with it a complex reality. Myriad
variables in terms of the operational dynamics and the range of influence of street offices
must be discussed in conjunction with any case study involving them. For the purposes of
this project, one such variable that is keenly important is the measure to which a given
street office wields its influence over the Residents Committees that are within its
geographical jurisdiction. Indeed, the three street offices in this project impose distinctive
impacts on their committees. The Weifang Street Office has the most centralized power
structure. The Meiyuan Street Office has greatly decentralized its power in order to
encourage the Huashan Residents Committee to run successful neighborhood businesses.
However, it still strictly manages the committee in areas of non-economic concerns.
Indeed, it does so in a way that is similar to the way the Weifang Street Office manages the
Jingtai Residents Committee. In contrast, the Dejia Residents Committee faces a more
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relaxed regime of control with regard to the Pudong Street Office. On one hand, the
Pudong Street Office is willing to share power with ordinary residents over the control of
the committee. On the other hand, the street office attempts to leave more discretion in the
hands of the committee so as to allow it to accommodate to the peculiar needs of their
community. In the Shiyan case, the same street office has cut its ties with a Residents
Committee even further.
Overall, what the committee’s upward linkage with the street office looks like often
plays a deterministic role as far as what choices the committee is able to make in terms of
functionality. The establishing of a centralized and rigid control regime on the part of the
street office confines the committee to being nothing more than an “arm” of the state, as in
the Jingtai case. In contrast, a decentralized and flexible structure creates opportunities for
diversity and innovation.
However, this is only one side of the story. To fully understand the functionality of
the committee, one also needs to look at its downward linkage to ordinary residents, i.e.,
one needs to understand the structural relationships that exist inside its community. This is
particularly important in examining the Huashan, Dejia, and Shiyan Residents Committees,
all of which are situated in the midst of decentralized control regimes. In a fragmentary
community like the Huashan Community, ordinary residents are regularly subjected to the
vertical control prerogatives of the committee. Committee-resident connections have thus
become thin, fractured, strained, and even antagonistic. A vicious circle ostensibly
develops in a scenario like this. The attendant consequence of this situation is that the
committee has no desire to identify itself with its embittered constituents. And since
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ordinary Huashan residents have not been able to exercise any significant influence over
the committee, the neighborhood economy has evolved into a profit-making machine with
little hindrance. This situation was essentially what the street office had originally
intended to bring about, and it accordingly got to the point where the profit-making
machine benefited only the committee and the street office. Admittedly, the committee
had to deal with angry residents and other problems that derived from its own lack of
legitimacy, but overall it was still able to enjoy significant benefits from the situation
engineered by the Weifang Street Office.
In contrast, the Dejia and Shiyan Residents Committees face dense, multiple, and
reciprocal networks of interests that exist inside their communities. These networks require
their cooperation… they must work with neighborhood activists and organizations; they
must in some sense comply with the accountability imperatives of the ARR, they are
subject to the political winds generated by direct and indirect elections, and they need to be
aware of and account for miscellaneous other self-governing channels that exist in various
capacities for ordinary residents. These networks counter the vertical influence that
originates from the street office and forces the committees to take local interests into
consideration. In addition, the strength of these networks clarifies the extent to which the
committees lean towards ordinary residents as opposed to the street office. For example,
the Dejia Residents Committee prioritizes administrative services, since it has stronger ties
to the street office than it does to its residents. Meanwhile, the Shiyan Residents
Committee commits to neighborhood self-governance, because it is chosen by and is
primarily responsible to its constituents, and not to the street office.
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In conclusion, the Residents Committee’s structural connections to both the street
office and to its own community help to explain the functional diversity that exists
between different committees. It is for the convenience of analysis that the covariation is
comprehended essentially by analyzing the committee’s separate linkages, downward and
upward. In reality, the covariation occurs in a complicated setting. A committee is
simultaneously subjected to the influence of both connections. More importantly, changes
in one set of linkages often bring consequential changes in the other set. It is these
dynamics of interactions between the street office and ordinary residents, channeled
through the committee, that provide the context for interpreting the dynamics of the
grassroots state-society relationship in urban China.

250

Residents Committee and State-Society Relations at the Urban Grassroots
A primary motivation of this project is to explore the changing state-society
relationship in contemporary China, a nation which has witnessed spectacular economic
growth under strict authoritarian political control. In confronting such a gigantic society
undergoing profound transformation, this project can only realistically draw inferences
from changes at the urban grassroots level, particularly as they are observed to take place
inside the multi-tiered ‘sandwich structure’ relationship of the street office, the Residents
Committee, and the residents. This ‘sandwich structure’ is a hotbox for intensive
interactions between the state and ordinary residents, and as such it ostensibly is the ideal
place for studying broad-based change as it takes place in China. The committee is an
officially recognized neighborhood organization by the state, but the committee is neither a
part of the state nor is it an element of civil society, at least according to the popular
definition of that phrase. It happens to be an in-between organization that does not fit
neatly into the traditional state-society dichotomy.
This chapter has delineated the connection between a committee’s function(s) and
its structural relationship with the street office and ordinary residents. Now, it is time to
reconceptualize the postulation stated in Table 2-2. The empirical analysis conducted thus
far can now facilitate the theoretic remodeling of the committee’s functionalities in
accordance with the dimensions of its structural relationships to the state and to ordinary
residents (Table 5-2).
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Table 5-2: Reconceptualization of the Analytical Framework
Street office Centralized
Decentralized
Community
Participating
Fragmented

Civil disobedience model
Penetrative model
(Jingtai; Huashan)

Synergistic model 112
(Dejia; Shiyan)
Corporatist model
(Huashan 113)

The penetrative model describes a committee that is tightly controlled and that
attempts to execute the will of the state amidst the confining limitations of a fragmented
community. The civil disobedience model characterizes a committee with deep ties, where
its constituents will fight against a regime of strict control engendered by a repressive state.
Contrarily, a committee with some decision-making power on its hands might act against
the interests of the community if it operates according to the dictates of the corporatist
model, according to which a committee generally faces little resistance from ordinary
residents. Finally, the synergistic model portrays a committee that works with both the
state and ordinary residents in reciprocal ways.
This kind of analytical framework helps us to generalize theoretically about the
four committees of this project, which can all be classified by three of the models. This
framework has been well used in discussing and characterizing different kinds of statesociety relationships that operate at the urban grassroots level. This section begins by
summarizing the changes that have happened in both of the outer layers of the sandwich
112

The synergistic model is similar to the social corporatist model in terms of the positive outcome from the
structured interest expression. However, the later model primarily describes the cooperative structure in
stable democratic countries. In those countries, the state functions like a moderator above competing social
interests. In contrast, the synergistic model focuses on reciprocal connection in developing countries,
including those non-democratic ones. The state there often fails to keep neutrality, but actively participates
the process of social construction for certain directions it desires.
113
It refers to the economic function the Huashan Residents Committee takes.
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structure. Then, the implications of these changes are explored in line with the four
scenarios diagramed in Table 5-2. All of this eventually leads to some inferences about the
broad state-society relationship in contemporary China.
Residents Committee and Urban Community
The Organic Law of Urban Residents Committees defines the Residents Committee
as the only legitimate neighborhood self-governing organization, and so was essentially
designed to serve and represent the interests of its residents. However, the committees have
more often functioned as the state’s instruments of social control than as entities of selfgovernance, especially during the pre-reform era when they were largely used as agents of
social surveillance. As this project has pointed out, the committee has experienced
dramatic changes since the reform. Nowadays, they are concerned in one way or another
about all the residents in its community, and as we have seen in the case of several of the
committees studied in this project, they often carry out a wide range of functions. And,
regarding changes that have affected the committees, there are at least three things that
need to be understood about the changes that have particularly affected the bottom layer of
the state-Residents Committee-residents sandwich.
Neighborhood Participation. The idea of ‘neighborhood participation’ can refer
to residents participating in activities put on by the committee, it can refer to residents
sharing responsibilities in the community, or it can refer to them participating in elections.
Neighborhood participation was rare in the old days, since most residents listened to their
Danwei, and not to the Residents Committees. Only a few disaffected urbanites mobilized
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around the committee so as to participate in state-sponsored events, like political studies.
Since the reforms, the situation has changed completely.
Level of Neighborhood Participation. The Jingtai Community is an atomized
neighborhood where there is scant neighborhood participation and where the committee is
barely concerned about the interests of its residents. The participation level in the Huashan
Community is also generally low, as most ‘participation’ occurs primarily between the
Huashan Residents Committee and neighborhood activists. However, ordinary Huashan
residents have participated in neighborhood politics in a few cases, even though their
participation has been marked by contentiousness and confrontation. Examples of this kind
of participation include everything from writing angry disclosure letters to physically
attacking local officials. The Dejia and Shiyan Residents Communities have witnessed a
higher level of neighborhood participation. Almost all neighborhood activists and ordinary
residents in these committees participate in neighborhood affairs in one way or another.
Both committees provide multiple opportunities for participation to all residents, such as
by organizing elections for representatives for the People’s Congress at the local district
level, or by organizing elections for residential representatives that gather in the periodic
ARR meetings. Sometimes, outside people and organizations also participate in activities
in these two communities, including students, private companies, and nearby officials from
military posts.
Nature of Neighborhood Participation. The participation in the Jingtai Community
is economic in nature. Ordinary residents purchase necessary services and the HPMC reaps
profit by fulfilling these needs. This commercial exchange situation is in a sense non-

254

discriminatory, but it is based upon the ability to pay, which is totally different from the
traditional type of top-down administrative services that are the norm in other communities
across China. This situation is evidence of the fact that economic liberalization has
infiltrated the grassroots level of urban areas.
The participation of neighborhood activists in the Huashan Community is
economic in nature, too. They benefit from the neighborhood economy by exchanging
their cooperation with the committee and the street office for profit and for some status.
However, this type of corporatist exchange relies on dependency, not equality, and it
provokes angry responses from ordinary Huashan residents. These responses, though they
are often labeled ‘radical,’ can and should also be labeled as moments of political
participation, where residents are aiming to voice their frustration and rage against the
exclusivist neighborhood decision-making structure.
Political participation also occurs in the Dejia and Shiyan Communities, but in very
different ways. Both communities have established channels around the committees
through which residents are able to voice their concerns and participate in decisions.
Ordinary residents can take part in neighborhood politics through the ARR, elections, and
various neighborhood meetings. These channels essentially rein in the power of the
committee; meanwhile, they reduce the possibility of “radical” participation. Residents
living in the two communities also enjoy engaging the community socially, which is very
rare in the Jingtai and Huashan Communities. 114 Social activities are particularly
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The HPMC provides cultural entertainment activities to Jingtai residents. However, due to its business
nature, those activities are very limited, such as the Mid-Autumn Festival Party once a year. Some of the
cultural activities are for profit, such as community gym and catering.
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important, since they are always related to the establishment of harmony, happiness, and
the enjoyment of daily community life. The various diversionary clubs, neighborhood
sports events, the community-citizenry school, and other voluntary activities greatly enrich
community life and solidify informal and formal ties within communities. Finally, the two
communities do not witness the level of economic participation on the part of residents that
we see in the other two communities.
Neighborhood Institutionalization. Chinese urban communities in general are
densely populated, which intensifies the urgency of tending to various social issues. Issues
related to making a neighborhood safe, keeping a local environment clean, and simply
attempting to establish a place of home where cultural and psychological satisfaction can
be found in general… all of these things arguably become even larger challenges when
tackled in the Chinese urban context. These communities are also units that are and have
been subjected to a significant amount of social and political management, as is evidenced
by the seemingly omnipresent facts of family planning and welfare programs in Chinese
urban areas. In modern society, many of these issues are tackled by institutions, and as we
have seen this is very much the case in China. The committee has perhaps a pivotal role in
addressing the problems presented by the Chinese urban climate. It thus has a tough role to
play, and in order to try, it ultimately has to rely on various neighborhood activists and
organizations. The types of neighborhood organizations and the ways they are associated
together are therefore important aspects of grassroots politics in China. Whereas Chinese
communities were once marked by how atomized, divided, and un-institutional they were,
neighborhood institutionalization has experienced significant changes in the reform era.
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There are two types of independent organizations in the Jingtai Community, the
Jingtai Residents Committee and the HPMC. The committee follows in line with the
traditional method of effecting social control while the HPMC is really a completely new
type of institution in urban China, and is in fact largely a product of the kind of
commercialization Chinese urban areas have experienced in the post-reform era. They do
not accommodate each other comfortably, because of their distinctive objectives and
because they are almost completely disconnected from each other. To a large degree, the
tension between them is a reflection of the broad paradox that would seem to be presented
by the co-existence of authoritarian politics and a market economy. Economic
liberalization continues to make the management of an increasingly open and diversified
society a much more complex affair for the Chinese authoritarian state. The traditional
means of strict control, it seems, have either had to evolve or have disintegrated entirely
and have been replaced by institutions that are often separate from the state. In the Jingtai
Community, both organizations play a zero-sum game where the HPMC gains almost
always at the expense of whatever connectedness does exist between the committee and
residents. The latter is marginalized since it does not (and really cannot) meet the needs or
demands of Jingtai residents, and thus (as would be predicted by the proponents of free
markets) other suppliers—in this case the HPMC—rise to meet the needs of residents.
Ultimately, then, the Jingtai Community has essentially split, is very much tensioncharged, and is witness to a very low level of institutionalization; and what
institutionalization there is has been very much fragmented.
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In the Huashan Community there is an interest symbiosis between its committee,
private businesses, and neighborhood activists. They are closely tied together because of
common economic interests. Neighborhood businesses need the committee’s permission to
operate in the community, and neighborhood activists benefit economically from
cooperation with the committee and those businesses. The committee shares profits with
the businesses and wins compliance from neighborhood activists for its other activities.
The recent arrival of the dispatching security unit simply adds strength to the
administrative capacity of the community. As a result, the community has a higher level of
institutionalization than the Jingtai Community, since its major organizations are united
and cooperate with each other. However, the interest symbiosis is quite an exclusive one
and thus is not very much accessible by ordinary residents, which is different from the
close connection that exists between the HPMC and Jingtai residents.
The institutionalization in the Dejia and Shiyan Communities is of a very different
stripe. First, there is a very strong presence of neighborhood organizations in these two
communities, such as the ARR, the senior association, the local YMCA, the SWS, various
diversionary clubs, and even some other outside organizations that are active in the politics
of the communities. These indigenous organizations each have their own unique ties to
local residents, and these ties vary in terms of what motivates the organization to establish
them, the size of the organization in question, and in terms of the history of each
organization and how much potential there is that the local residents will continue to invest
in their relationship to them. Together these ties and the relationships and capital that result
from them establish the foundation of strong institutional networks. The Residents
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Committees further strengthen this institutionalization by providing leadership,
coordination, and support. And cooperation and leadership also go a long way towards
building solid institutions in these communities.
Neighborhood Self-Governance. While it was originally enshrined in the Organic
Law of Urban Residents Committees (Article 1 and 2), the self-governing spirit that now is
beginning to possess some committees has only recently become a phenomenon worth
discussing. The four cases examined in this project show that there are encouraging signs
that point towards the continued proliferation of a self-governing spirit. In the Jingtai
Community, the HPMC has supplanted the committee in the management of most
neighborhood issues. To a certain degree, this can be seen as an act of self-governance,
since Jingtai residents have been able to freely choose the HPMC over the committee,
essentially by a market means. Self-governance in the Huashan Community, unfortunately
though, has taken on an ugly face. Unlike Jingtai residents, the residents of the Huashan
Community cannot afford to purchase services, and this has basically meant that they have
had to accept the scraps that fall from the table of the exclusivist interest symbiosis
mentioned earlier that dominates Huashan politics. The accumulated resentment of such a
disenfranchised citizenry not surprisingly led eventually to physical confrontation. Since
the ‘interest symbiosis’ essentially maintained an exclusive monopoly over all the
resources in the community, the people needed to find some way to make their voice
heard. Fortunately, the “May 1” incident eventually broke up the interest symbiosis and
has probably established a precedent for acts of self-determination. More in the way of
self-governance and participation will likely follow.
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In contradistinction to what the situation once was in the Huashan Community,
self-governing practices have taken deep root in the Dejia and Shiyan Communities. In
these locales, ordinary residents have taken responsibility for a variety of neighborhood
tasks and activities ranging from those involving daily security and environmental
maintenance to those which require deep neighborly commitment and acts of mutualassistance; and they have also taken the initiative in providing different outlets of cultural
entertainment. They also participate in decision-making regarding issues of importance in
their communities. In a few cases, they have even organized to defend their interests
against various outside infringements. This high level of self-governance relies on active
neighborhood participation and on well-established neighborhood institutions. The
committees in these communities catalyze these self-governing practices as they coordinate
the institutional “muscles” inside themselves. The Shiyan Residents Committee does the
best job of all in this regard… indeed it has well-broadened and deepened a series of selfgoverning measures.
Residents Committee and the Street Office
While designating the Residents Committee as a self-governing organization, the
Organic Law also requires it to assist the missions and ends of local governments,
particularly those of the street office. The street office was not a significant player in urban
management in the pre-reform era, since most urban residents were tightly controlled
through the Danwei system, but the street office has moved from the periphery into the
middle of matters of urban management; and it has done this (or has been forced to) when
economic liberalization has gradually eroded the intimacy that once existed between the
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state and its various working units. Can the street office effectively control these rapidly
changing urban communities? This is a key question that needs to be answered if the
state’s governing capacity in cities is going to be understood. Since the street office is
heavily relying upon the Residents Committee as it attempts to engage in grassroots
management, then the committee becomes an important indicator for checking the pulse of
the street office, the nerve end of the colossal Chinese state.
Effectiveness. There are at least three respects in which the committee assists the
street office: political control, administrative control, and administrative service.
Political Control. It is in this arena where the history of the committee exhibits its
greatest continuity, and yet it is no longer as important as it was three decades ago. All four
committees in this study have devoted more energy to areas other than political control. 115
It reflects a general tendency of de-politicization in an increasingly open society.
Nevertheless, three street offices in this project are still capable of maintaining rather
effective political control with the cooperation of the committees. 116 In accordance with
the request of the street office, the committees can arrange for tight measures of
surveillance over political targets. These measures include such things as 24-hour
monitoring, home visits, or peer surveillance. This micro security network has been
interwoven into each urban community and helps the state to nip political troubles in the
bud effectively.
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Even the Jingtai Residents Committee spends more time on managing Majiong tables than political
control.
116
The Shiyan Residents Committee has officially quit this function. However, it does not refuse to provide
critical logistical support for the SWS (and the street office), such as the household registration system and
the network of neighborhood comprehensive security team network.
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Administrative Control. Most tasks of administrative control involve the general
public rather than only a few political targets, which makes it a better touchstone for
evaluating the social control capacity of a street office. The three street offices have
performed in distinct ways in this area. For example, it is clear that the Weifang Street
Office has basically failed to implement any administrative controls in the Jingtai
Community, due to the impotent status of the Jingtai Residents Committee. The Huashan
Community under the Meiyuan Street Office is deeply troubled by neighborhood crimes.
In addition, it seems that neither the Meiyuan nor the Pudong Street Offices have come up
with good solutions to the floating population problem. However, in general, the Meiyuan
and the Pudong Street Offices are effective in implementing those policies that the state
cares about the most, including the family planning policy, the household registration
system, and neighborhood dispute mediation.
Administrative Service. This is the area where the street office has witnessed the
most expansion since the 1980s. It includes miscellaneous tasks that are passed down from
the district government, like those involving social welfare assistance, charity events,
emergency event management, collecting fees, surveys, managing sewage and housing,
developing local economy, etc. To a certain degree, the street offices have faithfully
carried out these tasks. In terms of administrative service, the Meiyuan Street Office
actively promotes the neighborhood economy in its communities, and the Pudong Street
Office focuses more on non-economic administrative services. The latter has even set up a
professional SWS in the Shiyan Community so as to assure the successful implementation
of tasks involving administrative service provision. It is hard to say which committee is
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most effective in this, as they engage in different activities. However, it shows that the
street office at the very least has the capacity to effectively carry out its intended tasks with
the cooperation of the committee.
Decentralization. The nature of the power balance between the street office and
the committee varies between the four committees. The Meiyuan and Pudong Street
Offices have delegated significant power to their committees. Relating to the broad social
transformation that has been taking place in China, this decentralization would be better
considered a permanent rather than a temporary trend for two reasons. First, the Chinese
state has limited resources that it can deploy as it attempts to govern increasingly complex
cities. The execution of many urban grassroots activities involves a bevy of trivial details.
The street office simply lacks the ability to employ or gather this information without the
help of the committee. Therefore, the street office is left in a position where in order to do
its job it essentially needs to empower the committee. The Huashan, Dejia, and Shiyan
Residents Committees have proven the value of decentralization. The Jingtai Residents
Committee shows how the exercise of strict measures of control by a street office can
eventually stifle its practice of urban management.
In addition, the state is increasingly coming to understand the problems of overcentralization in social management. One of the key successes of the Chinese economic
reforms is that they have decentralized economic power to non-state actors on a broad
scale. This has enlightened and encouraged the state to pursue a decentralizing approach to
social management. As the director of the Pudong Street Office, Ms. Wang Yun, stated “I
feel that my street office is running behind the time. Even though my office has already
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expanded by twenty times since the late 1970s, I still do not have enough people to handle
the tasks we are responsible for now. The solution cannot simply be to hire more officers.
Our government intervenes too much. There are many things that should be left to
residents themselves, such as neighborhood security and environmental cleaning. My street
office is trying to shrug off non-governmental jobs and give them back to local
communities.” Although the street office is still in the preliminary stages of carving out a
reasonable division of labor with its committees, the trend of decentralization that has
marked the street office is worthy of note. It is very compelling to see how far the state has
voluntarily allowed its presence in urban communities to diminish.
Responsiveness. In general, the street office responds to local residents
infrequently. However, this project has been able to examine several very interesting cases
in which residents have influenced local governments in one way or another. In the
Huashan Community, ordinary residents used public confrontation as a way to make the
district government aware of the mismanagement of their community, which in turn
prompted the district office to reshuffle the affairs of the Meiyuan Street Office and the
Huashan Residents Committee. And the Dejia and Shiyan Residents Committees have also
successfully defended community interests against local governments through non-violent
means.
Aside from a few zero-sum cases, where local governments have responded in an
all or nothing way to the aspirations of communities and committees, they have also
responded to the committee for the sake of larger interests. For example, the Pudong Street
Office has invited residential representatives to evaluate its performance. This illustrates
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the fact that even local organs of the Chinese state are concerned with issues related to
responsiveness. Leaders from the street office also attend the ARR regularly so as obtain
feedback and suggestions from local residents. In both Dejia and Shiyan Communities, I
have witnessed cases where street officials voluntarily called ad hoc meetings with
members of committees or groups of residents to discuss community affairs.
Rule of law. This penultimate and ever enigmatic component of governance has
been designated as a priority in the new era of Chinese political reform. This project finds
some evidence to support the existence of change related to the Rule of Law at the local
government level. The clearest example of this kind of change involves the street office’s
efforts to standardize its connections to the committee according to the Organic Law. It
was originally the idea of local governments, not ordinary residents, to promote selfgovernance in urban communities. The Pudong Street Office has made calls for the
establishment of the ARR in all of its thirteen communities and has consistently
encouraged the participation of local residents in matters of local governance. In addition,
it insists that all of its committees must hold and be subjected to the results of
“democratic” elections every three years, even though these elections are often conducted
in perfunctory way.
The street office has also tried to clarify a division of labor with the Residents
Committees, which has included gradually reducing the number of assignments it hands
down to them. The establishment of the SWS in the Shiyan Community is also a
breakthrough, since the Pudong Street Office has essentially relinquished direct control
over the Shiyan Residents Committee. This means that the SWS—though it cooperates
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extensively with the street office—is essentially a local and nominally independent entity.
And finally, the street office has accepted the committee’s request to drop its political
control duties, which is consistent with the “rule of law.” 117 Even the Weifang and
Meiyuan Street Offices have shown that they can make primitive but encouraging
adjustments that aim at the same sorts of goals. For example, after the “May 1” conflict in
the Huashan Community, the new Meiyuan Street Office ordered all of its seventeen
committees to establish the ARR, hoping to induce residential participation and
cooperation in those communities. In the Jingtai Community, the Weifang Street Office
refrained from stopping the gatherings of the one-on-one marketing network, since no law
forbids such gatherings.
The Grassroots State-Society Relationship and the Residents Committee
By any measure, tremendous changes have occurred, both in the way the Residents
Committee functions and in the nature of the structural connections it maintains to the
street office and ordinary residents. But because China’s urban society is so complex and is
changing so dramatically, the evidence collected in this project is inadequate a foundation
upon which broad generalizations about the nature of politics and social life in urban China
can be based. This is simply a fact that any researcher who’s subject is the politics of
contemporary China must learn to live with. But the vastness of the scale of the subject
matter does not mean that the data collected here is unreadable because of its limitedness.
Several inferences can be drawn and several readings can be made about the state-society
relationship at the grassroots level based on the comparative data presented here. A
117

In China, only state agencies with legal authority can carry out political control activities, such as home
visits. The Residents Committee is a non-governmental organization without such legal authority.
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roadmap for doing analysis—which is comprised of the four analytical models—has been
discussed in depth. The next challenge is to divine some possibilities that perhaps herald
winds of change amidst the tangled jungle of grassroots state-society interactions.
A State Penetration Scenario. This scenario well describes China before the
advent of the reform era which began in the late 1970s. In the pre-reform era, the state
literally dominated every major aspect of society. Society existed largely as a
conglomeration of scattered individuals, all of whom followed the baton of the state
submissively. In cities, nearly all residents depended exclusively upon the state-run
Danwei system for their physical needs as well as for the basis of their puny social lives.
The Residents Committee supplemented the Danwei system with additional channels of
control over social dissociates. Some scholars call this type of total domination by the state
over society as totalitarianism (Tsou, 1986).
The profound economic reforms that have taken effect since then have persuaded
most intellectual observers that totalitarianism is no longer the proper framework for
characterizing the Chinese state-society relationship. And if the state really is receding (or
retreating, depending on how one looks at it) then to what extent have its totalitarian roots
been retained? More specifically, to what degree can the will of the current Chinese state
penetrate the urban grassroots? What kind of a ‘totalitarian capacity’ does it still have for
exercising the dictates of its will? The four cases, particularly the Jingtai case, provide
helpful data that can be used to approach this question. This data as such will be returned
to in a moment.
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An attempt to answer the above questions must begin by discussing the impact that
the economic reforms have had on urban neighborhoods. In the pre-reform era, urban
neighborhoods were mostly divided into different working units. Each working unit
provided public housing and other social services to its employees and their families. As a
result, a neighborhood tended only to host residents from a same working unit. As long as
the state owned the working units, it was easily able to control the employees. However,
the reforms quickly dissolved the Danwei system, which—as already stated—was the
backbone of the totalitarian control apparatus in Chinese cities. During the reform era the
state-owned working units were dramatically reduced in size, and quickly became
antiquated and usually much less efficient than their private-sector counterparts. This
meant that more and more urban residents were no longer directly dependent upon the state
for their livelihoods. In addition, housing and other social services were rapidly
commercialized. As a result, the state lost its most powerful means of social control… the
means to control an individual resident’s economic status.
Another consequence of the reforms was the shocking stratification that developed
inside a once highly homogeneous urban society. Some residents—like those living in the
Jingtai community—became millionaires, while others fell into absolute poverty. This
scenario was very common in the Huashan Community. In addition to dramatically
affecting the economic status of individual residents, economic liberalization has also
performed some seriously dazzling magic on many urban communities. A once promising
community, like the Huashan Community, has degenerated into being a slum-like
neighborhood in just ten years. Similarly, the once best living communities in the city, like
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the Dejia Community, were quickly surpassed by even more lavish neighborhoods, such as
the Jingtai Community, in just five or six years.
The Jingtai Community has witnessed perhaps the most radical changes to the once
totalitarian system as a result of commercialization. Its residents come from various
backgrounds, which essentially means that social control effected by a unified working
unit has become impossible. Heterogeneity as opposed to the old style homogeneity now
marks the Jingtai community. In addition, the completely private ownership of housing
property has sparked a consciousness of private interest and individuality into existence
that is often not consonant with the state’s will. A clear example of this can be seen in that
most Jingtai residents even refuse to provide home telephone numbers to the Jingtai
Residents Committee. This is a strong sign of privacy often seen in the Western societies.
More importantly, Jingtai residents are wealthy enough to pursue rather independent lives.
The prevalence of market mechanics allows them to purchase services and even different
kinds of social security from private companies, like the HPMC… which again tends to
marginalize the state.
Alongside the rise of private freedom in the Jingtai Community, the almost total
disintegration of civic ties and reciprocity has taken place. This is one of the more
unpleasant results of rapid commercialization. This is precisely what troubles Putman
(2000) when he witnesses the thinning social capital in highly commercialized cultures like
America. In the Jingtai Community as elsewhere, physical convenience and individual
wealth tend to weaken one’s psychological attachments to their neighbors. Many Jingtai
residents do not even know who their next-door neighbors are. This kind of residential
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apathy based upon economic independence makes it even more difficult for the committee
to rely on the traditional means of urban control and mobilization that were the norm in the
pre-reform era.
The embarrassing situation faced by the Jingtai Residents Committee—which has
essentially become only a surrogate entity that is still attempting to maintain control
through traditional means—is clearly the result of its inability to adapt to the challenges
presented by commercialization. This project has laid out in detail the thin relationship that
exists between the committee and ordinary residents, and the very limited functions the
committee can take on as a result of this relationship. The committee is de facto paralyzed
because of its alienation from the community, although it pretends to control the
community. Except for the responsibility of political control, the committee has defaulted
in almost all other administrative responsibilities of critical importance to the state.
Because of this, it is fair to say that the state has lost effective control over the daily lives
of most Jingtai residents.
Living in the Jingtai community, one feels little the ubiquitous shadow of the state
that was so common in the pre-reform era. The proliferation of the market mechanism and
the accumulation of wealth have opened a certain space in which Jingtai residents can act
freely without the state’s tutelage. The state is trying to substitute the Residents Committee
for the old Danwei system. However, commercialization has profoundly undermined the
state’s capacity to maintain the type of control that characterized its totalitarian past. The
erosion of the totalitarianism is also apparent in the other three communities. In the
Huashan Community, the committee had been able to maintain some types of effective

270

control through a corporatist structure, but the accumulated tension eventually ignited
furious confrontation between the street office and local residents. Even in the Dejia
Community—where the most effective means of control are still maintained—its
committee still needs to balance the desires of the state and its residents cautiously. As a
result, it refers to itself as a “service committee,” which obviously has a neutral
connotation. Finally, the Shiyan Residents Committee has simply abandoned its political
control responsibilities.
In sum, the four committees have demonstrated different degrees of erosion of the
state’s totalitarian control. While it is difficult to locate and precisely detail the remaining
totalitarian elements of Chinese society, the broad trend is indisputable: as economic
liberalization proceeds, the state is increasingly incapable of exercising domination over a
stratified, dynamic, and somewhat self-sustained urban society. Thirty years ago, the state
was the “society,” because the former had politicized and penetrated the latter almost
completely. Today, the state is only one part of society. The question thus has now become
this: what has filled in the new space created by the reforms and the rapid
commercialization that followed? One possible candidate is “civil society,” which, as a
term, often refers to the totality of civic and social organizations or institutions that form a
basis of a funtioning democracy in the West.
A Civil Disobedience Scenario. This scenario depicts a rising independent and
spontaneous civil society that covertly and even overtly dissents from the state’s authority.
This scenario is a strict interpretation of the liberal tradition that finds its origin with Locke
and John Stuart Mill, since it emphasizes civic defiance and peaceful confrontation as the

271

best ways to counter the legitimacy of the abusive state. It is also informed by the
experiences of those societies that were/are enduring democratic transition, societies like
Spain, Mexico, and South Korea. A common characteristic of these societies is that in all
of them the market economy is a key, if not an absolutely necessary, catalyst for the rise of
civil society. The transitional theories have demonstrated that the market economy has
tended to increase the size of middle class, which in turn creates heavy pressure for
democratization at a certain transitional stage (Dahl, 1971; Lipset, 1981; Rueschemeyer,
Stephens, and Stephens, 1992). While disagreements exist about the details of the
mechanisms that are necessary for the transitional process, the mainstream of liberal
thinkers believes that the market economy transforms state-society relations into a pattern
of social realignment favorable for the rise of a civil society, the key function of which is
to provide a counterbalance to the state and thus prevent its capacity for tyrannical abuse
(Cohen and Arato, 1992; Held, 1996; Tocqueville, 1945). In line with this logic, the civil
disobedience scenario advocates nonconformity, civil resistance, and peaceful revolt as the
major forms of counterbalance in non-democratic systems. Although its focus on the
disobedient side of civil society might seem to overlook or give short shrift to the
possibility of cooperation between civil society and the repressive state, the spirit of the
scenario is consistent with a classical understanding of civil society. Civil society has
always been an independent arena of collective action that has been able to sustain itself
without the tutelage of the state. The results of the above kinds of civil disobedience end
up creating just such an independent arena.
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In contemporary China, there is no doubt that the authoritarian state is a potential
target for civil disobedience. The rapid commercialization of China has significantly
expanded the amount of space available for social growth, which makes the civil
disobedience scenario more alluring than the state penetration scenario for the
development of any kind of contemporary or even future state-society relationship in
China. How do the broad trends—the receding state and the expanding market economy—
play out in terms of the civil disobedience scenario at the urban grassroots level? The three
poignant disputes involving residents, grassroots organizations, and local governments
discussed in this project can illustrate several things of importance.
The “May 1” event in the Huashan Community was a radical form of interest
expression, in which angry residents spontaneously joined a public protest against both the
abusive street office and the Residents Committee. In contrast, the case of the “No.1 Rest
House of Tianjin City” in the Dejia Community is significant for two reasons. First, the
target of struggle was a much more powerful state organization than a street office.
Second, it was solved peacefully within the legal channel of the People's Congress of
Tianjin City. The third case, the dispute over the commercial bungalows in the Shiyan
Community, is equally meaningful, since the committee organized an assertive but nonconfrontational act of disobedience against the street office.
In all three disputes, residents aimed to protect their private interests from
governmental infringements. It reflects the fact that ordinary residents have acute interest
conflicts in some areas with the state, and they are willing to take action to defend their
interests. More importantly, these collective actions eventually won concessions from the
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state, which of course has a strong tradition of discouraging and even opposing any kind of
non-sanctioned concerted social action. To some degree, these three events point to the
possibility of a grassroots socialization where society is self-organized and can be
organized in such a way as to counterbalance the potential for abuse on the part of the
state. This kind of a dynamic was completely foreign to the previous atomized society,
where indeed all aspects of life were pervaded by the state.
The collective spirit of all these events can be easily connected to the prevailing
discourse concerning Chinese state-society relations, that is, that the commercialization in
China could initiate social and political changes that will undermine the institutional
domination of the state and result in a more autonomous and self-interest conscious society
(Baum, 1994; Gold, 1998; Calhoun, 1994; Harding, 1994; White, 1993a). Given the
widely accepted covariate, if not causal, relationship between a market economy and civil
society, it is not surprising to see that the rapid commercialization of China has prompted
some analysts to look to civil society as the crucial concept related to the discussion of
democratization in China. To a certain extent, the three events could be near-ideal
endorsements for the liberal mantra. They illustrate the effectiveness of civil disobedience
and how it can translate into a coagulation of interests that precedes the actual formation of
organized elements of civil society. And the ultimate end of civil society is of course that it
is to act as a collective counterweight to the state.
However, these events are really very ambiguous in nature and can be given rather
divergent interpretations. A closer examination conducted in light of the larger context
reveals some interesting facts that do not neatly fit into the liberal mantra. For example, the
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“May 1” event in the Huashan Community could be viewed as more of an outburst of
accumulated dissatisfaction by Huashan residents, undertaken in an irrational and wrathful
way, rather than as an instance of constructive civil disobedience. According to this
construction, the goal of the protest should not to be seen as a challenge to the political
establishment, but rather as a message of alarm sent to the district government alerting it to
the recklessness of the street office. Once the storm passed, the new Huashan Residents
Committee and the Meiyuan Street Office re-established effective control quickly. The
events that took place in the Dejia and Shiyan Communities are even more debatable. Both
events were led by the Residents Committees, and they have always maintained a deep
intimacy with entities of local government. The role of the committees in the two events
can easily be described as dispute mediation between ordinary residents and the state rather
than as public defiance against the state’s authority. In fact, these mediations benefit the
rule of the state, since they help release the tensions that tend to accumulate in the rapidly
changing urban grassroots arena. More importantly, these events are sporadic, and
constitute only a tiny portion of the interactions that take place between the state and
ordinary residents which are intermediated by the committees. In reality, it is not these few
“flammable” events, but the interactions that take place on a daily basis that better define
the nature of state-society relations in the urban grassroots arena.
This project does not attempt to deny the existence of classical dissent elements at
the urban grassroots level, such as former student protesters, Falun Gong practitioners, and
other socially discontented persons. These all clearly exist. The important fact to note,
however, is that none of these groups can become organized in the eyes of the state as has
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been observed in this project. And ironically enough, these groups are actually brought
under control by the committee and by neighborhood organizations, which both have
generally tended display rather supportive attitudes towards the state’s control agendas
involving these elements of dissent.
This project also argues that the liberal explanation of what constitutes civil society
is even being overstretched when it includes neighborhood organizations that have little or
no connection to the state such as the YMCA, neighborhood activists, various social
groups of interest, and neighborhood senior associations. Compared to the Residents
Committee, these organizations fit the category of civil society better, but even still none
of them have chosen a position of non-conformity vis-à-vis the state. Rather, they are
voluntarily involved to different degrees in the neighborhood network which centers
around the committee. And it is clear that the underlying impetus of action does not center
on defiance as far as these organizations are concerned, but on cooperation with the state.
Certainly one can argue that this kind of cooperation can be subjected to the liberal
interpretation, and is consistent with some definitions of what constitutes civil society.
Studies of the Eastern European communist countries have reported that there are some
kinds of cooperation that exist between emerging civil society and the still overwhelming
party-state, and as far as these observers are concerned this kind of cooperation is a
strategic necessity for making sure that nascent civil society can survive and grow within
those regimes temporarily (Weigle and Butterfield, 1992). In fact, state-civil society
collaboration has even been observed to exist in developed countries in studies of public
policy and economic/social development (Bradford, 2003; Mandell, et al, 1999). By
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downplaying civil society as only being a counterweight to the state, however, those who
so characterize it are interpreting and defining it in a weak and loose way.
Can the cooperation of the committee (and other neighborhood groups) with the
state then be interpreted as a strategic compromise or as simply a new form of state-civil
society collaboration? Again, this question has to be asked against the overall portrait of
grassroots politics. While it is true that the committees have organized some collective
counter-attacks against entities of local government, none of them has really adopted a
position of civil disobedience. The common conception that commercialization gives rise
to civil society fails to capture the reality about the mainstream character of state-society
relations in the urban grassroots environment in China. The conventional ideas about civil
society might lend themselves too quickly to predicting changes at the grassroots level in
China as the result of rapid commercialization. They would be well-used, of course, if civil
society eventually emerges, but China has experienced nearly three decades of profound
economic reforms, yet only pockets of civil elements—rather than even a thin layer of what
really constitutes civil society—currently exists at the urban grassroots level. Cooperative
neighborhood networks, very sporadic elements of dissent, and an effective state together
draw a very sober picture of grassroots organization which is very inconsistent with a
sanguine and realistic liberal mantra. Contemporary Chinese society in general is
ultimately unable and even unwilling to confront the authoritarian state. This raises a very
interesting question: while rapid commercialization prompts many China observers to
anxiously try to gauge when and how civil society can come to China, would it not also be
helpful to step aside from the liberal mantra so as to examine the appropriateness of the
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concept itself to China’s reality? This type of thinking at least offers a new venue for
explaining the absence of civil society in contemporary China. This idea is further explored
in the next chapter.
In sum, both the penetrative and civil disobedience scenarios seem to point to some
truths about how contemporary neighborhood politics work in China. For example, the
totalitarian scenario reveals the continuity of the state’s tough position on any political
dissent. It also observes that a stiff political climate is creating new challenges for the
authoritarian state, as is exemplified by the marginalization of the Jingtai Residents
Committee. Similarly, events like “May 1” in the Huashan Community do contain
elements of public defiance towards the authoritarian system, as the civil disobedience
scenario projects; and it would be premature to declare that those civil elements will not
gestate large-scale social protests or even the eventual establishment of civil society in
China in the future. However, both scenarios, in keeping with the zero-sum logic of
reductionism, oversimplify the prolific interactions that really take place within the
political/social reality of the urban grassroots arena in China. This kind of penetrationdefiance thinking only fuels the China Paradox, as the true state of neighborhood politics
largely does not follow the tracks envisioned by the two scenarios. In this sense, and as far
as studying China is concerned, reductionism is especially alluring and especially
dangerous.
A State Corporatist Scenario. This scenario, which is derived from the Huashan
case, could be accurately applied to China only if one jumps out of the dominant zero-sum
thinking. On the one hand, the Huashan Residents Committee has exhibited no defiance of
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the state, since it was monopolizing business activities with the blessing of the street
office. Also, it is currently vulnerable to the state in the sense that the street office controls
its personnel. On the other hand, the committee was not and has not been totally penetrated
by the will of the state, although it has actively promoted the state’s social and political
agendas. In the economic arena, the committee is not a puppet, but is and has been an
entity of its own interest. It has run its businesses independently, it has shared in a portion
of the revenue generated by them, and has spent its accumulated revenue according to its
own will. Thus neither penetration nor dissension, but interest collusion defines the
connection between the street office and the Huashan Residents Committee. The ‘interest
symbiosis’ that has been present in the community also includes neighborhood activists,
whose cooperation is crucial for neighborhood management.
The corporatist structure in the Huashan Community is particularly interesting
because it represents a transitional possibility between a purely state-controlled system and
robust commercialization. A similar possibility for corporatism exists at the macro level
since economic reform has weakened the totalitarian state and has increased economic and
social freedom in China. To some extent, the Huashan case is like a miniature
representation of what the broad transition has looked like in China. Like the rest of China,
the Huashan Community has witnessed emerging business opportunities as a result of
market expansion, such as convenient neighborhood services. These services were
formerly provided rather inadequately to urban residents by way of the state’s controlled
channels of distribution. Since the economic reforms in China have been sponsored and
planned by the state, it was not uncommon for those individuals and organizations tied to
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the state to receive the lion’s share of opportunities in the first years of reform.
Accordingly, the business opportunities in the Huashan Community were given to its
Residents Committee. The committee maintained its daily operations so as to assure the
profitability of its businesses. The Meiyuan Street Office was responsible for financial and
logistical supports, as well as for guaranteeing the committee a monopolized status in
neighborhood economy. Both then shared the profit from the businesses. This was a typical
corporatist arrangement established on the basis of incomplete commercialization and the
state’s extraordinary influence in business. A similar arrangement can be easily identified
in many areas in contemporary China, particularly in the economic arena. Many even
believe that the corporatist bond is a key structural factor which is responsible for the
thriving local economy in China (Gu, Shen, and Wong, 2001; Oi, 1995; Peng, 2001).
It is clear that the corporatist structure in the Huashan Community is different from
the ‘neo-corporatism,’ which is a term used to refer to situations in open politics where
policy makers are influenced or dominated by business enterprises, especially the militaryindustrial complex. Instead, the structure of Chinese corporatism bears some similarity to
many of the social-corporatist economies of Europe, such as Austria, Ireland, and the
Scandinavian states. The corporatist structures in these countries allow the state to
effectively manage domestic interest cleavages, particularly those that exist between
businesses and organized labor, so that the countries can adjust and perform well in the
global marketplace (Katzenstein, 1984).
However, what serves for a better comparison to the Huashan case is the kind of
corporatist structure that is found in developmental states, particularly the kind that exist in
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East Asian states like Japan and South Korea. They have established dense ties to
promising private businesses, they have provided them with monopoly status in their
domestic markets, rendered them fiscal supports, and often times they even directly
manage their production (Amsden, 1989; Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990). Essentially, these
kinds of corporatist structures have greenhoused their domestic business interests,
effectively protecting them from foreign competition while they nurture them into strong
global competitors. These states have also effectively lowered labor prices and have
silenced labor discontent in a way that unabashedly exemplifies the fact that economic
development is a singly important priority for these governments. The corporatist structure
in the Huashan case, although it is much more coarse and negligible in scale, displays
many similarities to the structures of these developmental states. Like these developmental
states, the Huashan corporatist structure has been rather effective in promoting business
growth. It also demonstrates how the interest symbiosis that develops in concert with
businesses and free markets is more effective in terms of social control than would be a
purely top-down penetration structure, as is evidenced by the Jingtai case. This effective
type of control can be used for understanding the national politics of social control. Kang
(2000) attributes the political stability at the macro level after 1989 to the solidarity had by
elites in a corporatist context. He argues that the pre-democracy movements in the late
1980s taught the political elite lessons about forming interest coalitions with officially
sanctioned economic and intellectual elites in order to expand the ruling basis and in order
to contain unstable trends.
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However, the developmental states discussed above only represent one kind of
possibility for corporatist arrangement. The exclusive corporatist ties that exist between the
state and businesses, even if they are not perfect, are justifiable when society can
eventually benefit from developmental outcomes. Another possibility, which is vicious but
is even more common in the developing world, is ‘Latinization.’ Latinization represents a
situation in which a market economy, a divided society, and corrupt politics coexist and
resultingly create periods of prolonged repression, stagnation, and injustice. The
marketization that happens under conditions of political monopoly reinforces economic
privileges for a few and wealth disparity, which in turn precipitates the formation of elite
coalitions and their repression of the interests of the general public (Cardoso and Enzo
Faletto, 1979). The state corporatist structure thus becomes a preemptive arrangement to
prevent dissent interests from being mobilized into organized social and political
opposition.
This is the scenario that captures the essence of the corporatist structure presented
by the Huashan case. The nature of the Huashan case rests upon the symbiosis of partial
commercialization and power monopoly. While the corporatist structure in the Huashan
case might have began similarly to a developmental state, it had become increasingly
Latinized as it shifted attention from serving residents to hording profit. The same force,
economic liberalization, gave rise to the symbiosis but also eventually led to its demise. At
the beginning of the reform era, the street office and its close affiliates successfully used
their monopoly to exploit the commercial opportunities present in the communities for
their own interests. This created a rather effective and stable symbiosis, in which various
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kinds of corruptions, such as nepotism and secret spending, prevailed. Ordinary Huashan
residents were excluded from the process, and many even suffered because of the business
operations. However, the continuing economic reforms gradually undermined the interest
monopoly and made it increasingly unsustainable. The accumulated antimony finally led to
a violent public protest, which broke up the corrupt corporatist structure.
The vicious cycle displayed by the Huashan case reveals a possibility for transition,
which has important implications for China’s broad social and economic arrangements.
The various levels of government in China have been credited for rapid economic growth
because of their active involvement. In other words it has been credited for doing
something similar to what a developmental state does. However, there are increasingly
outcries against the corruption and distortion that seem to come along with things that the
government is heavily involved in. As marketization deepens, the legitimacy of the state’s
domination over the economy—particularly regarding the type of corporatist structures
already discussed, of which the Huashan case provides an example—has been gradually
undermined. Certainly, it is irresponsible to assert that what happened to the Huashan
Community will be eventually replicated at the national level. Any such happening would
involve a much more complicated logic of development than that which has been used to
describe the Huashan situation. In addition, there is not even a consensus about the
appropriateness of applying the term ‘corporatism’ to the Chinese pattern of growth,
although some observers strongly insist on doing so. However, the Huashan case at least
reveals some inherited structural tension that resulted from a low-level state corporatist
arrangement, and in particular it reveals what such fallout looks like when the context in
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question involves corporatism that exists between entities related to the market economy
on the one side and an authoritarian state on the other. These kinds of situations need to
make it on to the radar screens of those who study Chinese politics. Although a case like
the Huashan case finds its origin in a very low profile neighborhood, the type of interaction
it bespeaks between the movers and shakers of the local scene needs to be explored. For
while China’s economic miracle has impressed most observers, any kind of state
corporatism, if it has contributed to the miracle, may eventually lead to a kind of
Latinization. This is a disastrous possibility that China must cautiously guard against, and
that those who study China must be on the lookout for. And they must look for it in all
areas… not just the high-profile ones.
This point leads this discussion on to the next series that must be answered. First,
to what extent is the corporatist scenario applicable to the rest of urban neighborhoods in
China? Or, in terms of what has been studied by this project, what can we infer from the
Huashan case about the state-society relationship at the urban grassroots environment in
general? A close examination of the facts about the Huashan case suggests that there is
little universal about it. A monopolistic status, similar to that which the Huashan Residents
Committee enjoyed at one point, is a precondition for the existence of a corporatist
structure in a community. The other three committees studied all face different situations.
In the Jingtai Community, the HPMC actually marginalizes the Jingtai Residents
Committee. The Dejia and Shiyan Residents Committees also lack a monopolistic status in
their communities. They have to listen to and share power with other neighborhood
organizations, such as the ARR, YMCA, and other neighborhood groups. The power
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structure in these other environments does not allow them to exclusively collude with the
street office while ignoring or even harming their constituents. And so—as far as the data
collected by this project is concerned—there is no more reason to assume that the Huashan
situation is any more common to the Chinese urban grassroots environment than any of the
other types of scenarios that play themselves out in the other three communities.
In addition, a corporatist structure is expensive to maintain. The collusion in the
Huashan Community was possible not because members of the committee received
stipends from the state with which they could facilitate a corporatist style dynamic. The
stipends they received were lower even than the minimum wage level in Tianjin City.
Indeed, the issue of cost and the committee is a broad one. First, the cost of unifying
neighborhood activists was beyond the committee’s normal operational budget. Rather, it
was the lucrative neighborhood businesses that sustained the interest symbiosis.
Additionally, the Huashan Community is located at outskirts of the city, so it faced nearly
no competition when it started providing its convenient services. Its success story cannot
be easily copied by most inner city communities, where the competition for convenient
neighborhood services has already been met on a wide variety of fronts all around those
communities. It is hard to believe that the committees there can be more economically
successful than those of private businesses. Without stable revenue, the interest collusion
could never have been extensive, strong, and persistent.
Finally, even if the initial conditions are met for establishing a corporatist-type
arrangement, the sustainability of corporatism still remains a generally questionable matter.
The nature of state corporatism is an exclusive process of profit sharing among elites,
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which inevitably creates a haven for corruption. The resultant discontent from the public
that inevitably arises often forces the elite to further solidify its coalition rather than giving
concessions to the public. Thus, this kind of inherent structural tension finds no outlet until
it blows up the whole system, as has been often seen in some Latin American countries.
And of course this was precisely the outcome in the Huashan case. The committee was
rather successful in operating businesses and fulfilling the state’s social control missions
for more than fifteen years. But the accumulated tension eventually broke up the
corporatist structure, and it did so in an unfortunate way.
In sum, the corporatist scenario might be popular in the economic arena, but most
urban communities do not possess favorable conditions that would allow for its sustenance
or extension. Nevertheless, the scenario is enlightening, since it indicates a possibility for
the transition of urban neighborhoods as well as for the nation as a whole. Rather than
considering the Residents Committee to be either a puppet or an enemy of the state, the
Huashan scenario signifies the potential for its cooperation or, more accurately, for its
collusion with the street office. In looking closely at the Dejia and Shiyan cases,
cooperation between the street office and the two committees looks quite different.
A Scenario of State-Society Synergy. This synergistic scenario is illustrated by
the Dejia and Shiyan cases. It reveals another possibility for a broad-based change in the
nature of urban state-society interactions; one in which street office-committee cooperation
crosses the public-private division and produces positive outcomes for both the state and
for local communities. This sort of cooperation would really work in a very circular way.
The mutual enhancement as a result of the synergy leads to more autonomy for the local
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committee, and also to better local service provision. A better service provision then leads
to an increase of intimacy and trust between the committee and its residents, which in turn
enhances the legitimacy of the committee and thus makes governance easier, whether the
governing initiatives are originated locally or down from the state.
The synergy is tangible in that the Dejia and Shiyan Residents Committees are
susceptible to the winds of influence that come from both the street office and their
constituents. The fact of the combination of both the decentralized structure of the Pudong
Street Office and vibrant neighborhood participation in the Dejia and Shiyan Communities
has enabled both the respective committees to traverse the state-resident boundary that
seems to be so strong in the other two communities. For the street office, the task of
neighborhood management, which involves such things as social control and
administrative services, is tedious and nearly impossible to handle without help from its
fourteen committees. The size of the street office has swelled quite a bit since the 1980s;
yet it still cannot keep pace with the rising challenges of urban management. Therefore, it
has to rely upon the committees for help. Meanwhile, the committees have established an
intimate relationship with the street office and are still heavily dependent upon the street
office for things such as fiscal resources, policy execution assistance, and for help with
coordination in general. This kind of interdependence forms their basis for cooperation and
co-production. In practice, the street office and the two committees have maintained a
relatively clear division of labor, which has roughly corresponded to their abilities and
operational foci. The street office is able to provide those supports that most efficiently
complement the inputs that are delivered to the community by the two committees. Adding
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the two kinds of inputs together results in greater output than either side could deliver on
its own.
However, decentralization on the part of the state only creates the potential for
synergy. It does not and cannot create the organizational vessel or network that by
necessity must be the other side of the coin. A participative community that contains dense
neighborhood networks of association is crucial for effecting of the committee’s most
important functions. Mobilized activists, neighborhood organizations, and ordinary
residents are imperative for complementing the committee’s organizational skill, energy,
and familiarity with the locality. More importantly, active inputs and direct involvement
from the community help to prevent the street office-committee connection from
deteriorating into cozy collusion. The Huashan case shows how the presence of interwoven
ties between the committee and the street office in a fragmentary community can
precipitate the creation of a corrupt interest symbiosis which operates at the cost of the
public. In contrast, neighborhood participation, which is based on voluntarism and
cooperation, can bend the committees toward the interests of ordinary residents.
The synergy it has been able to establish with local communities has yielded
multiple benefits to the Pudong Street Office. The most obvious benefit it has received
involves the effectiveness with which it is able to implement its policies in its
neighborhoods. It has outperformed the Weifang and Meiyuan Street Offices in nearly all
policy areas, which can be seen in the fact that the Pudong Street Office is able to depend
on its committees to carry out a myriad number of functions. The Weifang and Meiyuan
Street Offices can depend on their committees for little. In the social control area, the
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Pudong Street Office can rely upon comprehensive neighborhood security networks that
are indigenous to their neighborhoods for successfully attending to a series of state agendas
that originate from the street office. These agendas include everything from monitoring
released convicts to imposing population policy control standards on the populace to
maintaining neighborhood security. This synergy as such also allows the Pudong Street
Office to adequately address a wide range of administrative issues, such as welfare and
unemployment relief, charity events, and cleanup campaigns. In contrast, the other two
street offices are stretched thin even in their social control tasks because of the flimsiness
of their committees.
This committee-street office synergy has also increased the Pudong Street Office’s
legitimacy among ordinary residents, largely because the Dejia and Shiyan Residents
Committees have performed rather well in serving their residents. Although tension with
ordinary residents has arisen occasionally, the street office in general faces neither apathy
nor resentment of the kind seen in the Jingtai and Huashan Communities. In addition, since
the street office has decentralized power to the committees and has encouraged
neighborhood self-governance, it has also consequently established a cushion between
itself and ordinary residents. The committees, since they are accepted as representatives of
the communities, can serve as mediators between the street office and residents when
disputes arise. In addition, the expansion of mechanisms of grassroots self-governance and
even neighborhood democracy in local communities also extends the amount of
accountability that the Pudong Street Office has to ordinary residents. And of course, the
committees gain significant autonomy in this scenario and are treated more like partners
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than subordinates. These two facts have gone a long way toward heading off the
development of the kinds of incidents and conditions that have marked the life of the
Jingtai and Huashan Communities.
Meanwhile, a synergistic relationship also creates obvious benefits for local
communities, which has been detailed elsewhere. For example, the Dejia and Shiyan
Communities have much higher levels of participation than the other two communities.
Residents take part in neighborhood affairs through multiple means like neighborhood
meetings, volunteer activities, community entertainment events, and even through
participation in elections. Perhaps the most fundamental change in these two situations has
been the reorientation of the committees from being one-time instruments of the state to
being self-governing organizations. This has catalyzed neighborhood institutionalization
and has turned what were once loosely associated living compounds into lively, dense, and
reciprocal communities. Dejia and Shiyan residents participate in neighborhood decisionmaking processes, receive better services from both the street office and the committees,
and have begun to hold and be responsible for a variety of cultural, educational, and
entertaining activities, all thanks to what has happened in terms of neighborhood
institutionalization. This point is of particular importance to Chinese society as a whole,
since the entire urban grassroots arena has long been in a state of disunity and disarray that
essentially was the result of decades’ worth of state penetration and domination. While the
top-down authority dynamic that wrought so much damage on urban grassroots
communities still persists today, the Dejia and Shiyan Communities have been increasingly
institutionalized in various ways, and have moved all the more towards being marked by
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representation and self-governance instead of collapse, disunity, and sociological
atomization.
The win-win situation that exists between the street office and urban neighborhoods
in the Dejia and Shiyan Communities would seem to represent quite a different dynamic
from the pattern of social development that characterized the former communist countries
of Eastern Europe. The expansion of grassroots self-governance in those countries was
widely portrayed as resulting from the erosion of the communist rule. But although the
civil organizations that were associated with that period might temporarily have had to
sleep with the “devil” due to a severe power imbalance that favored the communists, the
social institutionalization woven around them nevertheless undermined the legitimacy of
the state. The situation in the Dejia and Shiyan cases displays a rather different pattern: as
grassroots self-governance expanded, the ruling capacity and the legitimacy of the state
were strengthened rather than undermined.
The Pudong Street Office significantly empowered its committees through a
dramatic decentralization of power to them. Meanwhile, it has also been a key advocator
for neighborhood self-governance. In order to make the committees accountable to
residents, the street office has even introduced democratic mechanisms into its
neighborhoods, such as direct and indirect elections, and the ARR. While self-governance
and neighborhood democracy are still processes that are in their infancy, it is an
indisputable fact that the committees have become significantly accountable to local
residents, particularly the Shiyan Residents Committee. This committee has arrived at a
point where it should be classified as a very independent and self-governing grassroots
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organization. However, these empowered committees do not ignore the street office’s
agendas and disregard its instructions. The street office-committee relationship has simply
become more dynamic and productive. For the state, none of its essential and sometimes
unpopular policies, such as those involving birth control and monitoring released convicts,
have been compromised because of the growing independence of the committees. Instead,
these state policies have been carried out more effectively since the committees have been
tied more closely to their residents. In some areas, the committees have even voluntarily
sponsored activities that benefit the rule of the state, such as classes in patriotic education
and legal lectures. More importantly, the empowered committees are able to better serve
those indigenous demands that are often beyond the state’s capacity. It not only saves
money for the state, but also helps create neighborhood harmony and order, which
ultimately enhances the state’s legitimacy.
Apparently the Dejia and Shiyan cases demonstrate a new possibility for transition
in urban China to a new state of affairs. This new possibility only loosely resembles the
trajectories of transition that have taken place in corporatist Latin American countries, and
barely resembles at all the ebbs and flows of the political movements in the former
communist countries of Eastern Europe.
Synergy in neighborhood affairs—when it is achieved—sets cooperation rather
than opposition or collusion as the tone of neighborhood politics. The state still maintains
an asymmetric amount of power, which enables it to fulfill its missions in grassroots
management, but it is an adaptive entity and has shown itself willing to share power with
localities in order to cope with new situations. It has even begun to seriously endorse
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neighborhood self-governance as a priority. 118 Meanwhile, in this project we have seen that
ever-expanding participation from ordinary residents has become increasingly common in
the affairs of some neighborhoods in China. However, we also see that this does not
undermine the state’s legitimacy or prevent the possibility of close cooperation with the
state at the urban grassroots level. Power decentralization on the part of the state and active
neighborhood participation have led to the mutual empowerment of the state and of local
communities… a synergistic result which is very distinct from either the civil disobedience
scenario or the state-corporatist scenario.
While it is not the goal of this project to tell how widely the synergistic scenario
can be applied in urban China, there are at least three points that allow for cautious
optimism about its potential expansion. The first point involves the effectiveness and
sustainability of the synergistic scenario—at least as far as the Shiyan and Dejia cases are
concerned. The economic reforms have profoundly changed the governing structures of
Chinese cities. The traditional type of urban management practiced in China (which has
been based upon direct control as seen in the Jingtai and Huashan cases) has proven to be
very problematic. The opposite of this kind of situation, though, would require an
autonomous, self-generating, and self-supporting civil society to be a substitute for the
state. The unfeasibility and perhaps inappropriateness of this scenario for China was
discussed earlier. This kind of development was shown to be only wishful thinking, given
the state of current social and political conditions in the urban grassroots arena. The
118

The Pudong Street Office will introduce direct election to all of its other committees in 2006. Overall,
direct election is still at experimental stage. However, there are evidences to suggest the possibility that the
Chinese government would expand the experiment to more regions in the near future. For example, the
Tianjin Municipality has decided to have at least half of its committees generated through direct election in
2009.
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Residents Committee will remain the leading organization of neighborhood governance for
the foreseeable future. Given this, and given the current linkage point occupied by the
committee in the Chinese grassroots political apparatus, a synergistic scenario is perhaps
the only viable situation where both the state and ordinary residents can be satisfied.
In addition, the Chinese government has already promoted the development of just
such a synergistic arrangement in rural villages. Wang (2003) finds that grassroots selfgovernance organized around the Villagers Committee in rural China has empowered not
only peasants, but has also helped the state to regain the legitimacy and governability it
lost during early years of the economic reforms. Like rural villages, urban communities are
also facing severe governing challenges, since both are being subjected to the same ever
more intense and deep waves of economic liberalization. If synergy works in rural villages,
why should not the state at least make an effort to gauge the appropriateness of it for urban
communities?
It is partially because of the success in rural villages that the central government
has been prompted to endorse synergy as the future direction of urban community reform.
On November 19, 2000, the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council jointly
issued a nationwide notice, calling for enhanced cooperation between local governments
and neighborhood organizations and expanding neighborhood democracy and selfgovernance. 119 In China, any “Notice” issued by the above two organizations together
signifies nothing but the official position of the state and the policies it intends to adopt
and eventually implement.
119

“A Notice about Forwarding [A Suggestion of the Ministry of Civil Affairs to Promote Nationwide Urban
Community Development] by the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council,” [2000] no. 23.
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Here the experimental nature of the Shiyan Residents Committee must be given
special attention. In China, most reform agendas are first tested in pilot experiments before
final policies are popularized nationwide. Therefore, the experiments conducted in these
pilot cases have strong implications for the future direction of reforms, depending on their
relative success or failure. The Shiyan Residents Committee is one of two cases where
direct election was piloted in Tianjin City. Thus by virtue of its pilot status, the Shiyan
Committee-Pudong Street Office situation is more likely to be the model for future reform
than the situations of the other three committees. The synergy thus observed as having
been successfully established in the Shiyan Community could conceivably contribute to
the data that helps to organize the next round of national reforms. However, the pilot status
of the Shiyan Residents Committee also makes it a special case that perhaps should set it
apart from other normal Residents Committees one would expect to find elsewhere in
China. While the Shiyan case has been very successful, one central thing is causing local
officials to debate whether the Shiyan Model could be extended easily to other
communities: all current members of the Shiyan Residents Committee are seniors who
work voluntarily. Are there enough senior volunteers in other neighborhoods that could
perform equally as well? Have they acquired enough skills to handle neighborhood affairs,
in the same way that Shiyan members are able to? Will their health conditions allow them
to work full time, or to handle the sometimes stress intensive job? These are legitimate
concerns that should raise questions about the applicability of the Shiyan case to other
communities. Therefore, the Shiyan Residents Committee as a pilot case presents perhaps
an ambiguous case for grassroots synergy. The fact that it does have some different

295

features from normal Residents Committees cannot be ignored, but it still has some
predictive value for future possibilities for reform. After all that has been said here, this
cannot be discounted.
In sum, compared with the other three scenarios, the synergistic scenario represents
the most latent possibility of transition for current grassroots state-society relations in
China. However, this optimistic scenario, precisely because it is attractive, must be
approached cautiously. Assuming cooperation between the state and local interests is
possible when contextual factors exist that are incongruent with the necessary prerequisites
for implementing the Dejia or Shiyan scenario… this kind of assuming will only
eventually embitter those engineers who hope to improve urban communities at the
grassroots level in China. Nevertheless, since the Dejia and Shiyan cases have proved the
viability of the scenario, it should be further explored in greater depth.
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Conclusion
China’s economic miracle has been baffling critics for nearly three decades. The
obvious “out of beat” situation that exists between economic liberalization and strict
political control is what creates the China Paradox. China represents a distinctive pattern of
development that does not easily fit into prevailing analytical frameworks. This project has
attempted to examine one aspect of the paradox, that being the grassroots state-society
relationship in urban China. The grassroots situation as examined by this project can be
characterized neither by using civil society to once again aggrandize the paradigm of
“society” domination (Migdal, 1988), nor by singing the praises of the state in a way that
reinforces the desires of those who wish to “bring the state back in” (Evans,
Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985). Rather, this project begins and ends with the
enigmatic Residents Committee. It is contended here that in order to properly understand
grassroots politics in China, this organization must be further investigated.
Any judgment about the dynamics of the grassroots state-society relationship
involves first an acknowledgement of the fact that it is a relationship that is in transition
and that it is not straightforward. It has multiple facets and seems to be in a constant state
of flux. In general, transition often implies inconclusiveness, as China is painfully finding
out as she experiments in order to find a stable state-society equilibrium that she can apply
to her rapidly changing urban environment. The grassroots situation is further complicated
because of its diversity. This project has identified three types of scenarios that can be
applied only with regard to the Residents Committee, but there is no single vision that
explains all. Indeed, the transformation of such a gigantic society can easily come with any
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of numerous “anomalies” that will certainly frustrate any “grand theorization.” In order to
get at this spirit of the transformation, it seems like it would be more prudent to applying
inductive reasoning shot through and inhered with prolific evidence. This kind of an
approach is wholly more appropriate than engaging in deduction that is dogmatically
guided by prevailing propositions which may be inappropriate to the context. The
inferences made by this project are limited because of the small number of cases studied.
Still, a detailed comparative analysis of such a key grassroots organization should be
recognized as an imperative starting place for investigating the true nature of the statesociety relationship in contemporary China. Common themes emerging from this project
have been subjected to further examination by looking at other segments of state-society
interactions. Starting from there, some major inferences are made by this project.
First of all, the Chinese state still retains an asymmetric amount of coercive power
over society at the urban grassroots level, despite the fact that its society has undergone an
ever-increasing social and economic diversification in the past three decades. No
grassroots force can challenge the authority of the state, at least not in foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, it is clear that China is moving away from its totalitarian past, and the process
is irreversible. The Danwei system has been largely dissolved and those totalitarian
elements that remain as residue constitute only a tiny portion of the state’s rich interactions
with ordinary residents. The state has neither the capacity nor the willingness to re-achieve
total domination over society. Indeed, local governments have had to continually adjust
themselves according to the changing urban environment. In urban communities, absolute
control has been gradually replaced with decentralized management and services.
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Chinese urban society has never been as diversified and vigorous as it is today,
thanks to economic liberalization. Residents enjoy lots of freedom in economic and social
arenas. Even the political arena has begun to assimilate to gradual but concrete waves of
reform that aim to empower local residents. Urban communities increasingly have been
confronted with active residents, energized volunteers, and independent neighborhood
organizations, all of which help to carve out space for grassroots self-governance.
However, these encouraging signs do not substantially point to the advent of a bottom-up
democratization, since the urban grassroots has generally been unwilling to confront the
state. The liberal mantra misses the point in this because it fatally underestimates the
state’s capacity for social control. But more importantly, it fails to recognize the simple
fact that regular Chinese residents often treat the state as a plus rather than as a threat. In
the eyes of general urban residents, the current government has acted more or less
positively and benevolently. Despite the conflicts of interest that they have with it from
time to time, ordinary residents and the state often find more ground for cooperation than
confrontation.
However, the grassroots state-society dynamic is far from trouble-free. Local
governments in general are still lumpy and intervene too much. This in addition to the fact
that urban grassroots communities are often fragmentary and incapable of self-governance
points to the fact that there are other issues that will affect China’s long term prospects for
political evolution besides political will. This imbalance between over-reaching local
governments and passive communities has created many polemic disputes, some of which
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are actually very contentious. As reform movements deepen, structural tensions that exist
now might well be intensified, if they are not attended to and given the proper adjustments.
Such adjustments become promising only if both sides engage with each other
cooperatively at the grassroots level. Synergy based upon decentralized state power and
residential participation has proven to be an effective mechanism for traversing the publicprivate cleavage. As this project points out, there is evidence that mutual benefit can
indeed derive from such efforts. Indeed, the synergy observed in this project is not an
unheard of phenomenon, as it is found in some other developing countries, such as Brazil
(Ostrom, 1996; Tendler, 1997), Mexico (Fox, 1992), and India (Heller, 1995). As Evans
(1996, p. 1130) argues, synergy is more than an outcome of endowment, and “there is
every reason to believe that synergy is constructable. …Even in class-divided societies
suffering under disorganized, authoritarian governance, innovative institutional tactics can
foster synergy on a limited scale.” This project has identified some encouraging changes
that have taken place both in local governments and in urban communities, which—at the
very least—supports the potential value of a further examination of synergy at the urban
grassroots.
Finally, acknowledging that the evidence that has been gathered from the
grassroots level in this project has limited generalizability, the evidence from this project
can be summarized as follows. Economic liberalization has dissolved the traditional
overlap of state and society in China, which creates possibilities for several trajectories that
transition could follow in China. In the midst of an overall process that can be
characterized by a shrinking state and expanding society, China is still witness to a
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situation of a strong state and a weak society. And since it is absorbed by formidable
challenges and uncertainties, it is unlikely for China to either fall back on totalitarianism or
to leap forward to political democratization in the near future. Rather, there emerges the
possibility for very promising state-society cooperation at the urban grassroots level. And
it seems that this kind of cooperation will involve a realigning and accommodating of
political authoritarianism and economic openness into a sustainable pattern of
development.
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Conclusion
The Residents Committee, It Challenges, and the Liberal Mantra
Chapter Six

Prologue
Every Friday afternoon, all members of the Shiyan Residents Committee, the SWS,
and some residential representatives held a meeting to summarize the activities of the past
week, plan the coming week, and discuss issues of importance. These meetings usually
lasted about an hour. However, the meeting on June 25, 2004 went unusually long because
a very contentious issue was brought to the table. Like many lower-to middle-income
communities, the Shiyan Community has mixed property ownership; there are few
privately owned apartments, however, with the rest being either completely or partially
owned by local governments or companies. The housing bureau in the Pudong Street
Office leased out eight Shiyan apartments for commercial usage, which contributed at least
50,000 yuan of net income to the street office. 120 This was a very contentious issue that the
committee to tackle at its weekly meeting.
Those present at the meeting offered essentially three opinions. The first of these
opinions, advocated vehemently by Grandpa Liu Yunhan, was for the community to
share—if not totally take control of—the leasing revenue. He justified his argument by
citing Articles 4 and 17 of the Organic Law of Urban Residents Committees, which
guarantees the committee’s sovereignty in terms of property rights and requests that local
120

Grandpa Zhao Fu suggested that this estimated number might well below the real figure, although he did
not know the exact profit from those apartments.
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governments provide for the committee’s operating budget. While acknowledging the fact
of the committee’s budget difficulties, Grandma Liu Baolan read the law very differently.
Her interpretation was that the street office owned the property and therefore it was in fact
legally entitled to the leasing revenue. Whether or not the committee’s budget derived from
revenue related to its eight apartments or not was ultimately up to the street office, not the
committee, as far as she was concerned. Grandpa Zhao Fu and Liu Jingyu agreed with
Grandpa Liu Yunhan in principle that the committee should share at least in a portion of
the revenue, but they strongly opposed discussing the issue with the street office now.
They apparently sympathized with Grandma Liu Baolan’s position, and thought that the
street office was all around in a better position to press for its rights than the committee
was. They also believed, however, that if any discussion were to be had with the street
office about revenue sharing that it would have to be done at just the right time. “It is a
bad time, since the (street) office has also gotten into financial trouble. The dispute (over
the two commercial bungalows) has already irritated the office. We should not trouble
them further at this time. Our committee is only one year old and we still need continued
support from the office. We can discuss our financial trouble with them and see if they can
help us. But we definitely want to avoid the perception that we are cutting into their
territory. We must maintain our good relationship (with the office). At this time, I think we
should focus on our internal affairs and postpone the issue until later,” said Liu Jingyu.
After tense debate, the committee decided by a majority vote not to raise the issue.
A potential storm was temporarily quelled. However, this event allows for some interesting
speculation about the future prospects of the committee. This conflict begs the question of
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whether the committee’s self-governing nature might threaten the current synergy with the
street office that made success possible to begin with. To conclude discussion about the
committee and the grassroots state-society relationship, I will firstly focus on some of the
challenges facing the four committees.
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Challenges Facing the Residents Committee
The interviews I conducted with committee members help to generate a
comprehensive picture about the challenges facing the four committees (Table 6-1).
Table 6-1: The Top Three Challenges Facing the Residents Committees (%) 121
Residents Committee
Challenges
Jingtai Huashan Dejia Shiyan Average
Administrative assignments and interventions
from the street office
34
38
7
21
29
Committee’s limited financial resource
0
20
38
50
23
Committee’s limited jurisdiction

0

9

12

0

7

Deficiency in the committee’s managing
structure
Low income working for the committee

17

0

0

17

5

27

14

0

0

9

Rapid increase of demands from residents

0

5

5

0

4

22

14

38

4

21

0

0

0

8

2

100

100

100

100

100

Low participation from residents
Low capacity of self-governance from residents
Total

For the Shiyan Residents Committee, financial problems are the most troublesome
issue. This perhaps explains why the committee was so sensitive to the issues that came up
in the meeting discussed above. The committee also worries about the number of
interventions that they have to or will have to deal with from the street office, despite their
current enjoyment of a high level of independence. Finally, this is the only committee that
questions the readiness of its constituents for self-governance. This is a problem that has
not yet been confronted by other committees.

121

The questions were prepared before the field research, and remained the same throughout the interviews.
All members of the four committees were asked to choose the top three challenges facing their committees.
The table is weighted according to the ranking of their choices. For example, the first choice is weighted
three times more than the third choice, and the second choice is two times more than the third one.
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The issue of financial problems also ranks highest for the Dejia Residents
Committee, which is understandable given the large number of diverse activities it
sponsors. However, it is interesting that the committee complains of low residential
participation. After all, Dejia residents participate much more than Jingtai or Huashan
residents. The problem arises, as far as the committee is concerned, in the fact that it has
been finding it difficult to push the degree of participation higher and/or deeper in the
community. And in order for all of its ambitions to bear fruit, even more participation than
they can already count on (which again by relative standards is quite a lot) is going to be
necessary.
The new Huashan Residents’ Committee, led by Mr. Cao Hui, clearly attributes its
troubles to the street office. The committee continues to be tied up by a huge number of
many governmental assignments. And, as is the case with the Dejia and Shiyan Residents
Committees, the Huashan Residents Committee is also troubled by its enduring financial
restraints.
Interestingly enough, the Jingtai Residents Committee protests more than the other
committees against the street office’s assignments and interventions. In addition, the
Jingtai Residents Committee complains of low compensation and the general apathy of
Jingtai residents.
At first glance, the four committees seem to be dealing with rather distinct
challenges. However, an integrated analysis of all committee members interviewed reveals
some interesting things. Governmental assignments and intervention (twenty-nice percent)
rank as the greatest challenge across the four committees. The second greatest challenge,
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budget shortage (twenty-three, is also related to the street office, as it is the greatest source
of income for the committee. If we add the low compensation issue into the equation,
nearly sixty percent of challenges identified originate from the street office. This evidence
supports the argument that the top-down influence coming from the street office is
comparatively stronger than the bottom-up influence of the residents. It also reflects the
latent presence of what may become an across-the-board appeal to the street office for
further decentralization and clarification of labor division. The third challenge is low
participation from residents (twenty-one percent). Engaging ordinary residents has become
an increasingly crucial factor that constrains the committee’s performance, regardless of its
specific functional agenda.
It is fair to say that the specific challenges facing the committees reflect their
equally distinctive functionalities. But all of their challenges originate in the same two
places: in their structural connections with both their residents and the state. These
connections, which shape the committee’s function(s), also indicate from where (or which
of these directions) future challenges for the committee might likely come from.
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Liberal Mantra and Chinese State-Society Studies
Up to this point, the project has been devoted to the purpose of analyzing statesociety relations as intermediated through the Residents Committee. The findings in this
project convey the mixed possibilities of grassroots state-society transformations in urban
China. On one hand, the Chinese state is still effective at containing any concerted pressure
from below, although its ultimate capacity to do so has been weaken by the economic
reform. More interestingly, in the face of a rapidly changing urban society, local
governments have demonstrated flexibility, adaptability, and developmental intention.
Paradoxically, there is an emerging trend at the urban grassroots level in which the
effectiveness and legitimacy of the state are actually improved after it loosens its control
by decentralizing power to local communities, actively promoting neighborhood selfgovernance, and even experimenting with grassroots democracy.
On the other hand, urban communities have become increasingly participatory,
institutionalized, and independent from the state. In this process, civic organizations play a
secondary role, since they generally have neither the will nor the capacity to challenge the
state. Although disengagements, non-conformities, and even confrontations occur here and
there, cooperation with the state emerges as a promising trend in urban governance.
Ordinary residents and the state are able to find more common ground than differences.
Neighborhood affairs are not organized around these civic organizations, but the Residents
Committee, which maintains close relations with both the state and residents.
The nature of the neighborhood politics unveiled in this project provides little
ammunition to the traditional interpretation of the committee as merely an instrument of
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state penetration. This should not surprise us, as fewer and fewer China observers still
portray totalitarianism as the defining characteristic of contemporary Chinese politics.
What makes this project interesting is the rather distinctive formats of state-society
interaction very different from what the liberal mantra envisions.
While the evidence allows no easy generalization of this profoundly social
transformation, a consistent pattern in urban neighborhoods is the absence of a so-called
“parliament of the streets” or “parallel polis” as seen in some former communist countries
such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The phenomenon of a network of autonomous civil
organizations as an alternative to a central and repressive state is not present China, despite
her functioning market economy and ever-enlarging social complexity. Among all the
explanations given in this project for neighborhood politics, the civil disobedience model
proves to be the least relevant. Expectations of even a nascent civil society at the urban
grassroots level are premature if not misleading at this time. Such a judgment reflects
reality on the ground as well as the country’s prolonged authoritarian history, including the
thorough domination of the party-state in the new Republic.
The findings of this project have been examined in light of the popularity of the
civil society concept gained particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern
European communist states. Democratization in those countries has partially been
attributed to a rising civil society that carved out critical public space for bottom-up
opposition (Rau, 1991; Tismaneanu, 1990). Proponents of civil society argue that the
concept has universal applicability to the rest of the communist countries (Miller, 1992)
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and other developing countries (Cammack, Pool, and Tordoff, 1988; Migdal, 1988),
despite the different cultures and traditions in individual countries.
Seizing upon the concept of civil society, Western scholars have quickly expressed
enthusiasm in exploring the possibilities of civil society in the Chinese context. Some
focus on the gap between Chinese reality and the ideal type of civil society, and starting
from there, offer their moral criticism of the political establishment in China (Chamberlain,
1993; Madsen, 1993, 1998; McCormick, 1991). Others attempt to discover civil society in
contemporary China (Chan and Nesbitt-Larking, 1995; Chen, 2002; Esherick and
Wasserstrom, 1992; He, 1997; Howell, 1998; Gold, 1990; White, Howell, and Shang,
1996; Kelly and He, 1992; Kluver, Randy and Powers, 1999; Ostergaard, 1989; Perry,
1989; Pye, 1991; Solinger 1993; Strand, 1990; White, 1993b; Yang, 1989; Yang, 2003) or
trace its existence in Chinese history (Bergère, 1997; Kwan, 2001; Rankin, 1986; Rowe,
1984a). While admitting its inadequacies to various degrees, they generally tend to agree
that the civil society concept is a very useful theoretical tool to understand the increasingly
vibrant Chinese society in the reform era.
Echoing this international attention, scholars trained in China have also engaged in
heated discussion on civil society and the political development of China. Ma (1994, p.
192) examined this domestic trend into two groups. The first group, domestic Chinese
theorists, contemplates “the making of a modern citizenry, consisting of law-abiding and
civil members of society.” The second group, exiled Chinese intellectuals, focuses more on
the creation of a private realm that is independent of and contentious with the state. While
the first group initiated the Chinese discourse on civil society by advocating a soft
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interpretation on state-civil society relations, something of a less hostile and more
harmonious interpretation, it has gradually lost its control over the discourse to the second
group (Ma, 1994). The second group’s view is essentially similar to the civil disobedience
model developed from the transitions of communist states in Eastern Europe. “In terms of
social structure, ideology, economic system, public psychology, and in particular the
model of development of civil society, China has more similarities with East European
countries than with East Asian ones” (Su, 1991, p. 35). Liu (1991, p. 8) praises East
European intellectuals for daring “to confront the state and party while maintaining
remarkable self-restraint in the course of their long struggle. They worked hard to develop
a civil society.” Their successful stories should inform their Chinese counterparts that
“China needs a flowering of all kinds of independent organizations, especially free trade
unions, and a strengthening of civil society,” according to Liu (1991, p. 9).
While some scholars have expressed reservations about its applicability in China
(Dean, 1997; Huang, 1993; Moore, 2001; Wakeman, 1993), the civil society concept has
gained paradigmatic status in the Chinese state-society discourse. Interestingly, despite the
Residents Committee’s quietly powerful roles in today’s urban neighborhoods, it has been
largely neglected in this sweeping mantra. However, we can still project the “would-be”
liberal interpretation by looking at how its twin organization, the Villagers Committee, is
understood.
The literature in general has expressed cautious optimism about the
transformational role of the Villagers Committee toward a more open political
environment in rural China (Bai, 1997; Carter Center Delegation Report, 1997, 1998;
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Epstein, 1997; International Republican Institute, 1994, 1997; Oi and Rozelle, 2000; Pastor
and Tan, 2000; Shi, 1999; Wang, 2001; Wang, 1997). It is portrayed as a key organization
channeling groundbreaking democratic practices in rural China, a flawed but nonetheless
genuine democratic element. Within this huge literature, the direct election in the Villagers
Committee has gained particular attention.
The elections have hatched a new elite with firm roots in local society, which may
be able to play an active role in the democratization of Chinese society. The system
of democratic self-government is being established in the rural areas of China
(Wang, pp. 247-252).
While facing criticisms pointing to the authenticity in rural elections, Pastor and
Tan (2000) defend their political significance in a long-term process of democratization.
One should not conclude that they [rural elections] are unfree, unfair, and
meaningless. … It is a process of incremental improvement, and if an election helps
a country move forward on a more civil, democratic path, then it is a satisfactory
election. Within the context of 5,000 years of Chinese authoritarianism, there is no
disputing that village elections represent a significant step toward a freer system,
and many villages have seen improvement with each round of elections (Pastor and
Tan, 2000, p. 506).
They further claim that China is right to start democracy in the rural villages, and
free and competitive elections are the most effective instruments to assure citizen demands
in economic uprisings and downturns (Pastor and Tan, 2000, p. 508, 512).
This liberal scenario is further reinforced with positive evidence as a result of
democratic elections. Oi and Rozelle (2000) discovered that the Villagers Committees after
open elections pursue more open accounting of village spending, and are more accountable
to peasants. O’Brien (2001) finds that free elected committees serve as important sources
of entitlement and inclusion for the bottom-up growing citizenship of peasants. Diamond
and Myers (2000) even believe that village elections have naturally led to experiments at
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the township level with direct election, a mid-term democratization, in which “The
slippage in control, part purposeful and part unexpected for the local authorities, brings
these elections a step closer to a normative vision of electoral representation familiar in
liberal democracies” (Manion, 2000, p. 782; emphasis added).
Although the literature on the Villagers Committee rarely attempts to appeal to the
civil society concept, it treats the committee and rural elections as something near to an
incipient democracy. This passion shares the same root with the paradigmatic status of
civil society in Chinese state-society studies, that is, the liberal mantra to understand the
profound social and political development in China.
While there are a myriad of definitions, those who follow the liberal mantra usually
accept that civil society is, at minimum, an arena of uncoerced associations without the
tutelage of state power. The distinction between civil society and the state consitutes the
key precondition for the role of civil society in modern history. The populance of civil
society has historical roots as a key dogma in the liberal mantra,. A significant reason is
the increase of statist appeals from the late 19th century up to the mid-20th century. This
enthusiasm spurred the state to various forms of erosion, intrusion, and even abolition of
civil society by the state. As a response to the rampant expansion of statism, people
naturally started appealing to the ideal of civil society to analyze and criticize the great
tension between state and society (Keane, 1988). Thus, civil society acquired not only
social and historical urgency, but also reclaimed moral and political attraction.
However, a more significant cause of its prevalence is the dizzying political
transitions in many left-wing and right-wing repressive states in the second half of the 20th
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century, particularly the successful democratization of Eastern European countries and the
former Soviet Union. Rupnik (1979) once called the political development in Poland
between 1968 and 1978 “the end of revisionism and the rebirth of civil society,” i.e., the
result of the bottom-up effort spawned by the idea of civil society.
Opposition in today’s Poland has come to mean independent social activity which
virtually ignores officials institutions … For this reason by opposition we
understand articulate expression of disagreement with official policies by an
organised body whether permanent or not, whether legal or not. By dissent we
understand spontaneous, sporadic or continuous manifestations of dissatisfaction or
disagreement with officials policies in all spheres of social life. Expressions of nonconformity or resistance can often spill over into dissent (Rupnik, 1979, p. 61).
Shils (1991) also attributes the Eastern European transition as being the outcome of
the emergence of civil society ideas. Although the communist states were relatively
successful in dissolving civil societies, they were powerless to erase their ideologies.
Taylor (1990) clearly defines the normative function of civil society in non-democratic
societies.
In societies suffering under Leninist tyranny, it articulated the hopes of those
fighting to open spaces of freedom. Originally, when the chances of doing away
with these power structures altogether seemed remote, the notion “civil society”
expressed a programme of building independent forms of social life from below,
free from state tutelage (Taylor, 1990, p. 95).
Here it is worthy to mention that the majority of Western schools interpret the
social transformation in these communist countries as the triumph of Western values,
ideals, and institutions. A critical assumption of this judgment, in terms of civil society, is
the universal validity of the structural framework, the state-civil society model based upon
the liberal notions, which can cut across spatial, cultural, and historical dimensions. Civil
society should be treated not only as a necessary instrument to resist and/or confront
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absolute power, but also as a prescriptive goal for its own sake (Ash, 1989, p. 246). The
underlying moral imperative is to spread and perpetuate the liberal zeal to both nondemocratic and genuinely free societies across the world.
However, while the liberal mantra is sweeping across the world, it faces an
interesting challenge from the developmental path of China, the one I call the “China
Paradox.” China outperforms many developing countries in terms of her commitment to
the market economy; yet she maintains the strongest political authoritarianism among all
major industrializing countries. This unique concurrence upsets the liberal mantra that
tends to purport the tandem of a free economy and open politics, although the soft-liners
are also willing to consider short-term dynamics besides simple economic determinism
(Przeworski, 1986).
For the liberal mantra, the China Paradox cannot be simply dubbed as an anomaly
resulting from her sheer size and extraordinary progress over the past three decades. To
call it a temporary issue in a long-term transition is equally debatable. If the liberal mantra
could not envision what has happened in China, where is its basis to predict the future, let
alone that three decades are not easily called temporal? If only eighteen percent of Chinese
urban residents thought the communist one-party system should be changed, another six
percent wanted only minor changes, but thirty-one percent did not care as long as life was
improving, and forty-four percent did not want any change at all (Tang, 2001), we have to
ask a question: “What has gone right politically during the economic liberalization in
China for the past three decades?”
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It is fair to say that the liberal mantra faces difficulty in explaining the manner and
velocity through which China has been undergoing change since the late 1970s. The point
here is not to communicate the argument that it fails to account for the Chinese
developmental path. That requires much more intellectual endeavor beyond the scope of
this project. Rather, this investigation strives to tentatively explore the applicability of the
liberal paradigm in light of a particular segment of the China Paradox, grassroots statesociety interactions where politics are absolutely alive and inspiring. Using Khun’s term
(1962), a dominant paradigm is the established “truth” that has won the confidence of the
scientific community. It is then applied to tell what is “scientific” and what is not, as well
as to guide the conduct of research and the appropriate standards for the verification and
evaluation of the findings. This project attempts to explore to what extent civil society, a
key concept in the liberal paradigm, is applicable to the urban grassroots level of China.
Although neighborhood politics is only a drop in the bucket of the gigantic Chinese
society, it refracts important knowledge about the profound transformation that China is
experiencing.
Based on the findings of this project, three tentative lines of argument can be drawn
insofar as grassroots state-society relations and the civil society concept are concerned.
The initial line stems from the nature of the Residents Committee.
Residents Committee, Amphibian Organizations, and State-Society Dichotomy
Given what has been discussed here, it can clearly be seen that the current
functioning and dynamic of the Residents Committee differ from what was envisioned and
intended by the original legal definition as it was found in the previously mentioned
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Organic Law of Urban Residents Committees. It is a grassroots self-governing
organization which represents the interests of its residents, but it also needs to facilitate the
state’s governing initiatives. These two competing purposes undoubtedly have given rise to
a far larger diversity of function vis-à-vis the other Residents Committees in urban China
than has been found even in the four committees studied by this project. Indeed, the four
committees discussed here display such distinct functions and structures that I have had to
use at least three different analytical models in order to discuss them and to place their
dynamics of operation into the larger discourse. The amount of diversity in general (again
in terms of functionality) that has been found prevents a succinct definition of its nature.
This project advocates a descriptive connotation over the nature of the committee.
First, the committee is an intermediary between the state and local residents and is
subject to the simultaneous influence of both. Although the influence from both sides
varies by time and place, the committee is not completely subsumed into either side. It
might lean towards one side or another, yet it acquires a unique existence as an
interlocutor; it is neither a purely state apparatus nor is it a completely independent
grassroots entity. The committee compensates for the state’s inability to micro-manage at
the urban grassroots. Meanwhile, it also offers a viable forum wherein residents can handle
either a large or small number of neighborhood affairs. Recognizing this intermediary
status allows us to discuss the impact that the state and local residents have on the
committee while it also allows us to maintain the integrity of the committee without
reducing it to a simple element of either side.
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Second, as an intermediary, the committee receives recognition from both the state
and local residents, i.e., dual legitimacy. In one way, the state passes laws to legalize the
committee’s status, and provides it with necessary logistical support. In the other way,
ordinary residents generally accept the committee as an integral and leading neighborhood
organization in community affairs.
However, this dual legitimacy does not imply that the committee is equally loyal to
both the state and ordinary residents. Indeed, the general focus of the residents’ committees
in China has been markedly different depending both on the context they are embedded in
and depending on the social and political circumstances confronting them. This fact
prompts discussion about the third feature of the committee. The boundary between the
committee and its upper linkage to the state or between its downward linkage to residents
is neither a clear-cut nor a differentiating one. Indeed, the boundary line is often blurry,
fluid, and dynamic in accordance with each committee’s specific social and political
context. To varying degrees, the state and local residents can penetrate the committee,
construct its boundaries, and shape its structure and function(s). In this sense, the
committee is not a static organization but rather is a malleable and transforming one, one
whose definition and operational focus varies according to its particular historical and
social context. For example, the committee was largely understood as being nothing more
than a social control instrument in the pre-reform totalitarian era. However, such a
conception no longer characterizes the committee appropriately given the current Chinese
context of social expansion, and given the new kind of political authoritarianism that is
found in the country today.
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Finally, the committee is a public-oriented organization. For the state, the
committee is a partner that can help it to implement its national policies and to solve local
problems; for residents, it is a place where they expect to and often can address localized
public concerns. Its public nature—which ultimately derives from its in-between status—
distinguishes the committee from primarily private-oriented institutions, such as the
family, individual businesses, or independent single-focus organizations, all of which do
not have nearly the same kind of in-between status that the committee has.
The above four characteristics together define a unique type of social organization,
one which I will refer to as an “amphibian” organization. The word ‘amphibian’ is
normally used to refer to animals that have an aquatic larval stage and a terrestrial adult
stage. I use this word in order to attempt to capture the transformation that the Residents
Committee has undergone. It was once essentially an instrument of social control and now
it has largely become a quasi-balanced ‘intermediate’ organization. An ‘amphibian’
organization such as the committee cannot appropriately be characterized as an element of
civil society, but neither can it be accurately characterized as an arm of the state. Instead, it
bridges the chasm between state and society, yet is also able to maintain its own distinct
features, its own logic, and its own unique sphere of influence.
The fact of the amphibian nature of the Residents Committee highlights the
inadequacy of the binary thinking that usually dominates discussions of Chinese statesociety studies. But of course, this is not the first time that the failings of binary thinking
have been highlighted. Binary logic is often criticized for its reductive tendencies… for its
intention to draw sharp, straight lines over complicated and rugged social phenomena. For
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example, Montesquieu (2001) dissolved the sharp contrast between state and society by
arguing that the “corps intermédiaire” are “amphibian” bodies that exist both within and
outside of established political structures, and thus function so as to link state and society.
Schumpeter (1968) highlighted the amphibious relationship that exists between institutions
in the process of capitalist “creative destruction.” Habermas (1989) also noted the
existence of a “tension-charged field between the state and society” in his discussion of the
concept of a “bourgeois public sphere.” He described this ‘field’ as a similar concept to
civil society, and as a clear antithesis to state power.
Between the two [state and society] and out of the two, as it were, a repoliticized
social sphere emerged to which the distinction between “public” and “private”
could not be usefully applied (Habermas, 1989, p. 142).
Landing on the ground of Chinese politics, Huang articulates the concept of “the
third realm” to label “the space intermediate between the state and society in which both
participate” (Huang, 1993, p. 224). In contrast to the rigid state-society dichotomy—
The concept of a third realm enables us to talk about those changes [state-society
interactions] in terms of the expansion and institutionalization of a third space,
without being drawn into a simplistic dichotomization between state and society.
We can even speak of the state-ification or societalization of portions of that space
(to take up the hints from Habermas’s analysis of the structural transformation of
the public sphere), without collapsing it into either state or society (Huang, 1993, p.
225; italic added).
As a result of the above-mentioned four features, the Residents Committee can thus
be considered an important component of this third realm. Reducing the committee to
being strictly a part of either the state or civil society oversimplifies the functions and place
of the organization in Chinese politics. Such reductionist thinking thus ignores and
obscures the most dynamic, profuse, and unique interactions that are part of the process of
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grassroots transformation. This is perhaps a major fault of either the purely state-centered
or society-centered approach to discussing local politics. While acknowledging that both
approaches contribute elements of truth, this project supports a trichotomous schema that
also recognizes the amphibian nature of the organization.
Certainly, I am not suggesting that the state-society antithesis is prescriptively
inferior to trichotomous thinking. The “dichotomy vs. trichotomy” distinction simply
refers to disagreement about which tools should be employed in deciding “what is taken
into consideration and what is left out, what weight is assigned to one factor as against
another, which sets of interrelationships are assumed to exist and which will go largely
unnoticed” (Inkeles, 1971, p. 419). These choices are not determined by any preconvictions (or they should not be, anyway) but ultimately by the particular dynamics of
situations that exist on the ground (i.e., their ability to capture the richness of the context,
to sense the nuance, and to adapt time and location).
This binary schema frames most contemporary Chinese state-society debates in one
way or another, whether explicitly or implicitly. Engaging in this kind of thinking has
become particularly tempting in the reform era where political authoritarianism and
economic/social openness coexist. As an analytical tool, the binary schema tends to induce
some intuitively plausible yet empirically debatable propositions, including the idea (1)
that being is composed of two elements; and (2) that the two elements are mutually
exclusive and even conflictive, and hence that they are always in dichotomous opposition
to each other. Applying this kind of thinking onto the complexity of reality in a wholesale
way often leads those who apply it as such to an additional leap of logic; that being the
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idea that reality needs to be primarily understood from the duality of its dichotomous
components. This is the potential fallacy associated with the concise but sometimes
oversimplified idiom of binary thinking.
While scholarly attention is drawn to debating whose influence is greater, the
state’s or the society’s, we run the risk of neglecting scrutiny of the underlying assumption,
that being the monolithicity of the state-society dichotomy. In most cases, this assumption
is not thought to be an assumption at all; it is assumed to be too axiomatic even to be
subjected to debate at all. Given all this, then, let us bring this investigation back around.
Are we merely acknowledging the committee as being a creature of the state, or, at the
other extreme, are we regarding it as the result of processes of social development? Does
Chinese political reality, as we have thus far discussed it, support this either-or scenario?
More importantly, to what extent does binary logic help us to address the central query
here being discussed: how can we best describe the grassroots state-society relationship in
urban China? This study has found that the committee is not strictly an appendage in the
state’s apparatus of control nor is it the result of evolutionary processes of social
transformation. We have to refer to both sides of this argument in order to really
understand the organization and its ultimately amphibian nature. Any such approach is
destined of course to be something of a balancing act, but it is this just this kind of
approach that is best able to capture the dynamic grassroots relationship that exists
between the state and society in today’s China.
Examining the Residents Committee as an amphibian creature provides a new
perspective because it focuses on the interactive dependency that exists between
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movements of both social and political development in China, and it does not become
trapped in any kind of distilled dichotomization. This new perspective is promising not
only because it increases understanding of urban neighborhood politics, but also because of
the widespread existence of go-between organizations that are similar to the Residents
Committee in China. The most obvious alternative is the committee’s rural cousin, the
Villagers Committee, which also ‘intermediates’ between the state and peasants. While the
Residents Committee plays a key role in urban grassroots management, the Villagers
Committee has extremely visible influence in the countryside. 122 The Villagers
Committee’s equally ambiguous status has spurred intense debate about its own nature.
Some of the observers mentioned above treat it as a new kind of grassroots organization
which might be a harbinger of nascent democratization in rural China, while others dismiss
it as being an instrument of the continuation of state-dominated politics (Kennedy, 2002;
O’Brien and Li, 2000). This indeterminacy concerning the nature of the Villagers
Committee suggests the possibility of losing genuinely important information. Indeed, this
may well happen if we ignore the ambiguity and complexity of the organization by
haphazardly employing the binary state-or-society schema.
Another type of neighborhood organization that is closely related to the Residents
Committee is the homeowners’ committees that are becoming more and more common in
commercialized urban communities in China. According to the recently released Property
Management Bylaw [wuye guanli tiaoli] on September 1, 2003, a homeowners committee
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The Villagers Committee controls most economic resources that are crucial to peasants, such as land,
irrigation, school, and road. In contrast, urban residents show much weaker dependence upon the Residents
Committee in terms of basic social and economic welfare.
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consists of several property owner representatives whose main responsibility is to monitor
the consistent fulfillment of the property management company’s service contract
obligations to property owners. Although the homeowners committee is limited in terms of
operational jurisdiction to the area of property management issues, the Bylaw stipulates
that it has to attend to the guidance and supervision faculties of the local Residents
Committee. 123 While acknowledging the potential of the homeowners’ committee to
contribute to Chinese democratization at the grassroots level, Read (2003) also finds that it
has an amphibious nature that is similar to that attributed to the Residents Committee in
this project:
For the most part, the organizers [of the home-owners committees] did not regard
their actions as part of a project of general democratization. They are usually
cautious about offending the government and generally appear willing to cooperate
with local officials and police on many everyday administrative matters, whether to
assure them of their loyalty or because they have no quarrel with the idea of
working closely with the state (Read, 2003, p. 59).
Besides the Villagers Committee and the homeowners committee, White (1993)
discovered ten types of “social organizations” [shehui tuanti] with amphibious
characteristics existing inside the urban ecology of a coastal city in China. He found that
these organizations constituted “a crucial communications channel between a state organ
and the organization’s members, thereby helping the state to get across ideological points
or specific policies” (White, 1993b, p. 79). 124 These organizations extend the reach of the
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The number of the homeowners committees is relatively few and their real impacts are still not clear. The
two completely privately owned communities I visited, the Jingtai Community and the Sinmiao
Condominium, have not established their homeowners committees yet. It is interesting to see the future status
of this new organization in neighborhood governance, particularly its relationship with the Residents
Committee and local governments.
124
They include political, economic, science and technology, arts, culture, social welfare, social clubs, public
affairs, health, and sports.
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state, providing a critical mechanism of coordination. Additionally, these organizations
also look significantly like embryonic forms of civil society, according to White’s
reckoning. Unger (1996, pp. 819-819) finds that the Federation of Industry & Commerce, a
newly emerged business association in Beijing representing large private interests, has
neither reached the degree of independence from state domination nor the degree of input
from below that is generally associated with societal corporatism. Instead, it provides a
critical coordinating mechanism between the state and its members.
Similar organizations of ambiguous status have also been widely documented to
exist and operate in many other areas of Chinese social and political life. For example,
Chinese economic reform has been widely interpreted to be a state-initiated process in
which many business players have maintained close connections to many entities of
governments (Liu, 1992; Oi, 1986; Solinger, 1992; Yang, 1989). Even many private
enterprises, which have traditionally been considered to have clear division lines with the
state display some amphibian characteristics.
In brief, many non-state businesses have state or collective bodies as their
supervisors, party-state officials as their bosses, and official institutions as their
profit-sharers. The intricate interlocking of government and business in China
makes it difficult for some scholars to determine whether the type of enterprises
recently established is in the ‘state’ or in ‘society’ (Ding, 1994, p. 312).
Furthermore, scholars also find similar institutional ambiguity in labor unions
(Zhang, 1997), religious organizations (Dean, 1997), universities (Hayhoe and Zhong,
1997), and even some state-run institutions, such as those of the media (Ding, 1994) and
the Women's Federation (Howell, 1996).
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While it might be true that not all such organizations can be called “amphibian
organizations,” as in the case of the Residents Committee, their dual characteristics span
the state-society spectrum and qualify them as at least quasi-amphibian organizations. And
these participate in a large amount of state-society interactions. A key conclusion of this
project is that the Residents Committee needs to be interpreted by its structural connections
to both the state and residents. It suggests that those organizations with ambiguous status
might be better understood if we treat them as intermediaries rather than as surrogates of
either the state or society. By focusing on the linkages and interactions between these
intermediaries, it is contended here that we can come away with a better understanding of
the intricacy of the state-society relationship in contemporary China.
State and Chinese State-Society Relations
The second line of inquiry addressed by this study involves the reevaluation of the
role of the Chinese state in the process of social construction. This investigation suggests
that greater attention should be paid to the state, not regarding its activities or tendencies
that have curbed the development of civil society, but instead regarding its formative and
directive role in social construction. There is a clear distinction between Western and
Chinese conceptions of the state, and these distinct conceptions need to be attended to. The
Chinese state has successfully built and communicated an effective moral
subconsciousness over its past three millennia of authoritarian history. That is, it has
conveyed itself as a necessity of public interest and a paternalistic super-arbitrator and
director. For ordinary Chinese, there is no “bad” state, but only “bad” rulers who usurp and
abuse the power of the state. Compared with the Western tradition, where social demands
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for representation within and against the state have been key elements of moral conviction,
the Chinese state carries a far more salient role in constructing the moral world inside
which it is itself interpreted.
In China, … the concept of society as a locus of legitimate public action has little
moral terrain on which to stand that has not already been appropriated by the state
or effectively delegitimized by state ideology (Brook, 1997, p. 20).
The sanctity of the state fundamentally frames the political development of China.
It also effectively blocks the emergence of alternatives that would suggest different ways
that the state and society should be associated. However, the formative and commanding
state in the Chinese context is easily distorted and misplaced in the liberal mantra. The
mantra largely adopts a view that polarizes society against the state. This derives from a
belief that society is larger and morally more legitimate than the state or is superior to the
state. This Western concept has its own unique history and intellectual context of
formation. In particular, the concept in its most popular manifestation denotes the necessity
for there to be a counterbalancing element to the state in order for a functioning democracy
to exist, or in order for a viable transition to democracy to take place.
The distinction between civil society and the state is indeed important to the
Western history, but more especially because it has been central to the different
forms of counter-absolutist thinking. Indeed, it owes its existence and relevance to
the development in the West of reforming absolutism, of what has been called “the
well-ordered police state” in the 17th and 18th centuries. It made no more sense in
the context of the polis, or the mediaeval polity, than it did in a host of traditional
non-Western polities (Taylor, 1990, pp. 115-116).
Indeed, the prominent status of the state in China can be extended to characterize a
common political pattern in East Asia, that of an Asian communitarianism that
significantly differs from the state-society division that has developed in the West. In East
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Asian countries, “the greater good was ideally manifested in a consensus overseen by the
moral authority of the leadership, reflected in a moralistic father-knows-best paternalism”
(Unger and Chan, 1995, p. 33). The division between the state and society and the
assertion of independent moral decision, upheld by the Western tradition, is often
portrayed as disharmonious and selfish in East Asia. Dependent relations between society
and the state are morally desirable and thus perpetuated in countries like China.
In Neo-Confucian societies where the public sphere has been created by and from
the state and not from the private sphere there remain few limits to the state and
there are few opportunities for individuals to play multiple roles (such as the ‘role’
of the independent citizen) in Asian society. They cannot easily ‘drop out.’ They
are always expected to behave as political participants in their communities, and
the state has a right to intrude into their ‘private lives’ in ways which the
hypothesized, individualistic, capitalist-liberal democratic citizen would not accept
(Australian-Asian Perceptions Project , 1993, p. 8).
Therefore, applying the concept of civil society to China without critically
acknowledging the above distinction might incur two potential fallacies. First, it shifts the
authoritarian state from being a presiding player over society to being a target that is
subject to revolt from the social bottom, whether that revolt be peaceful or confrontational.
Second, it downplays the proportional amount of the state’s strategic power in the statesociety construction. Many analysts have probably been surprised by the resilience of the
Chinese state’s legitimacy and relevancy in the post reform era. Their surprise is
understandable insofar as both of the above fallacies are particularly alluring, especially as
they have appeared to work as explanations for democratic development in recent times.
Indeed, civil society has demonstrated tremendous transformative capacity in the cases of
some of the former communist states of Eastern Europe. It is not clear to what extent these
states enjoyed the moral legitimacy and/or the anticipated superiority over society that the
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Chinese state does. But one thing is certain: The Chinese state is not merely a target of
transformation; it is indeed a dominantly formative force in the state-society construction.
Civil Society and Chinese State-Society Relations
The third line of investigation in this project directly relates to the concept of civil
society. Did or does China possess civil society? This question is of key importance in
transplanting the concept of civil society to China. If the answer is negative, the
transplantation becomes baseless, except as a tool of moral critique for a “China’s
responses to the West” mentality (Farquhar and Hevia, 1992). Frankly, this type of moral
critique, driven by ideological convictions rather than facts, is useless for understanding
the reality of what is actually happening in China. This is why the liberal school tries hard
to rake Chinese society for positive evidence of civil society.
The search for civil society in China peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s and
has kept its momentum ever since. A typical and perhaps debatable finding thus far has
been that an embryonic or approximated civil society has existed in China at least since the
time of the last Chinese imperial era, the Qing Empire (1644-1911). Rowe (1984a and
1984b), whose works are considered milestones in the excavation of China for civil society,
champions this trend. He finds that Hankou, one of the early cities exposed to and
assimilated to European cultural norms in the mid 19th century, “had come to look very
like the familiar Western conception of preindustrial, urban, commercial capitalist
society,” as a result of a “general trend toward social and economic pluralism” (Rowe,
1984a, pp. 120-121). This vibrant society showed “the steady development of organized,
corporate-style civil action and the proliferation of a wide range of philanthropic and
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public service institutions,” including organizations like guilds and guild federations, local
gentry, and various merchants (Rowe, 1984b, p. 5).
This discovery is exciting for the liberal school in part because it reaffirms the
tandem extant facts of a capitalist economy and social and political openness. 125 If civil
society dated as far back as the imperial Qing Empire, why should we not expect the
continued rise of civil society today when the conditions have been much improved for it
vis-à-vis political and sociological openness? Standing on this liberal position, such
expectation gives no cause for more criticism. However, the question itself, “Did or does
China possess civil society?” is immersed in the hidden values that underlie the concept of
civil society. If compelled or obliged by those values, we would fall into the trap of
unwary positivism. We may assume the Western experiences as a matter of course, which
would then transcend the different social and political paths that different cultures,
countries, and contexts. Pushed to extreme, the whole process of ‘discovering’ civil society
in China becomes nothing more than the application of an assumed universal norm onto a
context that is essentially distinct from the one where the original norm emerged.
To be fair, this project has found elements of civil society in China, such as
neighborhood senior associations and diversionary clubs. But their activities cannot
represent what really matters in grassroots state-society interactions. There is a qualitative
distinction between these isolated civil elements and a civil society, which we often define
as the totality of widespread similar organizations or institutions that are strong enough to
assert influence over social development and the public interest. The attempt to “discover”
125

Some even argue that the liberal tradition, which is equivalent to Western civil society, has existed long
before the Qing Empire, as part of Chinese culture (Bary, 1983).
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a functioning civil society in contemporary China might risk taking an irrelevant and
fictitious direction away from the reality of social and political development at the urban
grassroots level. Its imaginative existence can only be treated as a heuristic instrument
invented after the fact for positivist purposes.
In reality, the absence of civil society fundamentally challenges the concept’s
utility. For those positivists who adhere to the liberal mantra, it will not be easy to admit
that the concept is neither a factual entity nor an established political institution in China.
However, even the most ardent advocates agree that this presumed Chinese civil society, if
it is real, dramatically falls short of what it should be. Being that it is indisputable that
Chinese society is nothing close to being self-generating, self-supporting, and autonomous
from the state, the persistence of some to “discover” civil society in China can only be
interpreted as either priggish or wishful thinking. William Row later admitted that moral
advocacy underlay his construction of civil society in later imperial China.
My own persistent attempt to describe later imperial Chinese society in terms of the
European historigraphic construction ‘early modern’ has not met with universal
approval (Rowe, 1993, p. 140).
The proscriptive term “civil society” has led to biased interpretations of ambiguous
evidence, even if it has been unintended as such; and teleological suggestions have
surfaced that seem antithetical to the overall picture.
The concept [civil society] is at once too value laden and too under-defined to be
effective use, and consequently the outcome of any search to discover (or invent) it
in China can amount to little more than passing a blanket value judgment on the
Chinese past, based on expectations generated, justifiably or not, from our own
local experience (Rowe, 1993, p. 154; italic added).
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The above concerns go to the heart of the paradigmatic transplantation. How do we
treat the value system(s) underlying our inquiry? Any political theory, regardless of its
ostensibly value-neutral claim, is bounded with normative value(s), as is any political
researcher. What matters here is whether the researcher is straightforward with his moral
bias, whether he explicitly or implicitly proceeds from intuitive presumptions or from
empirical study, and how the evidence incongruent to his moral conviction is handled and
interpreted. While no one really debates the constitutive value of civil society to the
Western democracies, the argument that the concept then acquires universal validity is
deeply questionable. Even more questionable is the indiscriminate application of this
prescriptive concept as heuristic guidance onto a country with a very unique history and
with very distinct social, cultural, and political features.
Since the fade-out of the capitalism vs. socialism debate of the early 1990s, the
liberal mantra has naturally acquired a paradigmatic status in contemporary political
inquiry. The tandem relationship of the market economy and democracy persists as a core
assumption of the liberal mantra, although it has received much criticism (Huntington,
1968). When applied to state-society studies, the prescription easily falls under two types
of teleological logic. First, the liberal mantra maintains that a penetrative state will give
rise to a thriving civil society. It has done so in some countries, and will eventually do so
in others. This logic openly identifies itself with the moral purpose of the liberal mantra
and it is clear exactly where it is headed. The second logic is subtler and is disguised with
ostensibly “value-neutral” labels, and is therefore more commonly seen in research. It
maintains that civil society will inevitably be present subsequent to the emergence of one
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element—a market economy. If the process did not happen before, it will eventually. This
logic reduces the complex and organic process of political development to being dependent
on a singular, covariate (if not causal) relationship between an economic system and civil
society.
While both lines of logic advocate different arguments, they stem from the same
prescription encapsulated in a three-way relationship: the three partners are a liberalized
economy in harness with the rise of civil society independent from the state, and incipient
democracy. The idea of civil society thus carries too many teleological and reductionist
implications. Without being conscious of this fact, we run the risk of seeing the Chinese
reality as a mirror image of the reality experienced by the West. In the face of just such a
risk is where the China Paradox can sound the alarm. The China Paradox contributes a real
phenomenon that the liberal mantra would assume to be a contradiction. It exposes and
perhaps even challenges the underlying assumptions regarding the empirical validity of the
liberal mantra’s universal application. Specifically, the China Paradox challenges
paradigmatic transplantation by questioning the assumed economic-political tandem; that
is, why has China established a market economy yet seen little indication of a rising civil
society? This empirical contradiction helps elicit critical reflection of the often unspoken
assumptions behind the liberal mantra.
If this project can provide any insight in this direction, it is in its illustration of the
incongruence of the pattern observed with the liberal mantra. It does this by exploring a
segment of the state-society relationship—that being the arena of neighborhood politics as
found around the entity of the Residents Committee. The committee is a type of unnoticed
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organization in state-society studies that can better emancipate one from moral attachments
than the more macro and politically sensitive institutions can. The dense and often fuzzy
evidence found at the urban grassroots level challenges the well-developed and
straightforward paradigmatic conviction that civil society rises in concert with the process
of economic liberalization. It opens up the possibility of there being a fresh interpretation
without the constraints of a presumed position. It helps open a window on the China
Paradox through which empirical reality contradictory to the dominant paradigm can be
and is in fact perceived… and hopefully conceptualized more and more adequately as the
window becomes larger.

During my last conversation with Ms. Li Lan in her home shortly before I wrapped
up the field trip, I asked about her personal plan for the future. Surprisingly, she decided to
retire as the director of the Dejia Residents Committee in 2006. According to the Pudong
Street Office, all fourteen committees, including the Dejia, should be directly elected in
2006. The street office prefers local residents in new committees, although outsiders like
Ms. Li Lan could still serve if they received enough votes. Given Ms. Li Lan’s reputation
and previous performance, she would not have had to worry about her post in the coming
election. Indeed, she assured me that was not the reason forcing her to go. What drove her
decision was work fatigue. She told me,
Community affairs are very exhausting. I have worked here for more than seven
years, and I increasingly feel ‘my ability not equal to my ambition’ [libu congxin].
The government exerts constant pressure for better quality of service. Meanwhile,
you are facing endless requests from residents. I have done a lot. However, I
always feel much more lies ahead. There have been too many changes over the
years. I am too tired to handle any more. I ‘have a clear conscience’ [wenxin wukui]
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and can face the government and residents without the slightest guilt. But I will be
52 in 2006 and cannot endure ‘toss and turn’ [zheteng] any more.
Unlike the vigorous and ambitious character she displayed at her workplace, her
voice turned to being somewhat weary when she began discussing her future. The pressure
from the heavy workload has certainly contributed to her fatigue, but the uncertainty
involved with the future of the committee has clearly imposed even more influence on her.
She personally did not agree with the across-the-board approach to adopting direct election
for all committees in 2006. Given apathy from many residents, she worried that direct
election would only become a perfunctory show without producing a substantive boost for
the committee’s performance. Indeed, she told me several times about her disapproval of
the newly direct elected Shiyan Residents Committee, considering it to be not so useful.
Perhaps constrained by overconfidence in her committee’s performance or the
instinctive opposition that all men and women have to new developments, Ms. Li Lan was
somewhat reluctant to recognize the rather salient and meaningful changes that have taken
place in the Shiyan Residents Committee. Apparently, she was faintly aware of the
predicament wherein the coming changes would challenge her way of operating the
committee about which she felt so much pride. Being a government employee, Ms. Li Lan
always seemed to maintain some sense of superiority over ordinary residents and
particularly over the rest of committee members. Her official background also facilitated
the management of her committee and neighborhood affairs. However, direct election will
put her fate in the hands of Dejia residents. To compete with some ordinary residents in
2006 for the director position she had already held for so long would be a personal
embarrassment, if not a minor assault. If she loses in the election for whatever reason, that

335

would be an even greater humiliation. Therefore, although regrettable, resignation by 2006
might be a real relief for her physically as well as psychologically. This scenario certainly
seems to be preferable to her stepping into what she sees to be an adventure in “selfnegation.”
Ms. Li Lan’s decision partially reflects her silent opposition to what she deemed as
the unnecessary but imminent policy of direct election initiated by the street office.
However, she might not realize that the policy is only one puny episode of a much wider
and more profound transformational drama that is taking place in China: i.e. the
realignment of the state-society relationship that must be undergone so as to cope with
deepening economic liberalization and persistent political authoritarianism. Thanks to the
burst of reform era commercialization, Chinese cities have never been as dynamic and
expansive—or as stratified and volatile—as they are today. Opportunities march abreast
with crises as the “market beast” collides with the once stagnant and tightly controlled
urban society of China. Many urban residents have been witness to the rapid advancement
of their quality of lives; yet, considerable social and economic problems also have arisen in
the cities, those such as are presented by increased crime, unemployment, and the floating
population. Ever since the reform era got underway, the state has helped unleash the
energy inherent to Chinese society. However, the process that was set in motion at the
beginning of the reform era is now imposing increasingly poignant challenges on its own
sustainability. The total and comfortable control over society that the state once had has
been gradually dissolved, as commercialization has eroded the social and political
functions of the various working units that were once the basis of urban control. The
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diminishing state is facing a rapidly growing but tension-charged society. Both of the
actors in this problem, however, need to adjust to what is occurring and prepare for what
lies ahead. Their relationship (and its realignment) will be key for the continued
development of the country.
What faces Ms. Li Lan is direct election, a particular policy change that most
Residents Committees, such as the Jingtai and Huashan, will not encounter soon. However,
since they are amphibian organizations located between the state and urban residents, they
will all be put in the teeth of the same beast of transformation that was discussed above. In
this sense, Ms. Li Lan’s uncertainty towards her committee essentially involves the larger
question of acclimating the committee to the rapidly changing urban environment so that it
may continue to be a viable channel for the interests of both the state and urban society.
The committee is the key “middleman” between the state and residents in cities,
one whose logic can only be understood by looking to its interactions. Looking back on the
history of the Residents Committee, it is easy to see that the committee was primarily an
instrument of social control when the party-state nearly penetrated society completely.
Rapid commercialization has today insulated society from the state’s total domination,
which in turn has contributed to the rapid expansion of the purview of the committee. The
four committees in this project perform rather unique combinations of functionalities so as
to link urban governments with local residents. Because of this, it is clear that the
committee displays much more ambiguity and complexity today than it did before. It truly
is a reflection of the multiple possibilities stemming from the broad-based transformation
in which the forces of social/economic openness and political authoritarianism are
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attempting to reconcile themselves to each other in the context of contemporary China. If
any prediction were to be made, a well-known “platitude” that many members of the
Residents Committees cite repeatedly might provide a useful clue as to the what the future
may hold for this amphibian organization and for the grassroots state-society relationship
in China: “From above, the government’s concerns are ours, and from below, the
difficulties of every man are ours to help them through” [shang wei zhengfu fenyou; xia
wei baixing jienan].
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Glossary of Terms
ARR: Assembly of Residential Representatives
CCP: Chinese Communist Party
CDR: Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (Cuba)
HPMC: Huaxia Property Management Company
MCA: Ministry of Civil Affairs
MIA: Ministry of Internal Affairs
NPC: National People’s Congress
PRC: People’s Republic of China
SWS: Social Work Station
YMCA: Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association of Tianjin City
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